Will Amnesty's campaign on RI be useful?<\/p>\n
By Dino Patti Djalal<\/p>\n
LONDON (JP): Amnesty International's campaign on Indonesia
\ndates a long way back, but what sets its apart at present is its
\nferocity. So fierce, in fact, that it has raised some eyebrows
\namong those who see nothing dramatically new occurring in
\nIndonesia these days.<\/p>\n
To this, Amnesty officials would typically cite the cases of
\nthe recent closure of three magazines or that of labor activist
\nMochtar Pakpahan. Although it is clear that labor relations and
\nthe relationship between the government and the media remain
\nproblematic, it is indeed difficult to believe that these issues
\nshould warrant Amnesty's allocation of such lavish resources on
\nits Indonesia concern.<\/p>\n
There are dozens of other countries, including the developed
\nworld, that face the same issues. Moreover, although Indonesia's
\nhuman rights condition remains imperfect, it is certainly a far
\ncry from the bleak, venomous Orwellian image portrayed in
\nAmnesty's reports.<\/p>\n
In a recent television interview during a campaign stop in
\nNew Zealand, Amnesty International Secretary-General Pierre Sane
\ndefended his organization's report by saying: \"The information is
\nnot denied by the Indonesian government.\"<\/p>\n
Sane was mistaken, for the Indonesian government has
\nexplicitly called Amnesty's reports \"replete with falsehoods and
\nmalicious representations and so obviously a contradiction of the
\nfacts\".<\/p>\n
Similar disapproval was also voiced by Australia's Foreign
\nMinister Gareth Evans, who stated that in regards to Indonesia
\noverall and East Timor in particular, Amnesty's reports were \"not
\nobjective or measured or balanced\". He accused them of \"gathering
\nevery bit of conceivable ammunition, dressing them up and
\narticulating them in the strongest possible way...producing
\nmisleading results\".<\/p>\n
When asked about the doubts cast upon Amnesty's work, Sane's
\ndefense was to accuse these other governments of a \"cover-up\". He
\nadded: \"silent so-called diplomacy is really condoning what is
\ngoing on in Indonesia, ...they are praising the government (of
\nIndonesia) and distorting the facts.\"<\/p>\n
The implication of his statement was clear: anybody who
\ndisagrees with Amnesty is wrong and must have something up his or
\nher sleeve. There was an unmistakable rage of self-righteousness,
\na holier-than-thou attitude driven by an impression that Amnesty
\nalone monopolizes concern for human rights as well as accurate
\ninformation on Indonesia.<\/p>\n
This month, Amnesty International was forced to issue a formal
\napology to the Indian government after having published
\nfabricated photographs of what was alleged to have been human
\nrights abuse in Kashmir. (An independent commission in India, set
\nup to investigate the photos, determined that the pictures had
\nnothing to do whatsoever either with Kashmir or human rights
\nviolations).<\/p>\n
Though Amnesty officials insisted they were cheated and that
\nthe photographs were printed 'in good faith', it does show that
\nthe organization's work, in what is an exceedingly emotive
\nbusiness, can be quite vulnerable to propaganda and politically
\nopportunistic materials.<\/p>\n
Already the Indonesians are flabbergasted by Amnesty's
\nobjection to the country's political structure. This was received
\nin Jakarta as a sign that Amnesty is now, as the Foreign
\nMinistry's Director for Information Irawan Abidin formally wrote
\nto Pierre Sane, \"waging a political campaign under the banner of
\nhuman rights\" and that \"by waging this political campaign,
\n(Amnesty has) in fact abandoned the objective of promoting human
\nrights and adopted a political agenda as well as a political
\nobjective\".<\/p>\n
The Indonesians are also outraged by Amnesty's assertion that
\nthe New Order is the product of a \"military coup\" (as opposed to
\nan aborted communist coup). They ask, how can Amnesty get the
\ndetails right when even on the basics they are wrong?<\/p>\n
By rewriting the most poignant chapter of Indonesian history,
\nquestions are raised as to whether there is any point listening
\nto an organization which is permanently negative on Indonesia and
\nincapable of appreciating Indonesia's efforts and progress.<\/p>\n
The Indonesian government is now in the midst of
\ninternalizing a culture of human rights, a process which involves
\nraising human rights awareness and its implementation in the day-
\nto-day business of governing. This, surprisingly, is a trend that
\nAmnesty has failed to capture in its reports.<\/p>\n
One example was the convening of the UN Second Asia Pacific
\nWorkshop on Human Rights early in 1993. The workshop focused on
\nallowing the multi-national delegates to share their experiences
\nin human rights work and discussing the technicalities of
\nproblem-solving. This was to be done in a cooperative way,
\nwithout engaging in condemnatory attacks on each other.<\/p>\n
The non-confrontational approach was effective because it
\nneutralized the defense mechanisms of all delegates and set the
\nright mood for no-nonsense discussions on how to best promote
\nhuman rights.<\/p>\n
In any case, it was quite apparent during the workshop that
\nIndonesian officials were extremely keen to learn from the
\nexperience of other countries, and the varying input from these
\nforeign experts proved constructive for the subsequent
\nestablishment of the National Commission for Human Rights in June
\n1993.<\/p>\n
In October 1994, a second National Workshop on Human Rights
\nwas convened, where frank, grueling discussions took place in a
\nstretch of three days on how to best advance human rights in
\nIndonesia. On Oct. 26, 1994, a memorandum of intent was signed by
\nthe government and the UN Human Rights Commissioner on the mutual
\nagreement to cooperate in the development and implementation of a
\ncoherent and comprehensive national program for the promotion and
\nprotection of human rights in Indonesia.<\/p>\n
The two agreed to \"cooperate fully ...towards the development
\nand furtherance of an effective national plan of action for human
\nrights in Indonesia, consistent with the recommendations of the
\nVienna Declaration and Program of Action of 1993\".<\/p>\n
The government is also working closely with the International
\nCommission of the Red Cross (ICRC). Because the ICRC conducts its
\nhumanitarian work on a non-publicity and non-political basis, it
\nhas won the confidence of the central government and local
\nauthority. As a result, it has unrestricted access to areas of
\ninterest, including access to prisoners and detainees. The ICRC
\nis therefore in a communicative relationship to notify the
\nrelevant authorities of discrepancies and of what corrective
\nmeasures can be taken.<\/p>\n
When I visited East Timor in November 1994, Symeon Antoulas,
\nthe ICRC man in that province, told me that he had developed
\n\"excellent cooperation\" with the local authorities, and that it
\nwas a cooperation marked by mutual trust and confidence. Reminded
\nof a past problem, I asked him if I could quote him on that; he
\nsaid, \"by all means\".<\/p>\n
Genuine and honest efforts are being undertaken by the
\ngovernment to improve human rights in Indonesia. In a country
\nwith such complexities and sensitivities as Indonesia, this is a
\nlong-term enterprise. Human rights problems, like the disease of
\ncorruption, do not go away overnight nor with high and mighty
\nrhetoric.<\/p>\n
Amnesty International, at a crucial time, is losing a
\nvaluable chance to help contribute to Indonesia's human rights
\nefforts. Amnesty's high-profile campaign may well be successful
\nin rallying millions of its own members around the world and in
\nexciting scores of politicians. This, however, is a sideshow and
\nnot a yardstick.<\/p>\n
Essentially, Amnesty's campaign is regarded as a big turn-off
\nfor the Indonesian government who, according to Amnesty's own
\naccount, was beginning to warm up to the organization.<\/p>\n
This is not the first criticism of its kind towards Amnesty.
\nAmnesty's recent campaign on Colombia, furnished with eye-
\ncatching advertisements, was stung last year by British
\nParliamentarian Tristan Garel-Jones, who has done human rights
\nwork on that country. Garel-Jones criticized Amnesty's work for
\ntoo much fanfare \"rather than a serious attempt to work in
\npartnership with friendly democratic states whose aims and
\nobjectives are ours but whose resources are less.\"<\/p>\n
Amnesty's current campaign on Indonesia will inevitably die
\ndown and foreign governments will not be easily influenced. This
\nis not because Indonesia is strategically and economically
\nimportant to them, but because they can rely on their resident
\ndiplomats who keep their ears to the ground.<\/p>\n
When Amnesty does decide to ease up on Indonesia, its
\nofficials will pat each other on the back for the damage they've
\ninflicted on Indonesia's international image. But they should
\nhave no illusion about the real picture: While they were busy
\ntrumpeting on the international circuit, others were doing all
\nthe real work in Indonesia to improve human rights -- and Amnesty
\ndid not make a difference.<\/p>\n
That, in the end, is a very sad story.<\/p>\n
The writer is a regular contributor to The Jakarta Post.<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/will-amnestys-campaign-on-ri-be-useful-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }