Who will triumph at the polls?<\/p>\n
This is the second of two articles on the mapping of
\nIndonesian politics prepared by Lance Castle, a visiting lecturer
\nin political science at Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta.<\/p>\n
YOGYAKARTA (JP): New political parties are visible and audible
\neverywhere and the message that Golkar stands for failure and
\nbetrayal is beamed into tens of millions of homes.<\/p>\n
Golkar might get about one-tenth of its previous vote total
\nfor various reasons, mainly habit. Conceivably, Sulawesi Muslims
\nmight go for Golkar because of pride in Habibie. If it is true
\nBalinese society likes to split dichotomously, as some theorize,
\nEdy Soedradjat's Justice and Unity Party (PKP) might give
\nMegawati a fight there. (How ironic if that great nationalistic
\ninstitution should end up as a refuge for esoteric
\nprimordialism.) To know more about the likely outcome on points
\nlike this, we need more polls in particular regions, like
\nSulawesi, and polls which focus on rural people.<\/p>\n
So how might the seats divide up in the election? That the big
\nthree parties -- the National Awakening Party (PKB), the National
\nMandate Party (PAN) and the Indonesian Democratic Party of
\nStruggle (PDI Perjuangan) -- which were outside the system eight
\nmonths ago, will be overwhelmingly dominant is now axiomatic. I
\nbelieve PKB will be significantly weaker than the other two
\nparties, contrary to the opinion expressed by Indonesianist Bill
\nLiddle some months ago.<\/p>\n
The total Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) vote-bank cannot amount to more
\nthan about 20 percent of the vote, much of which might go to the
\nUnited Development Party (PPP), now that it has an NU leader,
\nHamzah Haz.<\/p>\n
A recent poll of Jakarta voters points to more choosing PPP
\nthan PKB, but this may not be the nation-wide pattern. Both PDI
\nPerjuangan and PAN can expect far above 20 percent of the vote;
\nprobably above 30 percent each.<\/p>\n
One approach at estimation would start from 1955, when non-
\nMuslim parties got 56 percent of the vote. Is not PDI Perjuangan
\nnow the sole significant legatee of all those votes, and so
\nstands to gain a majority single-handedly? Incidentally, during
\nthe PDI crisis of July 1996, Megawati's people claimed she stood
\nto get 85 percent of the vote in a free election.<\/p>\n
A The Jakarta Post poll also gave Megawati a substantial edge
\nover Amien. On further consideration, however, this can be
\ndiscounted. The respondents were telephone subscribers in cities,
\nand as such were more likely than average voters to be non-
\nMuslims or secularist Muslims.<\/p>\n
An alternative approach at estimation would start from the
\nfacts that:
\n* For thirty years, Indonesia has been undergoing an Islamic
\nawakening, or, better put, a scripturalisation, the biggest
\nbeneficiary of which is Islamic modernism. Syncretism, kejawen
\n(Javanese mysticism) or abangan (nominal Muslims) are generally
\nsupposed to be in decline.
\n* PNI voters, apart from the non-Muslims, have always been mainly
\namong the ethnic Javanese, the group with a particularly low rate
\nof natural increase over the decades. Though still the largest
\nsingle group, they now constitute only about 35 percent of the
\nnation.<\/p>\n
So who will vote PDI Perjuangan? Non-Muslims, l2 percent, plus
\nhalf of all Javanese, 18 percent, plus one-tenth of the remainder
\nof voters, 5 percent. This gives a maximum of 35 percent of the
\nvote for PDI Perjuangan.<\/p>\n
What about the Christian vote this election? There are several
\nparties targeting the Christian vote, but none has any salience
\nto the average voter. Probably what will happen is Christians
\nwill nearly all vote for Megawati, and then their representatives
\nwill form a separate caucus inside or outside PDI Perjuangan,
\nlike the black caucus in America.<\/p>\n
The institution of recall will become a dead letter since its
\nvictims require the \"nomination\" of their party and also the
\nconfirmation of the president. Under the new conditions, it is in
\nthe executive's interest to have a shifting majority in the
\nparliament.<\/p>\n
Frequent references to coalitions among parties in the new
\nIndonesia are misleading, since under the 1945 Constitution the
\npresident and vice president, once elected, are there for five
\nyears. The frequent fall of Cabinets owing to the withdrawal of
\nparty support, as in the 1950s, is impossible.<\/p>\n
Now add NU's 20 percent vote-bank as mentioned above, and the
\nremainder of the vote will likely go to Amien Rais or parties
\ninclined to support him rather than Megawati. Thus Amien is right
\nnot to be embarrassed to point out that whoever controls 50
\npercent plus one in the new House of Representatives (DPR) will
\nbe able to choose the president. (The 50 percent plus one
\nmajority was a particular bugbear of president Sukarno).<\/p>\n
Therefore, a likely breakdown of seats in the DPR might be:<\/p>\n
Party\/Faction Seats Leader<\/p>\n
------------------------------------------------------<\/p>\n
PAN 148 Amien Rais<\/p>\n
PDI Perjuangan 168 Megawati Soekarnoputri<\/p>\n
PKB 54 Matori Abdul Jalil<\/p>\n
Golkar & PKP 37 Akbar Tandjung, Edy Soedradjat<\/p>\n
PPP 37 Hamzah Haz<\/p>\n
PBB 18 Yusril Ihza Mahendra<\/p>\n
ABRI 38<\/p>\n
------------------------------------------------------<\/p>\n
Total 500<\/p>\n
This breakdown would mean Amien would dictate the outcome.
