Where did Indonesia go wrong?<\/p>\n
The following is the first of two articles by Olle Tornquist,
\nprofessor of political science and development research at the
\nUniversity of Oslo.<\/p>\n
OSLO, Norway (JP): Not so long ago, Indonesian democratization
\nseemed impossible. But the old theories that modernization is
\ninsufficient, or international dependency too extensive, have
\nlargely been abandoned.<\/p>\n
The efforts at rapid modernization (as in Indonesia), and
\nextreme independence (as in Cambodia) mainly produced
\nauthoritarianism. And the third wave of democracy reached several
\nparts of the developing world anyway.<\/p>\n
So while the deterministic schools of thought proved wrong, a
\nnew idealist post cold war truth was born: the possibility to
\ncraft instant democracies, no matter what the conditions, by the
\nintroduction of internationally sponsored minimum human rights,
\nfree and fair elections, and "good governance".<\/p>\n
And that is what finally was attempted in Indonesia as well,
\nfrom late May 1998, as the west and major parts of the domestic
\nelite suddenly changed their loyalties and realized that the lack
\nof legitimate governance was the root cause of the crisis.<\/p>\n
So when the economists had failed by "getting the prices
\nright" (ironically even triggering the end game by the reduction
\nof subsidies on May 4), somewhat softer colleagues were then
\nparachuted to also "put the institutions right".<\/p>\n
Within a year or two, it was argued, Indonesia would thus be
\nput on the right track by the combination of, on one hand,
\neconomic and financial reconstruction, and on the other hand, the
\nengineering of "appropriate" governance, decentralization, civil
\nsocieties, and rights, and liberties -- as a basis for free and
\nfair elections, plus pacts among "moderate incumbents and
\nrealistic reformers".<\/p>\n
What went wrong? Why may now the historical chance to sustain
\nthe rise of the world's third largest democracy end in a
\nsimilarly historical failure? Let us make a brief summary of the
\nmajor factors involved and draw the general conclusions.<\/p>\n
First, it was not the development of modernization but a
\npolitical crisis of despotic liberalism (the symbiosis between
\npolitical monopolization and economic liberalization) that gave
\nbirth to Indonesia's new democracy.<\/p>\n
Hence, the space was limited even for the combination of
\nelitist political pacts and the idea of "letting the economy take
\ncare of itself". This may make sense (irrespective of political
\nturmoil) in less politically dominated economies, but not in
\nIndonesia.<\/p>\n
Rather, the institutions crumbled and there were few
\nindependent and forceful actors that could take command and
\npropel change; economically, administratively, politically. The
\ndemocracy movement had been suppressed for decades, and business
\ncould either escape or was as dependent on political patronage as
\never.<\/p>\n
Formally liberal politics became a battlefield for
\nincreasingly scattered, privatized, and localized military,
\nadministrative, and economic interests (like now over Gus Dur's
\npresidency).<\/p>\n
There was a shift from centralized corruption, where the
\nrepressive godfather put some limitations to promote his own high
\nreturns, to a laissez faire regime -- without alternative
\ndemocratic coordination -- where it is perfectly rational for
\nsymbiotic political, economic and military leaders to instantly
\ngrab and extract as much as possible.<\/p>\n
Even the enlightened establishment thesis of the need to first
\npromote "rule of law" and "good governance" was out of context.
\nFor when a constitutional rechtstaat (state of law) does not
\nprecede popular sovereignty, as it did in western Europe through
\nrather authoritarian state and bourgeois measures, we either have
\nto say (as many supporters of Asian developmental states used to
\ndo) that time is not yet ripe for democracy -- or discuss what
\nsocial, economic, and political forces would simultaneously be
\nable to enforce constitutionalism and democracy.<\/p>\n
And this is not even addressed by World Bank proponents of
\n"good governance". So while the determinists were right in
\nstressing the insufficient preconditions for democracy, the
\nidealists had a point in saying that one should not miss the
\nchance to promote it anyway.<\/p>\n
But to craft democracy by only betting, then, on elementary
\ninstitutions, civil and political rights, plus national
\nelections, within a vacuum of supportive mechanisms, forces, and
\norganizations -- that was doomed to fail.<\/p>\n
Second, therefore, let us go beyond both the deterministic and
\nthe idealist elite perspectives and consider instead
\ndemocratization from the level of the citizens, the ones that are
\nsupposed to be equals and control public affairs.<\/p>\n
Many say that this is unrealistic and a waste of time. But the
\nsame argument caused most experts to neglect basic conflicts,
\nhidden opposition, and the potential for democracy already during
\nSoeharto's rule.<\/p>\n
So why should we repeat the same mistake now? Rather, let us
\nsimply start with the basic questions about the substance and
\nscope of the four fundamental prerequisites and instruments that
\nmost scholars, including of democratic audits, agree are
\nnecessary to develop if the principles of democracy (popular
\ncontrol and political equality regarding collective binding
\ndecisions) shall be real.<\/p>\n
(1) Free and fair elections: The country's most severe
\nproblems turned non-issues in elections that avoided the basic
\nlocal level. Only the military, political, and religious elite
\nwith old organizations and loyalties stood a fair chance. The
\npro-democratic movement and the students in particular were
\nmarginalized.<\/p>\n
There was neither space for local parties in local elections
\nor for new popular organizations and parties based on interests
\nand societal ideas. Worse: major foreign democracy-makers did
\nlittle to alter the picture.<\/p>\n
(2) Open and accountable government (which also require
\nindependent public knowledge, movement, organization, and
\ngovernment responsiveness to public opinion): Aside from informal
\ncontacts and networks, much of state and politics remains closed
\nfor those who thus lost out, and has often turned non-operative
\nand disintegrated in the process of fragmentation and
\nlocalization of power.<\/p>\n
Boss politicians have taken over -- brokering religious and
\nethnic leaders with mass following, businessmen and
\nadministrators with resources, and military and militias with
\nmuscles.<\/p>\n
While pro-democratic NGOs are comparatively well funded but
\natomized, the new attempts at popular organizations and parties
\nare poor and fragmented. Beyond the limited elections, there are
\nfew chances for people to influence the system other than to
\nreturn to informal contacts or resort to lobbying or pressure
\npolitics.<\/p>\n
Worse (again): this is partly nourished by foreign support,
\nlimited as it usually is to urban elite circles with good
\ninternational connections.<\/p>\n
Priority is given precisely to watch and lobby groups, not to
\nthe universal accepted need for mass based popular organization
\nto enforce open and accountable government.<\/p>\n
Ironically, even the organization of the foreign support
\nitself is a good illustration of lack of transparency and
\naccountability, at least in relation to those who matter (and are
\nsupposed to learn from foreign experiences) -- the Indonesian
\npopulation in general and the pro-democracy movement in
\nparticular.<\/p>\n
Furthermore, the decisive public sphere that had evolved among
\npro-democrats during the struggle against authoritarianism has
\nbeen difficult to expand locally and to ordinary people,
\nespecially when abandoned by foreign democracy-makers that bet
\ninstead on their own non government organizations (NGOs) and
\nconsultants.<\/p>\n
Hence, speculative media has filled most of the empty
\n"liberal" spaces.<\/p>\n
(3) Civil and political rights: The liberalization of civil
\nand political life is vital and a relative success, but remains
\nof limited significance for major parts of the population.<\/p>\n
Political violence is localized, semi-privatized, and
\nnourished by instigation and manipulation of ethnic and religious
\nloyalties. The lack of social and cultural rights is part of the
\nproblem.<\/p>\n
This became established state policy already during the
\nmassacres in the mid-1960s but is no longer controlled by a
\nsupreme godfather. Truth and justice is a precondition for
\nreconciliation but primarily a topic for NGO seminars.<\/p>\n
(4) A reasonably democratic society for citizens to be
\nsufficiently self-confident: The elements of a democratic
\nculture, and the interest and ideology-based popular organizing,
\nthat grew out of the struggle for freedom and national
\nliberation, have been thoroughly undermined by decades of
\n"floating mass politics" and boosting of feudal-like customs.<\/p>\n
In fact it has even affected the pro-democracy movement which
\ncontinue to suffer from divisive elitism (nourished by equally
\nelitist and divisive foreign support), while many people have to
\nweather the crisis before they can make use of the new democratic
\noptions.<\/p>",
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