{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1146337,
        "msgid": "what-really-went-wrong-in-indonesia-australia-relations-1447893297",
        "date": "2005-02-07 00:00:00",
        "title": "What really went wrong in Indonesia-Australia relations?",
        "author": null,
        "source": "",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "What really went wrong in Indonesia-Australia relations? S.P. SETH, Sidney The tsunami disaster has brought Indonesia closer to the world, particularly with rich developed countries able to help with their human and material resources. Australia, for instance, has committed about $A1billion (half as grants and rest as low interest loans) for reconstruction work over a period of time.",
        "content": "<p>What really went wrong in Indonesia-Australia relations?<\/p>\n<p>S.P. SETH, Sidney<\/p>\n<p>The tsunami disaster has brought Indonesia closer to the<br>\nworld, particularly with rich developed countries able to help<br>\nwith their human and material resources. Australia, for instance,<br>\nhas committed about $A1billion (half as grants and rest as low<br>\ninterest loans) for reconstruction work over a period of time.<br>\nThe government aside, the Australian people have also chipped in<br>\nfor disaster relief in Indonesia and elsewhere in the region.<br>\nThis then is seen as an opportune time to forge closer relations<br>\nwith Indonesia.<\/p>\n<p>The relations between Jakarta and Canberra have been strained<br>\nbecause of the way East Timor got its independence. The<br>\ndeterioration occurred under John Howard&apos;s stewardship as<br>\nAustralia&apos;s Prime Minister. Around the same time, Indonesia<br>\nunderwent a severe economic crisis and the fall of President<br>\nSoeharto, Indonesia&apos;s long term authoritarian president.<\/p>\n<p>It was under then president Soeharto that Australia and<br>\nIndonesia forged close relations. Australia&apos;s then prime minister<br>\nPaul Keating made it a priority foreign policy consideration.<br>\nWith Soeharto and Keating both gone from the political scene, the<br>\nrelationship became fatherless, so to say.<\/p>\n<p>When the Labor Party in opposition sought to make East Timor a<br>\npopular political issue, the Howard Government quickly wrested<br>\nthe initiative by advocating special autonomy for East Timor<br>\nfollowed by a referendum sometime into the future. Indonesia&apos;s<br>\nthen president Habibie, though, opted for immediate referendum in<br>\n1999.  In the process, Indonesia lost East Timor when its people<br>\noverwhelmingly voted for independence.<\/p>\n<p>Australia found itself in the middle of a political and<br>\nhumanitarian crisis, with John Howard&apos;s Government winning<br>\npolitical kudos for bringing about East Timor&apos;s independence. It<br>\nwasn&apos;t true, though. Australia simply happened to be in the right<br>\nplace at the right time.<\/p>\n<p>Of course, Canberra played a significant peacetime role after<br>\nthe mayhem created by the departing Indonesian forces and their<br>\nmilitia creations. The leading peacekeeping role was, in some<br>\nways, foisted upon Canberra as there was no one else in the<br>\nregion willing to do it.<\/p>\n<p>But inadvertently or by design Canberra managed to over-<br>\ndramatize its political and military role; making it look like a<br>\nmilitary victory over a demoralized Indonesia already in the<br>\nmidst of a severe economic and political crisis. Indonesia&apos;s<br>\nruling class, particularly its military elites, haven&apos;t forgotten<br>\nor forgiven Australia for this.<\/p>\n<p>It was felt that Australia had taken advantage of Indonesia&apos;s<br>\nweakness as it was grappling with its manifold problems. And they<br>\nhad a point. Because over the years, since Indonesia occupied<br>\nEast Timor in 1975, Canberra had accepted Jakarta&apos;s sovereignty<br>\neven signing the maritime boundary in the Timor Sea to partake of<br>\nits oil riches. This is now a contentious issue between Australia<br>\nand the independent state of East Timor. But that is another<br>\nstory.<\/p>\n<p>East Timor is now history, though it will continue to cast a<br>\nshadow on Indonesia-Australia relations. For instance, despite<br>\nAustralian protestations that Canberra respects Indonesia&apos;s<br>\nterritorial integrity, it is taken with a pinch of salt. Whether<br>\nit is the separatist movement in Paupa or Aceh, Australia is<br>\nbelieved to be somehow involved, largely because of its perceived<br>\nrole in facilitating East Timor&apos;s independence.<\/p>\n<p>Even as the tsunami relief operations are continuing,<br>\nimportant elements of Indonesia&apos;s establishment see sinister<br>\nmotivation behind foreign involvement in Aceh-principally from<br>\nAustralia and the United States. Maj. Gen. Syamsir Siregar, the<br>\nhead of the National Intelligence Agency, has reportedly said<br>\nthat foreign troops in Aceh brought a hidden political agenda to<br>\nmap territory and secure the strategic Strait of Malacca.<\/p>\n<p>Be that as it may, Australia does sound arrogant when<br>\nreporting on Indonesia. For instance, the front page banner<br>\nheadline in the Sydney Morning Herald about Canberra&apos;s instant<br>\nresponse to the tsunami disaster in Aceh was titled &quot;Australia<br>\ntakes charge in Indonesia.&quot; The report that followed wasn&apos;t much<br>\nbetter. It read: &quot;Indonesia has asked Australia to come into the<br>\nheart of its Government and help lead the reconstruction of its<br>\ntsunami-stricken regions, a diplomatic coup for the Prime<br>\nMinister John Howard&quot; It might just be a newspaper report but it<br>\ndoes seem to reflect a certain mindset.<\/p>\n<p>Commenting on what a brilliantly executed move the tsunami-<br>\npackage announcement was, an Australian analyst wrote, &quot;What once<br>\nlooked like a haphazard strand of foreign policy has been<br>\ntransformed into a coherent policy for reducing security and<br>\neconomic risks emanating from the Solomons, Papua New Guinea,<br>\nEast Timor and Indonesia-Australia&apos;s northern &apos;ring of fire&apos;.&quot;<\/p>\n<p>Leaving aside the propriety of reducing a decent humanitarian<br>\ngesture to a political gain, it just doesn&apos;t seem right to club<br>\nIndonesia with some of the tiny South Pacific states under<br>\nAustralia&apos;s zone of influence.<\/p>\n<p>Such insensitivity is also reflected in official policy<br>\npronouncements. Prime Minister John Howard&apos;s December 15<br>\nannouncement to effectively extend Australia&apos;s maritime security<br>\nzone to 1000 nautical miles is a recent example. Apparently, this<br>\nwas a unilateral decision without consultation with Indonesia.<br>\nAnd not surprisingly, Jakarta is unhappy.<\/p>\n<p>Canberra&apos;s own pre-emption doctrine against regional terrorism<br>\nstill rankles in Indonesia and other regional countries.<\/p>\n<p>At another level, Indonesia is tarred with the problem of<br>\nterrorism. At times Indonesia looks like a one-dimensional entity<br>\nneeding to be tackled as a regional terrorism hub. Prime Minister<br>\nJohn Howard believes that moderate Islam could be strongly<br>\nencouraged by increased investment in Indonesia. At the Asia-<br>\nPacific Economic Co-operation forum in Chile, he said, &quot;It&apos;s<br>\nimportant to try and tackle inequalities in societies which<br>\nprovide, how should I put it, a point of advocacy for<br>\nterrorists&quot;, as in Indonesia.<\/p>\n<p>There is certainly more to Indonesia than terrorism. And to<br>\nsee Indonesia as a regional terrorist hub requiring terrorist-<br>\nrelated help is a limited and limiting policy approach.<\/p>\n<p>The author is a free-lance writer based in Sidney.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/what-really-went-wrong-in-indonesia-australia-relations-1447893297",
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