Voting pattern may change<\/p>\n
This is the second of two articles on the pattern of the
\nIndonesian voting prepared by Lance Castles, a visiting lecturer
\nin political science at Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta. He
\nhas written a number of books on Indonesia, including Indonesia,
\nPolitical Thinking 1945-1965.<\/p>\n
YOGYAKARTA (JP): Indonesian polls released in recent months
\nclearly show a pattern of voting preferences, bearing a strong
\nresemblance to that of the elections in 1955.<\/p>\n
The most useful indication was a poll in November, which asked
\ntelephone respondents in five cities -- Jakarta, Medan in North
\nSumatra, Padang in West Sumatra, Yogyakarta and Surabaya in East
\nJava -- on who they regarded as the best person to be president.<\/p>\n
Differences were revealing and, in some cases, pronounced.
\nMegawati Soekarnoputri of the Indonesian Democratic Party of
\nStruggle (PDI Perjuangan), for instance, polled two-and-a-half
\ntimes better than Amien Rais of the National Mandate Party (PAN)
\nin Yogyakarta, but he beat her fivefold in Padang. The main
\nconclusions that can be drawn are as follows.<\/p>\n
* Amien and Megawati were streets ahead of the other
\ncandidates, with a likely combined total of about 70 percent.<\/p>\n
Purely on poll evidence, more respondents said they would vote
\nfor Megawati than Amien, but the voting on the election day will
\nprobably reveal the reverse, giving PAN a further 6 percent of
\nthe overall vote and cutting PDI Perjuangan down by 8 percent.
\nThis is because 41 percent of poll respondents were non-Muslims,
\ncompared with only 13 percent in the population at large, and
\nadjustments should be made.<\/p>\n
* There are two significant but much smaller parties, the
\nNational Awakening Party (PKB) and the United Development Party
\n(PPP), which can be expected to get about 12 percent of the vote
\neach.<\/p>\n
PKB might do better if rural voters go for it rather than for
\nPPP -- the polls, being purely urban, cannot help us here. But
\nit is worth remembering that the urban vote is one-third of the
\nwhole, so that the final percentage will not deviate too much
\nfrom 12 percent each.<\/p>\n
* The earliest poll in August showed Amien beating his rival
\nYusril Ihza Mahendra of the Crescent Star Party (PBB) seven-to-
\none; by February this had risen to 20-to-one. This trend seems to
\nshow that, within the aliran (underlying religious-cultural
\ncommitment) boundaries, at least, people tended to desert an
\napparent loser.<\/p>\n
Since PBB is widely believed to be more urban than rural, it
\nmay well fail to meet the 2 percent needed to be represented at
\nall.<\/p>\n
For this kind of reason parties like the Justice Party and the
\nIndonesian Uni-Democracy Party (PUDI) barely showed in the polls.
\nThey will certainly not occupy any seats.<\/p>\n
* Golkar is only getting about 7 percent and declining. Even
\nthe first poll in August showed it to have no prospects. Many
\npeople believe that it will perform well because it is supposedly
\nstrong outside the cities, where simple voters will choose it out
\nof habit, bribery or fear of the village chiefs.<\/p>\n
This is completely unconvincing. Rural voters are not dumb and
\nisolated. They are under the same electronic barrage as the rest
\nof the electorate. The parties and their posko (command posts)
\npenetrate into the most remote villages, often being
\ndemonstratively located opposite police stations to \"show the
\nflag\".<\/p>\n
* An important change has taken place since 1955. This can be
\nshown by a simple calculation. At that time, the non-Muslim
\nparties, mainly the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) and the
\nIndonesian Communist Party (PKI), got 56 percent of the vote and
\n18 percent went to Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), for a total of 74
\npercent.<\/p>\n
Since PKB is clearly allied to Megawati, and PDI Perjuangan
\ninherits all except about 7 percent (expected to go to the Golkar
\nparty) of the said 56 percent, Megawati would be a certain winner
\nif the old voting pattern still prevailed.<\/p>\n
But the fact is that there has been a clear swing to the
\nparties which are \"Islamic in spirit\". PDI Perjuangan plus PKB
\nappear to command only about two-fifths of the electorate,
\ncompared with three-quarters for the equivalent group in 1955.<\/p>\n
Three factors contribute to this trend.<\/p>\n
One is demographics. Family planning caught on earlier and
\nmore thoroughly among the Javanese, so that they have declined as
\na proportion of the population. And they were the stronghold of
\nthe non-Islamic votes.<\/p>\n
Secondly, there has been an Islamic revival, which means that
\nmore people translate being Muslim into voting for a party which
\nis perceived as Islamic, even though ironically the main
\nbeneficiary of this trend is PAN, a party which has eschewed all
\nreligious symbolism and tirelessly proclaims its openness to all
\ngroups even at the leadership level.<\/p>\n
Finally, the total elimination of the PKI and its affiliated
\norganizations has probably left the survivors vulnerable to
\nrecruitment by buoyant local representatives of the santri
\n(devoted Muslims) aliran.<\/p>\n
One woman said that in her village, all the residents switched
\nfrom PKI to NU. So, some old PKI strongholds in Java may turn out
\nto now go 40 percent or more for the Muslim parties.<\/p>\n
However, there is another possible reason for the trend that
\nhas noting to do with aliran. It may be that independently
\nthinking younger votes simply like Amien better than Megawati
\n(Ye gads, the death of all punditry and old-handery!) What can be
\nsaid for this interpretation?<\/p>\n
The strongest evidence is a large-scale poll reported at the
\nuniversities in Bandarlampung. It showed Amien and Megawati to be
\nfar ahead of the other candidates, but Amien somewhat ahead of
\nMegawati. Yet surely Bandarlampung (80 percent of its population
\nis Javanese) is aliran-wise, straight PDI Perjuangan territory?<\/p>\n
Recent discussions with nonacademic people, including hotel
\nand supermarket staff, showed that after an initial refusal to
\nstate a voting choice, the \"respondent\" turns out to have been
\npreviously a supporter of Megawati, partly because she was
\nperceived as unfairly treated, but is now considering switching
\nto Amien, who seems better suited to the needs of the time. The
\ntrouble with telephone polling is that it cannot pick up this
\nkind of phenomenon.<\/p>\n
Perhaps this \"decline of aliran\" phenomenon was foreshadowed
\nin research by J. Kristiadi of the Centre for Strategic and
\nInternational Studies (CSIS) some years ago in rural and urban
\nlocations in Central Java.<\/p>\n
He found that most voters said they followed the advice of
\npanutan (local leaders), such as an ulama, official or employer.<\/p>\n
However, the younger and better educated voters said they made
\nup their own minds, which could be interpreted as a move toward
\nnon-aliran voting.<\/p>\n
Furthermore, even some older voters said they voted for PDI on
\nthe advice of an official. This surely means that they were
\nmaking up their own minds on which advisor they would follow.<\/p>\n
How do these odds and ends of information relate to the
\nextraordinary reluctance of respondents in polls to state their
\nchoice?<\/p>\n
Anything from 65 percent to 85 percent of \"don't knows\" are
\nrecorded. If these people are conscious adherents of an aliran-
\nbased party, or bucolic clients of Golkar, why on earth don't
\nthey say so?<\/p>\n
It is not that they are alienated from the system, since less
\nthan 3 percent say they will not vote. The obvious explanation,
\nsurely, is that they have been habitually voting for a particular
\nparty, but are now hesitating. PAN seems the likely beneficiary
\nof this trend. There are going to be some very surprised people
\nwhen the voting results are announced in June.<\/p>",
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