Why national elections will not be democratic in Aceh<\/p>\n
Otto Syamsuddin Ishak, Civil Society Alliance for Democracy (Yappika),
\nJakarta<\/p>\n
Pro-democracy activists are convinced that as a political
\nsystem, democracy also serves as a mechanism capable of
\ntransforming a violent clash (war) into a peaceful conflict.
\nThis, however, is only true if people are allowed to live by
\ndemocratic values, including pluralism, tolerance, transparency
\nand negotiation.<\/p>\n
In the context of Aceh, now firmly under martial law, the
\nquestions have arisen about the possibility of whether the
\ngeneral election of 2004 will proceed democratically. Anyone
\ncommitted to democracy will return with the query: Do the
\nAcehnese live in an atmosphere imbued with the social ethics of
\npluralism, tolerance, openness and negotiation?<\/p>\n
This atmosphere involves horizontal social relations between
\nindividuals and groups, as well as vertical relations between
\nindividuals and groups on one side and the government on the
\nother.<\/p>\n
Under normal circumstances, social relations in Aceh are
\negalitarian in nature. But under martial law -- in which the
\nlocal administration is in the hands of soldiers from outside --
\negalitarian relationships are being changed into those
\ncharacterized by commanded centralism, a polarization and the
\nspirit of destruction.<\/p>\n
In an undemocratic militaristic government system, people have
\nno sovereignty. Social structures are subordinate to military
\nranks. The local people have to become part of the separatist
\nmovement or the militaristic nationalists. Under such conditions,
\nfloating masses will follow the agenda set forth for them by the
\nmilitary authorities. For instance, they must participate in a
\npledge-of-allegiance ceremony, followed later by a protest
\ndemonstration against peace, a demand for militaristic life and a
\nrally to get everyone fired up to hunt for separatists.<\/p>\n
Pluralism offers a way out of this social divisiveness. Ethnic
\ndifferences have been emphasized so that a split occurs along the
\nlines of Aceh's coastal regions and Gayo (with its many
\ntransmigrants from outside of Sumatra) areas fomenting a state of
\nconfusion characterized by inter-Acehnese mistrust, and then the
\nhistorical similarities can easily be replaced by militaristic
\nnationalism. Tolerance that reflects appreciation for fellow
\nhumans is turned into "our" solidarity and "yours" (enemy's).<\/p>\n
Organizations previously based on the awareness of the
\nimportance of upholding human rights and applying a democratic
\nand peaceful system are substituted by those founded on
\nmilitaristic nationalism and an uncompromising system seeking
\nsettlement by force -- a sign of the revival of pseudo-military
\n(militia) power. In other words, egalitarian social relations at
\nthe horizontal level are disrupted for the establishment of
\ncommanded relations.<\/p>\n
Vertical ties in the context of martial law are, as a whole,
\nhypocritical. The attitudes and behavior of the local population
\nare designed to suit the situation for survival. The experiences
\nduring general elections in the military operation zone (DOM)
\nera, in 1992 and 1997, are relevant in this case. Some people
\nparticipated in a pledge of loyalty to the unitary state, others
\njoined a militia rally with the consent of local Muslim clerics
\nand still others moved as a shield in the siege of Free Aceh
\nMovement (GAM) strongholds.<\/p>\n
The current political situation is designed for the Acehnese
\nto be "reeducated" back to the way of thinking during the DOM
\nperiod (after several years of relative peace\/democracy), through
\nmobilization for mass pledges, militia rallies, military raids,
\nand possession of party membership cards (especially for parties
\naffiliated with the military). Such activities are expected to be
\nseen as soldiers' successful attempts to "win the hearts" of the
\nAcehnese. In their entirety, the DOM and martial law political
\nmilieus offer nothing new in the general election context except
\nfor the local administration's military control.<\/p>\n
The general election of 2004 constitutes a political arena for
\nthe old, crooked elite and militia. Lists of candidates for the
\nregional representatives council and the provincial legislature
\nreveal many of the old faces from the heyday of the DOM
\nbureaucracy and political parties. Some of the candidates are
\nknown as former GAM deserters and\/or pro-Jakarta militia leaders.
\nOthers are infamous for their flawed social morality. Only a tiny
\nnumber do not fall into one or more of these categories. Such
\ncandidates result from the military administration's
\ndeconstruction of democratic groups and the labeling of critical
\nfigures as GAM supporters (with all its attendant dangers).<\/p>\n
Under this reign of soldiers, it is in fact pointless to link
\nthe 2004 election in Aceh with democracy, let alone the
\nconnection of this election with conflict transformation in Aceh.
\nThe 2004 election's relationship with the upholding of human
\nrights in Aceh is even more remote.<\/p>\n
Therefore, instead of asking whether or not the election in
\nAceh can be seen as a true democratic expression, the only
\nlegitimate question that can be asked is: Will the Acehnese
\nparticipate in such an election with only one type of candidate?
\nThe answer is: That will be a 110 percent success, they will go
\nto the polls with all the sincerity that they go to the loyalty
\nrallies, unless the militaristic nationalists foresee some kind
\nof negative reaction and call it off.<\/p>",
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