Volvo diplomacy<\/p>\n
Something is not quite right with this picture: Key Cabinet
\nministers arriving in their chauffeur-driven Volvo sedans to a
\nCabinet meeting on Monday to consider which direction to take on
\nthe status of Indonesia's relations with Sweden. It is not
\nterribly ironic in itself that they are driven around in Volvos
\n-- a fine Swedish automobile. It could have been a Mercedes Benz,
\nwhich President Megawati Soekarnoputri arrived in.<\/p>\n
The unfortunate irony is the mismatch between the ability (or
\nrather inability) of our political leaders to understand
\ninternational law and diplomacy, and the virtues that cars like
\nVolvo and Mercedes have: sophistication, reliability and
\ndependability.<\/p>\n
The Cabinet met on Monday after Stockholm rejected Indonesia's
\ndemand to arrest and hand over, or expel leaders of the Free Aceh
\nMovement (GAM) who have taken up Swedish nationality. Sweden
\nmaintained that these GAM leaders-in-exile, including president
\nHasan di Tiro, have not broken any Swedish laws.<\/p>\n
Responding to Swedish rejections, some Cabinet members and
\nnational leaders like Amien Rais (who as chairman of the People's
\nConsultative Assembly is also entitled to a Volvo limo) are
\ncalling on the government to punish Sweden, either through
\ndowngrading diplomatic ties, or severing them completely.<\/p>\n
Fortunately, there are still one or two cool heads in the
\nCabinet (the ones who have Volvo-like virtues) to persuade
\nPresident Megawati to postpone any action against Sweden, and
\ninstead to send another high-powered delegation to Stockholm to
\npersuade the Swedes to cooperate in fighting GAM.<\/p>\n
Indonesia, of course, has acted within its rights in asking
\nfor Stockholm's cooperation to arrest the GAM leaders who now
\nhave Swedish citizenship. After all, they have been conducting
\ntheir campaign for an independent Aceh state from there.<\/p>\n
But Indonesia's diplomacy, unfortunately, has not been matched
\nby more thorough preparations at home, so it was easy to see why
\nthe efforts were doomed to fail.<\/p>\n
Technically, Hasan di Tiro and his colleagues in Sweden have
\nnot broken any Indonesian laws either. No Indonesian court has
\never tried them (in absentia or otherwise), let alone convicted
\nthem for their actions which date back to 1976.<\/p>\n
The only thing Jakarta has in making its case to Stockholm is
\nan allegation of Hasan di Tiro's role in the Aceh insurgency, or
\nmore recently, an allegation of GAM's role in several bomb
\nblasts. None of which have been brought before a court of law.<\/p>\n
The National Police's request to Interpol to help arrest the
\nGAM leaders was sent recently, long after the last official
\nletter Jakarta sent to Stockholm.<\/p>\n
A request for Interpol's help however will not be sufficient
\nto convince Stockholm. The least the Indonesian government should
\ndo first, would be to make a case against Hasan di Tiro in court,
\neven in absentia, and get him convicted for whatever laws he has
\nbroken.<\/p>\n
Assuming that the trials are credible (which is a tall order),
\nonly then can Jakarta present a stronger case to Sweden. In the
\nabsence of an extradition treaty, this is still no guarantee that
\nSweden will comply. But at least Jakarta would be able to make a
\ncase that Hasan di Tiro has broken an Indonesian law. The way
\nthings stand now, he has broken no laws from any country.<\/p>\n
In international diplomacy, it is one thing to ask, and
\ncompletely another to demand or to impose something on another
\ncountry. Going by their statements in calling for punishment
\nagainst Sweden, many of our political leaders have failed to
\ngrasp the consequences with regard to Indonesia's international
\nstanding.<\/p>\n
Our relations with Sweden go well beyond bilateral trade, aid
\nand investment, all of which these leaders seemed quick to
\nbelittle.<\/p>\n
Stockholm accepted these GAM leaders in exile under the 1951
\nGeneva Convention on Refugee Status which requires countries to
\nprovide sanctuary for people who face persecution in their own
\ncountry. And Article 33 specifically bars the forced return of a
\nrefugee if he or she risks persecution.<\/p>\n
For Indonesia to impose its will on Stockholm is demanding
\nSweden to break the Geneva Convention.<\/p>\n
Another matter that Jakarta should consider is that Sweden is
\na member of the European Union. To pick a fight with Sweden would
\nbe tantamount to picking a fight with almost all of Europe. With
\nthe Union trying to coordinate the laws on asylum, it will not be
\nlong before Hasan di Tiro and friends will also enjoy protection
\nacross Europe.<\/p>\n
We must have learned by now from our dealings with Portugal,
\nduring the height of the dispute over East Timor. As a member of
\nthe European Union, Portugal managed to push resolution after
\nresolution through international bodies condemning Indonesia's
\npolicy in East Timor.<\/p>\n
Picking on Sweden, when our own position is weak, would risk
\nthe wrath of the European Union and further internationalize the
\nAceh issue, the very thing that most here wanted to avoid.<\/p>\n
It is clear that this is a fight that Jakarta is unlikely to
\nwin, given the ineptness, poor preparations, and most of all, our
\nleaders' poor knowledge of international laws and diplomacy.<\/p>\n
If you believe in the popular saying \"you are what you drive\",
\nthen most of our Cabinet ministers and political leaders do not
\ndeserve the Volvo limousines they ride around in every day. They
\nshould opt for something less sophisticated, less reliable and
\nless dependable.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/volvo-diplomacy-1447899208",
"image": ""
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"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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