Who started the fire?<\/p>\n
You did not have to be military intelligence to foresee last
\nweek's violence in the streets of Jakarta. The writing has been
\non the wall since the Indonesian Military (TNI), ignoring
\nmounting public opposition, virtually coerced the House of
\nRepresentatives to endorse the state security bill before it
\nended its session on Sep. 24. TNI was testing the will of the
\nbill's opponents, who had no other recourse but take their battle
\nto the streets. The House's insensitivity to public opinion has
\nleft the people no proper, less confrontational channels through
\nwhich to pursue their objections.<\/p>\n
Clashes between opponents of the bill, represented by
\nstudents, and the main sponsors of the bill, in this case TNI,
\nwere inevitable. The students were as determined as the military
\nto have their way. Both appeared ready for battle. Students came
\narmed with Molotov cocktails, and the National Police, still an
\norgan of TNI rather than the state, were deployed
\nin full force to check the students. In retrospect, violence
\ncould have been avoided and lives and property spared if only one
\nof the groups had backed down.<\/p>\n
This was a near replica of the November 1998 clashes between
\nstudents and ABRI, as TNI was then known. In this episode of
\nviolence, students attempted to march to the House to press for
\ngreater reform at a faster pace than the People's Consultative
\nAssembly, which was holding a Special Session, was willing to
\nadopt. Layer upon layer of armed security forces confronted the
\nstudents. Like last week, clashes and the resulting casualties
\nwere inevitable.<\/p>\n
Both incidents took place near the Semanggi flyover, the
\nnearest the students could get to the House. Like the House last
\nweek, the Assembly ignored the students and endorsed the gradual
\napproach to reform preferred by the ruling Golkar Party and the
\nmilitary. Events since November proved the skeptics right in
\ntheir belief this gradualist approach was simply an effort on the
\npart of Golkar and the military to buy time to consolidate their
\nrespective positions, which were increasingly being threatened.<\/p>\n
The authorities, in this case TNI and the National Police, not
\nonly failed to investigate and resolve the earlier violence at
\nthe Semanggi flyover, they also failed to learn any lessons from
\nthe event. While we leave it to the military and the police to
\ncome to terms with their mistakes, the biggest lesson the latest
\nSemanggi violence taught us is that we need to speed up the
\nprocess of removing TNI from politics altogether.<\/p>\n
Ending the military's political role was on the agenda when
\nthe students launched the reformasi movement in early 1998 to
\nbring president Soeharto down. When they succeeded in forcing
\nSoeharto to resign in May of last year, they pressed on with
\ntheir demand that the military's dual sociopolitical role end.
\nBut reform leaders -- Megawati Soekarnoputri, Abdurrahman
\nWahid and Amien Rais -- in keeping with the reality of the
\nmilitary's power, gave five to six years to phase the military
\nout of politics.<\/p>\n
The military, in response to public criticism, introduced a
\nnew paradigm and scaled back its involvement in politics, at
\nleast at the lower levels. At the top levels of politics,
\nhowever, TNI is very much involved in the current power struggle.
\nTNI has also been consolidating its power. Its 38 seats in the
\nHouse are powerful bargaining chips in light of the failure of
\nany one political party to win outright the June general election
\nand the division among reformist parties over the formation of a
\nnew government. And with B.J. Habibie becoming a lame duck
\nPresident after the East Timor debacle earlier this month, real
\npower has shifted from him to TNI Commander Gen. Wiranto.<\/p>\n
Events over the past few weeks have confirmed public
\nsuspicion about who is really calling the shots in Bina Graha
\npresidential office. First there was the declaration of a state
\nof emergency in East Timor, and now there is the government's
\nstrong-arming the House into endorsing the state security bill,
\nwhich when enacted will give the president and the military
\nimmense power. With this new legislation nicely tucked in his
\npocket, the stage is open for Wiranto, not Habibie, to push the
\nagenda of his choosing. Let us not forget that while the next
\ngovernment will be elected in November, it will not assume power
\nuntil Jan. 1. A lot of things could happen during this time.<\/p>\n
It came as no surprise that the announcement that the
\nPresident would delay signing the new bill into law came from
\nWiranto's office rather than Habibie's. The reason cited for the
\ndelay, to \"familiarize\" the ignorant public with the virtues of
\nthe new legislation, was patronizing and an insult to the
\nintelligence of opponents of the bill.<\/p>\n
If TNI was so concerned about the public's understanding of
\nthe legislation, it would have allowed a public debate of the
\nbill instead of rushing it through the House.<\/p>\n
In defending the military's dual function, TNI officers have
\noften said they could not see themselves playing the role of
\nfirefighters. Politics, in their eyes, is too precious to be left
\nentirely to unruly politicians. Through its political role, they
\nargue that TNI is able to play an active part in promoting
\nstability and prosperity in the country.<\/p>\n
Events over the past year, however, have proved the military
\nhas become too much of a political player. Rather than
\nextinguishing fires, it has been starting its own, East Timor and
\nlast week's violence two cases in point. Which begs the question:
\nIf the firemen become arsonists, who will put out the fires?<\/p>",
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