What Aceh really needs<\/p>\n
On the face of it, things seem to be going rather well in
\nNanggroe Aceh Darussalam. Why else would the government decide to
\nrevoke martial law over this westernmost Indonesian province and
\ninstitute a civil emergency? In terms of timing, of course, the
\ndecision is quite appropriate. Martial law was imposed on the
\nrestive province on May 19 last year to enable the military to do
\nwhat was needed to quash the decades-old insurgency, led by the
\nFree Aceh Movement, or GAM.<\/p>\n
The central government in Jakarta initially intended to impose
\nmartial law for period of six months, in the expectation that
\nwithin that time the province would have been secure enough to
\nenable the civil administration to resume functioning. As it
\nturned out, more time was needed to quell the insurgency
\nmovement, so martial law was extended for another six months,
\nwhich means martial law in Aceh will formally end on May 19 next
\nweek.<\/p>\n
Which begs the question: Has the imposition of martial law
\nover the past year truly and effectively put an end to the
\nseparatist movement? To some extent, it seems, the answer would
\nbe yes. In most areas of the war-torn province, peace has been
\nsufficiently restored to enable local administrations to resume
\nfunctioning and schools to be reopened.<\/p>\n
Yet, the continued existence of pockets of GAM resistance in
\nseveral of the province's more remote and inaccessible areas
\nclearly point to the fact that all is not quite well in Aceh.
\nOnly earlier this week, for example, media reports mentioned GAM
\ntaking seven more Indonesian journalists hostage, even as it
\nreleased one Jakarta-based television cameraman, together with
\nsome 150 other civilians who have been held by the insurgents for
\nmany months.<\/p>\n
Precisely how weak -- or strong -- the decades of military
\noperations have left the movement is of course difficult to say.
\nBut if the most recent abductions and the continued presence of
\nIndonesian military personnel is anything to go by, the most
\nprobable answer would be: Strong enough for Jakarta to remain on
\nguard. Indeed, overall it can be said that the \"military
\nsolution\" to the Aceh problem has been a total failure.<\/p>\n
In 1989, for example, when the Soeharto regime declared the
\nprovince a military operation zone (DOM), official estimates put
\nGAM's strength at about 500 men and women. At the end of
\nPresident Soeharto's rule in 1998, their numbers have grown to an
\nestimated 3,000 -- surely a sign of failure by any measure. The
\nreasons for such a phenomenal growth vary from economic injustice
\nto the harsh repression of dissent, to kidnaping and arbitrary
\nkilling of civilians by the military. An estimated 10,000
\nAcehnese civilians were killed and thousands of others were
\ndisplaced in that period, with many living in appalling
\nconditions in refugee camps even today.<\/p>\n
Soeharto's successors, from presidents B.J. Habibie and
\nAbdurrahman Wahid to President Megawati Soekarnoputri, sought for
\na brief time to accommodate the Acehnese people's aspirations for
\njustice and self-rule in the form of the granting full regional
\nautonomy to Aceh, but in the face of the continuing unrest in the
\nprovince, eventually resorted once again to military operations
\nwith the imposition of martial law last year.<\/p>\n
Now, with \"some 50 percent to 60 percent\" of GAM's fighters
\nincapacitated, in the words of the ad interim coordinating
\nminister of political and security affairs Hari Sabarno, the
\ngovernment deems it timely to revoke martial law in most of the
\nprovince, although that status will be maintained in the few
\nremaining GAM strongholds, while the \"integrated operations\" to
\nprovide social and humanitarian assistance besides conducting
\nmilitary operations would also be continued throughout the
\nprovince.<\/p>\n
It remains to be seen if the measure will yield the \"positive
\npolitical consequences, particularly in the international
\ncommunity\" that Hari Sabarno expects. As we see it, however, any
\noperation, \"integrated\" or otherwise, is doomed to fail as long
\nas it fails to address what the Acehnese people really want. What
\nthey want is first and foremost fair treatment and justice,
\neconomic and otherwise, accountability for the human rights
\nviolations committed during the past decades and recognition of
\ntheir rights and dignity as citizens of this republic.<\/p>\n
These are aspects of life that no military operation can
\nprovide. Indeed, too much damage has already been done by
\nmilitary action over the years. Instead, Aceh's civil society
\nmust be empowered so that the Acehnese can decide for themselves
\nwhat they want and how they intend to go about fulfilling those
\nneeds. Until this is understood in Jakarta, peace in Aceh will
\ncontinue to remain an ephemeral ideal at best.<\/p>",
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