Why can't Asia unite even for the sake of its own security?
\nFor decades, Western experts have complained about the failure of
\nthe Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to learn the
\nvalue of collective security from Europe's postwar experience.
\nASEAN's leaders have ignored the lessons offered first by the
\nCommon Market, and then the European Union.<\/p>\n
The benefits of these models are supposedly so obvious that it
\nseems incomprehensible that ASEAN's leaders cannot see them.<\/p>\n
East Asia's apparent disarray over a response to North Korea's
\nnuclear demarche brings these complaints into the open once
\nagain. A North Korea with nuclear bombs surely poses a common
\nthreat to all Asians. Everybody, it is said, should help the
\nUnited States put Kim Jong-il in his place. The fact that North
\nKorea's close neighbors seem unable to grasp this seems to
\nconfirm that Asian disunity is not just stupid, but chronic and
\nwillful.<\/p>\n
But history and geography matter in assessing the nature of a
\nthreat. Different traditions in tactical and strategic thinking
\nalso matter -- to say nothing of the unique way Europeans forged
\ntheir current cooperative arrangements out of aggressive nation-
\nstates that shared a common civilization.<\/p>\n
Nothing in Asia's history, however, remotely compares to
\nEurope's half-century of division and veritable occupation by two
\nrival superpowers. So it is no surprise that Asia's leaders do
\nnot look to Europe for solutions to their regional problems.<\/p>\n
Of course, human beings and nation-states do often behave in
\nsimilar ways. When threatened, countries tend to group together
\nagainst a common enemy. When the world was divided into two camps
\nduring the Cold War, deciding who was an enemy and who a friend
\nseemed easy. Alliances were established along pro-American or
\npro-Soviet lines.<\/p>\n
But even then, things in Asia were not so clear-cut. A jagged
\nline loosely joining Tokyo to Jakarta via Seoul, Taipei, Hong
\nKong, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore was sufficient to
\nsustain international cooperation. But that cooperation was
\nnothing like a lasting alliance.<\/p>\n
Why? There are many layers of explanation. At one level, Asian
\nhistory has been dominated by rival elites from China,
\n\"Turkestan,\" India, Persia, \"Arabia,\" Japan and Java (to name but
\na few examples) who claimed to lead separate indigenous cultural
\nentities. This differs markedly from Europe's shared Greco-Roman-
\nChristian civilization.<\/p>\n
Throughout Asian history, the continent's ancient foundations
\nof power were more sharply divided from one another -- and over
\nmuch longer time spans -- than in Europe.<\/p>\n
Modern history, however, did teach Asians that disunity led to
\nEuropean triumphs over them. In the 20th century, leaders
\nadvocating unity against the colonial and imperial powers
\nemerged. But the Europeans, who controlled over half the globe,
\nseemed able to disrupt any temporary gains.<\/p>\n
Europe's approach was two-pronged. First, it aimed to keep
\nAsia divided insofar as the West was concerned. This was
\nrelatively easy during the Cold War, as Asia's postcolonial
\nelites were forced to choose sides in a conflict of ideologies.
\nToday's global war against terrorism permits this approach to be
\nmodified to create new divisions. Second, Asia was brought under
\nthe rubric of a single interdependent global economy in which the
\nWest holds the key technological and financial cards.<\/p>\n
That strategy has proved remarkably successful. Over the past
\ndecade, Asia moved from division between two superpowers to
\nsomething that could be described as dominance by one super-
\neconomy. Either way, no regional unity on politics and security
\nhas arisen. The only prospect for a feeble identity of interest
\nis the emergence of some form of economic regionalism, pursued by
\nAsian leaders through free trade agreements.<\/p>\n
Asian disunity can be overcome only if Asia as a whole
\nconfronts a common enemy. The West will do everything possible to
\nprevent Asians from viewing Westerners as that enemy. In fact,
\nmost calls for Asian unity are concerned with uniting Asia \"with\"
\nthe West (often equated with the interests of the whole world)
\nagainst some part of Asia, whether it be Iraq, Iran, North Korea,
\nor Myanmar. Given that most Asian leaders believe Asian disunity
\nmade the West all-powerful in the first place, these calls are
\ntreated with understandable caution.<\/p>\n
What, then, of the future? It will take time for Asia's
\nleaders to shed the burdens of the past, in some cases especially
\nwhere relations with the West are concerned. In the meantime, if
\nthe global economy continues to integrate, will the prospect of
\nAsian unity be enhanced or hindered?<\/p>\n
Much depends on whether the West retains its sway in other
\nparts of the world. If that dominance continues through
\nincreasingly powerful networking technologies, the chances of
\nAsia creating a distinct unity of its own are slim.<\/p>\n
It is in this context that we can see why Asian leaders appear
\ntwo-faced or unreliable in the eyes of Europe and the United
\nStates. Asia cannot afford to unite against the West. But Asia
\nequally cannot afford to divide itself by ostracizing one of its
\nparts. For that way lies permanent dependence on the West.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/why-cant-asia-unite-even-for-the-sake-of-its-own-security-1447899208",
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