Violence leads to reemergence of Aceh nationalism<\/p>\n
Otto Syamsuddin Ishak
\nSociologist
\nJakarta<\/p>\n
On May 9 The Jakarta Post held a panel discussion on Aceh with
\nformer Indonesian Military (TNI) general affairs chief Lt.Gen.
\n(ret.) Suaidi Marassabessy, former state minister of human rights
\nHasballah M. Sa'ad, sociologist Otto Syamsuddin Ishak -- both
\nAcehnese -- and military analyst Kusnanto Anggoro. After
\npublishing the views of Suaidi and Hasballah on Monday and
\nTuesday, the Post is running the following two articles based on
\nOtto's presentation:<\/p>\n
Ahead of the Idul Fitri festival last year, parents took their
\nchildren to the market to buy new clothes to mark the holy
\nfestival. However, since 1998 parents have been shocked by the
\ninterest their daughters have shown in toy AK-47s: \"I don't need
\nnew clothes, just this rifle,\" one said. Many parents have cited
\nsuch instances, and toy traders are enjoying a profitable time.
\nWhat does this tell us?<\/p>\n
In a survey on public aspirations in Aceh by the Civil Society
\nAlliance for Democracy (Yappika) in 2000, those demanding a
\nreferendum for self-determination were mostly women -- who lived
\nin the longtime conflict areas of East and North Aceh, Pidie and
\nGreater Aceh, and in the newer conflict areas of Bireuen,
\nCentral, West and South Aceh, and even in nonconflict areas such
\nas Sabang. Of the respondents, there were more youngsters who
\ndemanded independence for Aceh. Again, what does this tell us?<\/p>\n
First, resistance after the end of the military operation zone
\n(DOM) in Aceh (1989-1998) has spread across the province, along
\nwith an increase in troops and in the territory of the Free Aceh
\nMovement (GAM). Violence by government troops against the
\nAcehnese has led to a resurgence of resistance -- which has
\nreached mythical proportions -- a sense of \"Acehneseness\", if not
\nan Acehnese nationalism, in the face of the \"colonialist\", the
\nRepublic of Indonesia.<\/p>\n
Second, the above signs bring to mind my own sense of shock on
\nhearing how children who witnessed atrocities by soldiers
\nagainst their siblings, parents or fellow villagers, by 1998 had
\nbecome adults raising clenched fists in defiance against
\nIndonesia. The above survey led to the reinforced conclusion that
\npeople's resistance is by now deeply entrenched -- formed as
\nchildren become adults and as new generations are born.<\/p>\n
Violence toward the Acehnese dates back to 1873, when the
\nDutch monarchy declared war against the Acehnese sultanate, and
\nup to 2003, as the Republic of Indonesia prepares to declare war
\nin Aceh against GAM -- who has learned from Jakarta's handling of
\nearlier movements such as the Islamic DI\/TII.<\/p>\n
So we see generations who have live with war, several areas
\nbecoming pockets of resistance and a \"culture of war\" in which
\nthe people have always been in opposition against rulers.<\/p>\n
During the 10-year period of the military operation zone, the
\nbrutal operations and the imposing of Golkar's (the former ruling
\nparty) rule led by governor Ibrahim Hasan went along hand in
\nhand. Once a charismatic ulema in Pidie, who had shifted alliance
\nfrom the United Development Party (PPP) to Golkar, fell sick, and
\npeople said this was a consequence of his action. People no
\nlonger asked for his blessing when they met him at the market.<\/p>\n
Unlike in Java, both the ulema in Aceh's villages or cities
\nimmediately lose people's respect once they are perceived to be
\none of the rulers. This reflects both the opposition toward
\nrulers and the people's egalitarian feature, in contrast with the
\nbureaucracy which has been influenced by Javanese feudalism.<\/p>\n
The above characteristic is evident in areas of resistance.
\nAmong the exceptions is West Aceh, where the town of Meulaboh has
\nbeen a colonialist settlement. This explains the potential here
\nto form militias and the presence of supporters of the planned
\nmilitary operation, such as the group that rejected the peace
\nzone and demanded the continued presence of soldiers.<\/p>\n
Central Aceh has been a hiding place and the last fort against
\nDutch colonialists, and its ulema were loyal supporters of the
\nleader Daud Beureueh. However, under the New Order government,
\nGolkar became strong in the local town of Takengon, and until now
\nCentral Aceh is led by the elite of Golkar and the military.<\/p>\n
Furthermore, given its diverse ethnicities of Gayo, Aceh,
\nJava, Batak and Padang, the potential to form militias in Aceh
\n(apart from GAM's armed wing) is naturally large in Takengon.
\nThus the allegation, among others, that they were involved in the
\nrecent vandalizing of the local office of the Joint Security
\nCouncil (facilitating the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement,
\nCOHA, between the government and GAM) without any preventive
\naction by the military, and which was not followed up by an
\nindependent investigative team.<\/p>\n
This was the first time in Aceh's history that a group was
\nsuccessfully mobilized to create a \"horizontal\" conflict.<\/p>\n
In East Aceh, militias have gained a hold only in urban areas.
\nThis became possible after DOM, when the overthrow of Daud
\nBeureueh was allegedly conducted by military members and a
\norganization of thugs from North Sumatra. When people demanded an
\nend to DOM, militias in Langsa town resisted this demand.
\nUnderstandably, civilians here also resisted the presence of the
\nJSC.<\/p>\n
Interestingly, since DOM was ended, one result of the
\nintelligence operation in Aceh has been the forming of militias
\nin urban areas. Pockets of militias during the DOM period in East
\nand North Aceh and Pidie were blessed by ulema before facing
\nrebels. New pockets of militia are in Takengon, Meulaboh, South
\nAceh and Singkel, whose recruits are former thugs and
\ntransmigrants. In times of stability these groups can be
\nmobilized for political parties, and in times of war they can be
\nused to create conflict with other groups in society.<\/p>\n
After 1998, demands to settle human rights violations, efforts
\ntoward democracy and the special autonomy were aimed at returning
\ndignity to the Acehnese; all these tested the seriousness (of the
\ncentral government) yet (the demands) were not realized, hence
\nthe Acehnese remain in opposition to Jakarta.<\/p>\n
So how can a military operation conquer their hearts and
\nminds? With the Acehnese, you cannot engage in physical contact
\nand only touch their hearts. Weapons can only take out their
\nhearts ... All males in Aceh, from 14 years old upward, have
\nexperienced being slapped in the face by the military.<\/p>\n
One must therefore differentiate between the Free Aceh
\nMovement (GAM) and the rest of the people who are in opposition
\nto Jakarta. Let the people's voices be heard, just help guard
\ntheir rallies, in an effort to separate the people from GAM.
\nDon't label them or they could really become GAM!<\/p>\n
Thus, what is needed is to open up public space. Why was there
\nno shooting when field offices of the Joint Security Committee
\n(JSC) were destroyed while small rallies have been shot at? If
\npeople cannot channel their aspirations through nonviolent ways
\nthey will become radical.<\/p>\n
If there is an opportunity to review the COHA, what could be<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/violence-leads-to-reemergence-of-aceh-nationalism-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }