Whither civil society?<\/p>\n
J. Soedjati Djiwandono, Political Analyst, Jakarta<\/p>\n
Both Sukarno, through his \"guided democracy\", and Soeharto
\nthrough his \"Pancasila democracy\", robbed the sovereignty and
\npower of the people. In a sense, therefore, reform in Indonesia
\nis a process by which the people will endeavor to reclaim their
\nsovereignty and power from the state. Reform is to advance the
\ncause of a \"civil society\".<\/p>\n
I am not going to dwell on an academic debate on the
\ncenturies' long history of the changing development of the term
\nand concept of \"civil society\" with its ups and downs,
\nparticularly as part of Western tradition of political thought.<\/p>\n
Suffice it to say that while before the birth of the nation-
\nstate civil society had been understood as the same as the state
\nitself, with the end of feudalism that had been markedly
\nincreasingly dominant and absolute power, civil society began to
\nbe posited vis-a-vis the state itself.<\/p>\n
Gradually civil society has been understood quite apart from
\nthe concept of state. It has been regarded as the answer or
\nreaction to the increasingly dominant and absolute power of the
\nstate.<\/p>\n
By contrast, therefore, civil society is marked by individual
\nfreedom. And this individual freedom is expressed in the birth of
\nvoluntary associations among citizens with some degree of self-
\nmanagement over their own affairs.<\/p>\n
It is often claimed that Western tradition of political
\nthought apart, some form of civil society was also to be found
\nsuch as in ancient times in the Middle East, particularly in the
\ndays of the Prophet Muhammad in Medina -- hence the term madani
\ncivil society, and -- the more or less self-managed desa
\n(village) in the old days of Java, and nagari in West Sumatra.
\nThe point is clear: Indonesia has it own model of civil society,
\nbelieve it or not.<\/p>\n
Be that as it may, the movement for the advancement of civil
\nsociety in Indonesia has not gone very far. In fact, there are
\nindications that it is on a serious setback.<\/p>\n
Indeed, free citizens' associations particularly in the form
\nof non government organizations were not respectable in the eyes
\nof the New Order regime. However, they grew fast in number at the
\nonset of the reform movement in the wake of the decline and fall
\nof President Soeharto and his New Order regime. NGO's
\nincreasingly gained respectability and popularity.<\/p>\n
What has gone wrong? In the first place, the reform process
\nitself does not prove to be favorable to the growth of civil
\nsociety. Indeed, by definition \"reform\" means a change within and
\nthrough the existing system and constitution. That principle,
\nhowever, should not bar an eventual change of the constitution
\nitself. Whatever amendments have been made so far to the 1945
\nConstitution have not really touched the fundamental defects of
\nthe Constitution, especially the establishment of an institution
\nwith unlimited power (the People's Consultative Assembly, MPR).<\/p>\n
One of the most important issues of reform is the supremacy of
\nlaw. But supremacy of law presupposes just law. On examination,
\nhowever, there are still dozens of constitutional provisions,
\nlegislations, laws, and government regulations, including
\npresidential decrees, whose consistency with the constitution is
\nin serious doubt.<\/p>\n
Most of these are discriminatory in nature, and are thus
\nagainst human rights. Numerous problems have arisen that have
\nmade people's lives miserable because of discriminatory laws and
\ngovernment regulations that discriminate against people because
\nof their racial, ethnic or religious backgrounds.<\/p>\n
A mechanism for judicial review is badly needed. Yet the issue
\nposes a dilemma. A national consensus is an absolute must on
\nfundamental principles embodied in the constitution. The first
\nprinciple in the state ideology, belief in God, has always been
\ncontroversial. The myth is that it unites the nation marked by
\ndiverse faiths. But the reality is that it has always been a
\nsource of conflict.<\/p>\n
The question if Indonesia is a theocratic or a secular state
\nis always answered that it is neither. Indonesians never realize
\nthe contradiction in the argument that there is freedom of
\nreligion in the country, but everyone must have a religion.<\/p>\n
That the president shall be an \"indigenous citizen\" needs to
\nbe clarified once and for all. Or else, it may continue to be
\ninterpreted at the expense particularly of Indonesians of Chinese
\nstock.<\/p>\n
Thus, as I wrote earlier, no matter how badly the nation needs
\na mechanism of judicial review, its creation under the present
\ncircumstances would pose a dilemma. It could be counterproductive
\nand dangerous, because it would not solve constitutional
\ncontroversies once and for all.<\/p>\n
One important issue that has been agreed upon also is a system
\nfor a direct election of the president. Whatever their diverse
\nmotives, a direct presidential election would be an entry point
\nto constitutional change.<\/p>\n
One of the fundamental defects of the present constitution is
\nthe establishment of an institution -- the MPR -- with virtually
\nunlimited powers, controlled by and accountable to no one and to
\nno institution. A direct election of the president and vice
\npresident in (a single ticket or otherwise) would make it
\npossible for us to do away with the MPR.<\/p>\n
To agree to a direct election of the president while
\nmaintaining the continued existence of the MPR, is a
\ncontradiction.<\/p>\n
It is our own choice, whether we want to work toward modernity
\nor complacently engage ourselves in self-delusion and get
\nnowhere, as far as democratization is concerned. Instead, we
\nwould continue to have a constitution, which would be just a
\nrecipe for dictatorship. This would simply mean that we would not
\nget any closer to the ideals of a civil society.<\/p>\n
Because of their New Order mindset and mentality, which seem
\nto be beyond repair, the present generation of leaders and
\npoliticians cannot be relied on to carry on the process of
\ngenuine reform. They are unwilling and unable to reform
\nthemselves, perhaps because of their vested interests and thus
\ntheir resistance to change, and hence their aversion to
\nconstitutional change.<\/p>\n
It is in terms of that mindset and mentality that I think of
\nthe \"old generation of politicians\", or the \"new order forces\",
\nrather than in terms of their age or past association with the
\nNew Order regime.<\/p>\n
Unfortunately, however, an increasing number of free
\nassociations of citizens, particularly NGO's, main stakeholders
\nof reform, have their own weaknesses. They have continued their
\nstrong advocacy for good governance. But in themselves they often
\nfail in practicing what would be elements of good governance at
\nthe national level.<\/p>\n
A number of them are now beset by internal crisis and faced
\nwith the threat of frictions and conflicts as a result of
\nmismanagement, lack of accountability and lack of transparency in
\ntheir financial management, and the prominence of personal
\ninterests. They are losing credibility. They are sadly lacking in
\n\"social capital\". The net result may then be that we are getting
\nfurther away from the ideal of civil society.<\/p>",
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