Will Jiang Zemin step down?<\/p>\n
Natalia Soebagyo, Board Member, Center for Chinese Studies,
\nJakarta<\/p>\n
Now that the date for the 16th Congress of the Chinese
\nCommunist Party (CCP) has been confirmed for Nov. 8, speculation
\nis high about what will President Jiang Zemin do. Will he or
\nwon't he step down gracefully as the Party secretary-general?
\nWhat is important to note is the attempt of CCP leaders to secure
\nan orderly political succession. How serious are they?<\/p>\n
No doubt the changes in China's domestic situation and demands
\nof the international community require a Chinese leadership that
\nis not only more savvy about the outside world, but also more
\nattuned to the dynamics of a fast-changing Chinese society.<\/p>\n
Since its accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO),
\nChina is a full-fledged and recognized member of the
\ninternational economic community and therefore has to act
\naccordingly.<\/p>\n
Chinese society has also changed; the individual in China has
\ngreater freedom now to pursue his aspirations. There is, to a
\ncertain extent, greater freedom of expression allowed and urban
\nlife especially is very vibrant.<\/p>\n
There are surely still many unresolved issues related to the
\nblind pursuit of economic development while having to
\nsimultaneously build the necessary institutions for supporting
\nsuch rapid development. Corruption is rampant, state-owned
\nenterprises are saddled by debt, the number of private
\nenterprises continue to grow and the public is increasingly more
\ncritical. Chinese society is therefore now much more complex.<\/p>\n
Deng Xiaoping had anticipated this and not long after he
\nassumed power he began to put in place a system for orderly
\npolitical succession, realizing full well that institutionalizing
\nsuccession in a Leninist system is no easy task. He started the
\nprocess by handpicking his successors early, by encouraging his
\npeers to retire and by emphasizing the importance of institutions
\nand clear procedures in the management of the politics of the
\nelite.<\/p>\n
He also began limiting his importance within the system so
\nthat his departure would not be too disruptive. Thus, he gave up
\ntwo of the top three positions, namely the premiership and head
\nof the party.<\/p>\n
However, as rivalry among the political elite became more
\nacute, Deng subsequently purged his handpicked successors, first
\nHu Yaobang in 1987 and then Zhao Ziyang after the Tiananmen
\nincident in 1989. He also kept his position as chairman of the
\npowerful Military Affairs Commission.<\/p>\n
It was clear that there was, and still is, a big difference
\nbetween real power and formal position and that the institution-
\nbuilding process was not going very far. Hence, Deng did not
\nfollow through his succession strategy as he had originally
\nintended.<\/p>\n
Jiang Zemin's appointment was Deng's third and last attempt to
\nsecure the party's leadership. In the aftermath of the Tiananmen
\nincident, Deng's options were limited. Other members of the
\nPolitburo Standing Committee had either been too lenient or too
\nharsh towards the Tiananmen demonstrators and Jiang Zemin was
\nseen as a safe bet, a solid party member who had steadily risen
\nin the ranks through a series of steady promotions despite
\nlacking the revolutionary credentials.<\/p>\n
Over the years, Jiang has emerged as a leader who began his
\nterm as secretary-general cautiously, but who over the years has
\nproven capable of weathering the storm, setting the middle ground
\nbetween those on the left who espouse upholding socialism and
\nthose on the right who have no qualms over so-called \"bourgeois
\nliberalization.\" He has come into his own as a political leader.<\/p>\n
This confidence is reflected in Jiang Zemin's desire to attain
\nthe same stature as his predecessors by trying to make his \"Three
\nRepresents\" theory part of party doctrine. By doing so he is
\nasking the Party to represent the fundamental interests of the
\nbroad masses of the Chinese people, not simply representing the
\nvanguard of the working class.<\/p>\n
The \"Three Represents\" is a theory which ideologically
\njustifies the emergence of the new capitalists in China, making
\nthe CCP a more open, almost an \"all people's party\".<\/p>\n
As the 16th CCP Congress draws near, analysts wonder whether
\nin this coming congress Jiang Zemin will tackle the issue of
\npolitical reform and succession from the \"third\" generation to
\nthe \"fourth\" generation of China's leadership.<\/p>\n
Membership of the Politburo Standing Committee was determined
\nmonths ago and many scenarios have been raised about who will be
\nthe next core. One scenario is that Jiang Zemin will relinquish
\nhis position and hand over the baton to Hu Jintao, thus carrying
\nout a smooth transition. Another scenario has Jiang Zemin
\nstepping down only if Li Peng, Zhu Rongji and others of his
\ngeneration relinquish power too.<\/p>\n
If the CCP is serious about establishing a system of orderly
\npolitical succession, Jiang Zemin would not be given the
\nopportunity to retain his power. He currently is president, Party
\nsecretary-general and chairman of the Central Military
\nCommission. The Constitution limits the Presidency to two terms
\nand Jiang Zemin is nearing the end of two terms.<\/p>\n
He has also been Party secretary-general for longer than two
\nterms. Besides, he is 76 and if he doesn't step down it would irk
\nspeaker for National People's Congress Qiao Shi who grudgingly
\nwithdrew in 1997 when Jiang asked all those over 70 to step
\ndown.<\/p>\n
If he insists on staying on the scene, he could always extend
\nhis term as chairman of the CMC or revive the position of Party
\nchairman, which Deng abolished in 1982.<\/p>\n
But unfortunately for Jiang, he has already promised to
\nwithdraw from the scene by the end of this year.<\/p>\n
To induce him to step down, the trade-off could be for the
\nParty to officially incorporate the \"Three Represents\" into Party
\ndoctrine.<\/p>\n
All this speculation proves that political succession in China
\nis still an opaque process and that the law of men still prevails
\nover the rule of law; but hopefully the trend is going in the
\nright direction.<\/p>\n
One can only assume that political reform in China, as with
\neconomic reform, will be slow and incremental, nudged along by
\nreformist elements both within and without the CCP.<\/p>",
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