{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1421179,
        "msgid": "we-need-clarifications-1447893297",
        "date": "1999-12-01 00:00:00",
        "title": "We need clarifications",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "We need clarifications The The Jakarta Post's editorial of Nov. 23, 1999, reports on the latest progress on the truth about East Timor and the urgency to question Gen. Wiranto on this matter. Since his ascent to the military's top job I have continuously regarded Wiranto with esteem. Imagine his three predecessors being put into Wiranto's shoes: They would probably not have succeeded so well. The way Wiranto stepped aside as a vice presidential candidate confirmed my earlier feelings.",
        "content": "<p>We need clarifications<\/p>\n<p>The The Jakarta Post's editorial of Nov. 23, 1999, reports on<br>\nthe latest progress on the truth about East Timor and the urgency<br>\nto question Gen. Wiranto on this matter.<\/p>\n<p>Since his ascent to the military's top job I have continuously<br>\nregarded Wiranto with esteem. Imagine his three predecessors<br>\nbeing put into Wiranto's shoes: They would probably not have<br>\nsucceeded so well. The way Wiranto stepped aside as a vice<br>\npresidential candidate confirmed my earlier feelings. But within<br>\nthe whole picture there appears to be a black spot: the East<br>\nTimor campaign of terror and destruction after the Aug. 30, 1999,<br>\nballot. How is it possible that the high profile Gen. Wiranto<br>\ncould endure such a failure! A number of reasons remain<br>\nunassessed and call for clarifications:<\/p>\n<p>1. Delusion and lack of knowledge of the feelings of the East<br>\nTimorese. Was local government reporting on the issue of the<br>\nreferendum in a self-delusory way, up to the point of taking for<br>\ngranted a pro-Jakarta victory? I would be extremely careful to<br>\nassert that the majority of the Acehnese, or the Irianese, would<br>\nopt to stay within a unitary state if given a chance to express<br>\ntheir wishes in a referendum about independence or not. There are<br>\nmany parallel cases in which the political elite was sure of<br>\nvictory which later proved to be a totally wrong assessment.<\/p>\n<p>2. An absence of military strategy. Because of a possible impact<br>\nof \"psychological obstacles in curbing or shooting the rampaging<br>\npro-Indonesia militias\" -- after 23 years of common fight against<br>\nthe separatists -- TNI's command should have withdrawn in advance<br>\nall unreliable elements in the military and replace them with<br>\nsoldiers from other military commands, as those would not have<br>\nany emotional ties with East Timor.<\/p>\n<p>3. Irresponsible TNI conduct in East Timor. The announcement of<br>\nthe results of the ballot on Sept. 4, 1999 and the imposition of<br>\nmartial law were interspersed by the arrival of Maj. Gen. Kiki<br>\nSyahnakri on Sept. 8, 1999. During five full days a combination<br>\nof rogue TNI elements and militias were allowed to go on a<br>\nrampage of unrestrained destruction, burning, raping and killing<br>\n(National Committee of Human Rights Report, Nov. 20, 1999).<\/p>\n<p>4. Was the inaction of TNI's top brass in Jakarta a conscious<br>\ntactical move so as to direct the blame for the East Timor mess<br>\nsolely on Habibie as the initiator of East Timorese independence,<br>\nand thus kill off his last chances for reelection?<\/p>\n<p>5. Am I right in my assessment that TNI top brass allowed the<br>\nmilitary and pro-Jakarta militias a free hand for a couple of<br>\ndays to take revenge and then reluctantly took control of the<br>\nsituation again, having been pressured by the international<br>\ncommunity?<\/p>\n<p>There will remain much speculation why Habibie opted for a<br>\nU-turn in the government's policy on East Timor, and whether Ali<br>\nAlatas and Wiranto were fully consulted or not on this policy<br>\nprior to its announcement. All the bloodshed and pain could have<br>\nbeen avoided if the government had had a \"sincere\" intention to<br>\ndraft and promote first a \"special autonomy\" package before<br>\nconsidering the possibility of independence. But after 32 years<br>\nof Soeharto it seemed psychologically unthinkable and too early<br>\nfor the Habibie administration to consider such a move. As soon<br>\nas the possibility of independence was declared an option in<br>\nJanuary, the alternative of a special autonomy was in fact<br>\nkilled.  How much \"face\" would've been lost if the government had<br>\nappointed Xanana Gusmao as governor of the province of East Timor<br>\nwithin the framework of the unitary state, with the TNI<br>\nconsequently pulling out.<\/p>\n<p>However, the new team under President Abdurrahman Wahid could<br>\neventually have succeeded in implementing such a scenario.<br>\nEast Timor's independence simply came at least a year or so too<br>\nearly!<\/p>\n<p>B.  COOMANS<\/p>\n<p>Jakarta<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/we-need-clarifications-1447893297",
        "image": ""
    },
    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}