Why do violence incidents occur?<\/p>\n
By Makmur Keliat<\/p>\n
SURABAYA (JP): The recent election campaign, which has been
\nmarred by violence, has shattered the limbo of political
\nstability in Indonesia. Of great significance is the Banjarmasin
\ntragedy that claimed 123 lives. The tragedy turned the campaign
\nfrom a \"festival of democracy\" into a rampage.<\/p>\n
Since a series of violent acts occurred before campaigning
\nbegan, the question that now haunts people is will violence
\ncontinue unabated in the coming months? The answer to this
\nquestion largely depends on how we answer the following question:
\nWhat should be done to prevent people from indulging in violence?<\/p>\n
Violence is certainly a crime. Everybody agrees that
\ndestroying public facilities and private property, as occurred in
\nthe closing days of the campaign, must not be tolerated. It is a
\ndaunting peril to the continuity of development in Indonesia. But
\nwe should remember that punishing those involved in the recent
\nriots would only be effective in the short-term. Legal sanctions
\nhave certain limitations in their efficacy in shaping people's
\nbehavior and in making them adhere to regulations.<\/p>\n
In criminology, for instance, it has long been argued that the
\ndeath penalty for murder will not automatically deter other
\npeople from committing the same act. We must remember that legal
\nnorms are merely one of the tools to maintain social order. Of no
\nless significance are social norms such as customs and
\ntraditions. There is, in fact, no regulation that explicitly
\nprohibits people to walk naked in public places. Yet, since we
\nlive in a civilized world, it is only those who are mentally
\ndisturbed who dare to go naked in public.<\/p>\n
Considering this analogy, the recent spate of violence has
\nnothing to do with the weakness of Indonesian regulations against
\nacts of vandalism. The reality is, indeed, quite the reverse.
\nRegulations concerning the freedom of expression in Indonesia are
\nfar more restrictive compared to those in developed countries,
\nlet alone with regard to violence. Therefore, one plausible
\nreason behind the violence may lie in the deterioration of social
\nnorms. But imposing stricter rules by using and enforcing \"rubber
\nregulations\" would not be a panacea in the long-term. Violence is
\nlikely to be a reflection of anomie and can be attributed to the
\nlack of moral standards in society.<\/p>\n
From reports in the mass media, one can clearly see that the
\ntargets of violence were mainly state-owned buildings and
\nproperties owned by big companies. One reason why the violence
\nwas directed toward state facilities and big private companies
\ncan be traced to the distinctive relationship between state and
\nsociety in Indonesia. To a large extent, this relationship tends
\nto be governed by the norms of paternalism. The government takes
\non the role of a father while society only follows suit. Father
\nknows best and children are there only to be seen, not to be
\nheard.<\/p>\n
But there are always two requirements to preserve this kind of
\nnorm. First, there should be no gap between the father's words
\nand his deeds. Otherwise, the power and legitimacy of the father
\nwill evaporate. Second, by rule of thumb, paternalism also
\nimplies that the father as a power holder should treat his
\nchildren equally. If not, the cohesiveness between father and
\nchildren and among the children themselves would be in disarray.<\/p>\n
These requirements seem to have been largely neglected. It is
\nno public secret that many government officials have displayed a
\ndiscrepancy between word and deed. This has tarnished the image
\nof the government as a trustworthy father. With regard to the
\nsecond requirement, it is also easy to spot the discriminative
\nfacts. For instance, getting a driving license, an identity card
\n(KTP) or a land ownership certificate always requires some
\nunofficial payment -- the so-called \"illegal levy\". Otherwise,
\nthe bureaucracy can easily become red tape.<\/p>\n
It is not strange to hear people saying that the acronym UUD
\nUndang Undang Dasar (UUD or constitution) means ujung-ujungnya
\nduit, meaning \"in the end, it is money\". Certainly, for the
\nbetter-off and for those who have access to the big brass in the
\nbureaucracy, this unwritten regulation creates no financial
\nproblem. A shortcut is always available for them. But for those
\nwho are not so fortunate, this has become an enormous burden and
\nsuggests that money is the universal constitution. As a
\nconsequence, although it has been said a thousand times that
\neverybody is equal before the law, the existing impression
\nremains on the contrary. The law is made for the haves.<\/p>\n
It is against this backdrop that violence should be
\nunderstood. Violence is partly a product of the \"shortcut
\nculture\" prevailing in Indonesian society, articulated by the
\nhave-nots in the form of mobs. Since, by definition, the state is
\nthe sole institution in a society which has the legitimate right
\nto avoid the onset of a lawless society and to exercise force on
\nall individuals who reside within its jurisdiction, it comes as
\nno surprise that violence has arisen as an expression of
\nresistance against the state's monopoly of violence.<\/p>\n
If we agree with this analysis, then there are several aspects
\nwe need to consider. First, violence should not be viewed as a
\nproduct of idiosyncratic behavior. It is a function of dimming
\nexpectations, and a choice taken by rational human beings.
\nSecond, while it might be right to say that some have
\nmasterminded the recent violence, it is also worth remembering
\nthat \"seeds cannot flourish on infertile land\". In this context,
\nsocial circumstances are the seedbeds on which hatred and
\nviolence are planted. Third, failure to take objective social
\ncircumstances into consideration could have a serious impact on
\nIndonesia.<\/p>\n
This would provide certain people with \"fertile land\" to
\ndisseminate the idea that development generates only a breakdown
\nof legal certainty. As a result, the use of unlawful violence to
\ngain political means and outbursts of frenzy would become
\nendemic. Militants, mostly young and unemployed people, would
\ncontinue fighting, armed with stones. The prevailing stability
\nwould be the silence of the graveyard.<\/p>\n
The government needs to consider the fact that acts of
\nviolence designed to violate the legal basis of the state have
\nbeen used throughout history. Violence has acquired a strong
\nlegitimacy on several occasions, such as in the struggle of the
\ndeprived and the oppressed, or in the name of anticolonialism and
\nself-determination. Indonesia, which is known as a peace-loving
\nnation and is admired because of its ability to preserve unity in
\ndiversity, should not be eager to change the situation.<\/p>\n
The writer is a lecturer in the Faculty of Social and
\nPolitical Sciences, Airlangga University, Surabaya.<\/p>\n
Window A: Violence is partly a product of the \"shortcut
\nculture\" prevailing in Indonesian society, articulated by the
\nhave-nots in the form of mobs.<\/p>\n
Window B: The government needs to consider the fact that acts of
\nviolence designed to violate the legal basis of the state have
\nbeen used throughout history.<\/p>",
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