\nEven if PKB, as on past performances, prefers a Sukarnoist to a
\nmodernist Muslim and votes with Megawati, that would still give
\nPDI Perjuangan only 222 seats out of 500, or 40 percent. The rest
\nwould prefer a deal with Amien. Perhaps this is why the PKB
\nleadership, having done its sums too, is talking to PAN again in
\nspite of the demonstrated disloyalty of Gus Dur to the Ciganjur
\nconcept.<\/p>\n
It does not necessarily follow that Amien will be president,
\nthough his second name means that in Arabic, and though all
\nadjudge him (rightly) to be ambitious. The new Constitution will
\ncertainly limit presidential terms to two at the most, and Amien
\nis a relatively young man. So will he not support Megawati for
\ntwo terms in a mainly ceremonial role, with himself in the old
\nHatta role of vice president and first minister, and then take
\nover as the fifth president in 2009? That way he gets to rule 20
\nyears without breaking the Constitution. Eat your heart out Fidel
\nRamos.<\/p>\n
There have been reports that when the new People's
\nConsultative Assembly (MPR) meets, it will, as it is entitled to
\ndo, revise the Constitution before proceeding to elect the
\npresident. This would involve inserting a Bill of Rights, which
\nwas unsuccessfully attempted after 1965, but could also
\ninstitutionalize the Hatta role of vice president cum first
\nminister, restoring the symbolically satisfying dwitunggal
\n(couple -- the late president Sukarno and the late vice president
\nHatta) of the early years of independence.<\/p>\n
A Supervisory Council of representatives of the five biggest
\nfactions could be created to take over some of the sensitive
\nroles of the president, like high appointments, remission of
\nsentences, etc., while still leaving the first minister in
\nundoubted control of the executive branch.<\/p>\n
The impression of winner-take-all would thus be diminished,
\nand Indonesia would be seen as having a government of laws and
\nnot of men. The provinces, cities and districts will have their
\nown variety of regional coalitions and single minorities to
\nhandle the matters which will be surrendered to them under the
\nnew autonomy law.<\/p>\n
A final philosophical reflection is that everyone who observed
\nthe painfully long 1955 campaign thought the central issue was
\nIslamic state versus Pancasila. Sukarno, not to mention the
\nCommunists, attacked the Masyumi as national traitors who were in
\ncahoots with the Darul Islam rebels and the Dutch and were
\ndeliberately creating a danger that the Christian islands would
\nsecede and West Irian would never be recovered. In turn the
\nMasyumi branded the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) bearers of
\natheism and anarchy.<\/p>\n
The Muslim parties frustrated the work of the DPR in enacting
\na permanent Constitution because its terms of reference required
\na two-thirds majority.<\/p>\n
So in 1959, Sukarno, with Nasution's support, was able to
\n\"return\" to the integralistic, executive-dominated 1945
\nConstitution, so initiating four decades of dictatorship. Too
\nlate, alas, the end of ideology has arrived. Parties demanding an
\nIslamic state are unlikely to get more than 10 percent of the
\nvote in June.<\/p>\n
Communism, the blighting ideology of the twentieth century, is
\ndead. Even Megawati is not a Sukarnoist; her close advisers are
\nunabashed pragmatists. Late, yes, but let us congratulate the
\nIndonesian people for making psephology an interesting academic
\npursuit again. What a bore it was these last forty years.<\/p>",
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