WB project monitoring needs review<\/p>\n
By Nila Ardhianie<\/p>\n
SURAKARTA, Central Java (JP): External aid from both
\ninternational financial institutions and donor countries is
\nplaying a very important role in Indonesia's economy,
\nparticularly during this time of crisis, but the system of its
\nsupervision needs reviewing to avoid past mistakes which led to
\nquite a high level of leakage.<\/p>\n
The financial leakage in the World Bank-funded Integrated
\nSwamp Development Project (ISDP) can be used as an example on the
\nneed to introduce adjustments in the monitoring of projects
\nfinanced with foreign aid. Between July 1997 and September 1998,
\nthe ISDP was monitored by the farmers participating in the
\nproject as the target group.<\/p>\n
Such participative monitoring, facilitated by the Duta Awam
\nFoundation, detected various problems, like corruption at various
\nlevels, low accountability, lack of transparency, low
\nparticipation of the community and women, poor social preparation
\nand an inferior quality of physical and nonphysical construction.<\/p>\n
However, the World Bank itself seemed reluctant to solve the
\nirregularities related to the project, apparently due to its
\nexecutives' fear of the then president, Soeharto.<\/p>\n
The World Bank's representative, Dennis de Tray, said in his
\narticle published in The Jakarta Post of Sept. 24, 1998, that
\nthere was no evidence which could be used to file a lawsuit on
\ncorruption in Indonesia. Surely he would find difficulties to
\nfind evidence if the evidence should be in the form of bank
\naccounts and transaction bills.<\/p>\n
Actually, the World Bank could easily find the irregularities
\nif it asked the community directly entitled to enjoy the benefits
\nof the project on the amount of money or volume of the materials
\nthat they had received from the project.<\/p>\n
If there were irregularities at the community level, it could
\nbe expected to find corrupt practices at higher levels, too.<\/p>\n
In connection with the implementation of development programs
\nin Indonesia, the World Bank should begin applying a simpler and
\nwiser model of monitoring or supervising in cooperation with the
\nIndonesian government.<\/p>\n
With participative monitoring, the donors and the government
\nwill be able to detect irregularities directly at the lowest
\nlevel of the community targeted by the project and empower them.<\/p>\n
Farmers taking part in various discussions on participatory
\nrural appraisal with the Duta Awam Foundation disclosed that
\ncorrupt practices by some officials involved not only money but
\ngoods, too.<\/p>\n
Coconut growers joining in an ISDP in Riau, for example, said
\nthat each of them had received only Rp 50,000, instead of Rp
\n200,000 as promised, in assistance for the construction of fences
\nto protect their coconut trees from boars.<\/p>\n
They said that each family received only Rp 96,700 in loans,
\ninstead of Rp 100,700 as promised, and that they received only
\none liter of pesticide per hectare, instead of three liters per
\nhectare as planned.<\/p>\n
For the construction of simple huts where farmers could get
\ntogether, each village received only Rp 175,000, instead of Rp
\n500,000 as promised. Some villages even did not receive any money
\nin this respect.<\/p>\n
Another irregularity discovered during the monitoring period
\nwas that there were many farmers who had been asked to sign blank
\nforms or receipts for goods or money that they would receive.
\nObviously, a much longer list of corrupt practices in the ISDPs
\nalone can be drawn up.<\/p>\n
Various forms of corruption can easily occur in Indonesia
\nbecause the transparency level of development projects is very
\nlow. In this respect, only a few parties can gain access to the
\nmonitoring of the implementation of projects.<\/p>\n
The reason for this is very simple. If a group of people are
\nengaged in corruption, they will surely try to block other
\nparties' access to the project in question.<\/p>\n
In ISDPs, the low level of transparency is obvious because
\ncoconut growers know nothing about the size of their loans, how
\nthey should return the loans and also the regulations related to
\nthe loans. They never even kept the certificates of the land that
\nthey use as collaterals.<\/p>\n
The low level of transparency is actually a by-product of poor
\nsocial participation. Nearly every project in Indonesia does not
\ninvolve the local community in problem identification,
\nexploration of potencies, role division and discussions on ideas
\nto develop programs. Even if there were some preparations, they
\nwere simply a series of meetings with participants already
\nappointed by the relevant authorities.<\/p>\n
Social preparations can be of great use to all parties. The
\ncommunity, for instance, will have knowledge about the objectives
\nof the projects and the type of their contribution to make the
\nprojects successful.<\/p>\n
The absence of adequate social participation will not only
\nlead to low participation on the part of the community but also
\nto the obstruction of the process of democratization. The
\nsustainability of the projects will also be jeopardized.<\/p>\n
Minimum social preparations will be an obstacle to the
\ncommunity wishing to secure its rights and will only make the
\ncommunity perennial objects of development.<\/p>\n
The fact that social preparations cannot be made to the
\noptimum in various projects here is attributable to the low
\nquality of the parties executing the projects and also to the
\nsmall number of government personnel employed on a full-time
\nbasis for the projects.<\/p>\n
Nearly all bureaucratic officials employed in development
\nprojects are those already assigned regular jobs in their
\nrespective ministries. Those working full time on such projects
\nare usually foreign consultants who are paid hundreds of times as
\nmuch as the officials and contractors to whom the implementation
\nof the projects is entrusted. It is easy, therefore, to imagine
\nwhat will happen to development projects because those working
\nfull time in such projects are foreign consultants who generally
\nhave little understanding about local conditions and contractors
\nwho are usually devoid of the visions and missions related to
\ncommunity development.<\/p>\n
In the meantime, on the part of the bureaucrats, their
\nunderstanding of development projects is mostly limited to making
\nthe projects an opportunity for moonlighting. The result,
\nobviously, is poor supervision and support.<\/p>\n
It is no surprise, therefore, that some of the World Bank's
\npolicies on project implementation have been violated without the
\nknowledge of government officials at the central level. Or,
\nperhaps, these officials simply turn a blind eye to such
\nviolations.<\/p>\n
In this respect, the incidents discovered at ISDPs may serve
\nas an interesting example. The World Bank's operational policy on
\npest management stipulates that it will not finance pesticides
\nwhose formula belong to classes Ia, Ib and II -- which
\nrespectively indicate "extremely hazardous", "highly hazardous"
\nand "moderately hazardous".<\/p>\n
However, it has been found at ISDPs that 84.6 percent of the
\npesticides given on a loan or grant basis to the farmers in Riau
\nbelong to class Ia, Ib or II, while in West Kalimantan the figure
\nstands at 43 percent.<\/p>\n
Such irregularities will remain a crucial problems in the
\nfuture unless a comprehensive change is introduced in the
\npolicies on the implementation and supervision of foreign-funded
\ndevelopment projects. Foreign loans, which have been obtained
\nwith great difficulty, will simply go to waste if they benefit
\nonly a handful of people through corruption, while the burden
\nmust be jointly shouldered by the Indonesian community and the
\nstate.<\/p>\n
The writer is executive director of the Duta Awam Foundation.<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/wb-project-monitoring-needs-review-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }