Vietnam needs vision to build peaceful and affluent society<\/p>\n
By Asvi Warman Adam<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): For Vietnam's leaders, these days are full of
\nworries. Indeed, the times of war have long past, but strangely
\nenough it is during this peacetime that they are facing an
\nextremely difficult decision to make.<\/p>\n
If we took a close look at the long history of this nation, we
\nwould understand that this nation has long been one of never-
\nending struggles.<\/p>\n
A lot of things have occurred, but one recurrent issue
\ninvolves the contrast between the vitality of the national
\nculture of the Vietnamese and the discontinuity in their
\npolitical construction. It seems that the capacity of the
\nVietnamese as a people has constantly had to collide with the
\ninstability of the country's political structure.<\/p>\n
In the wake of the eras of the Ly, Tran and Le dynasties, as
\nwell as the upheavals of the last half of a century, the
\nVietnamese state has literally functioned in a fragmented
\nfashion. As noted by Daniel Hemery, an expert on the history of
\nVietnam at the University of Paris, during the entire period of
\nfour and a half centuries, namely, between 1558 and 1990, the
\ncountry has had the chance to be united politically for a total
\nof only 70 years.<\/p>\n
Outside of these seven decades, Vietnam has had to undergo
\nperiods of fragmentation, tensions and conflicts, both internal
\nand external. Internal wars seem to have been their hallmark.<\/p>\n
As a political society that wishes to build national unity and
\nsolidarity, the Vietnamese have had to face a huge obstacle in
\ntheir fight to continue to exist. Up until today, the divergence
\nbetween the north and the south is still felt in Vietnam in
\nvarious aspects of life.<\/p>\n
This problem stems partially from outside pressure coinciding
\nwith the flaring of internal tensions. This can be seen in the
\nfact that the division of Vietnam into two distinct entities
\nafter its independence, between 1954 and 1966, was made possible
\nby the lack of unity in social consensus among the Vietnamese
\nthemselves.<\/p>\n
This fragmented internal situation was aggravated by the
\nforeign intervention by the United States, China and the Soviet
\nUnion that for all intents and purposes functioned as an
\nextension of the French colonial actions.<\/p>\n
But perhaps the most consistent and influential of these
\nexternal pressures was that exerted by China for as long as two
\nthousand years.<\/p>\n
To the Vietnamese, living next door to the much larger state
\nof China, with its burgeoning population, has meant living
\nconstantly under threat. Any strong Chinese presence exerts
\nconstraints on Vietnam.<\/p>\n
In this geo-historical situation that is as disadvantageous to
\nVietnam as it is, we see a historical paradox: The Vietnamese
\nnational community has proved itself to be an enduring one, far
\nfrom being destroyed. And for all the fear of China, the
\ntraditional structure of Vietnamese society consists of a
\ntriangle of powers: the state or monarch, the educated elite
\n(mandarin) and the peasant community.<\/p>\n
It is no accident that the essence of this system originated
\nfrom the state model of Chinese Confucianism. Borrowing the
\nChinese model, while at the same time trying to break loose from
\nits influence has been one of Vietnam's biggest dilemmas.<\/p>\n
To the Vietnamese, China has been a long-time foe, while at
\nthe same time functioning their mentor. The modern Vietnamese
\nstate has continued socializing these old values: The structure
\nof peasant community and family, myths, religious rituals, farmer
\npatriotism, as well as a total bond to the native land and the
\nancestors.<\/p>\n
Yet Vietnam has remained a clear and unique entity through the
\nlong periods of collision with the Chinese civilization, and with
\nits briefer encounters in the 20th century with some of the
\nworld's mightier powers such as France and the United States.<\/p>\n
In 1976, one year after the fall of Saigon, the culmination of
\nthe efforts at reunification of Vietnam took place. And this
\nshould have been seen as the most appropriate time for the
\nVietnamese to think of their future.<\/p>\n
Instead, what they did was invade Cambodia. This left them
\nentrapped in that neighboring country over a decade. Their
\neconomic development was neglected, their dependence on the
\nSoviet Union grew. And finally there was nobody they could rely
\non as the Soviet Union itself collapsed.<\/p>\n
Looking to the past for answers is clearly futile. Nowadays,
\nwhat the Vietnamese may need most is a future-oriented outlook
\nthat could redefine the directions to be taken toward reaching
\nthe goals of a peaceful and affluent society.<\/p>\n
What is missing in Vietnam today is a social consensus, that
\nis, a shared understanding between everybody in the community --
\nincluding party members -- of what the Vietnamese community
\nitself now is, what it is to become, and how to bring it from
\nhere to there.<\/p>\n
This is what is termed "social vision" by Douglas Pike, an
\nexpert on Vietnam at the University of California, Berkeley. He
\nis adamant that a nation requires leaders, but a nation also
\nneeds a vision.<\/p>\n
Without leaders, a nation will not advance. However, without a
\nvision, a nation will vacillate without a clear direction despite
\nthe fact that leaders exist.<\/p>\n
Vietnam has several questions to answer in relation to this
\nsocial vision:<\/p>\n
Is the class-struggle still relevant? Can the history and the
\nfuture of Vietnam be explained in terms of dialectics-
\nmaterialism?<\/p>\n
Does the market economy suit socialism and can they go
\nhand-in-hand? Will the Communist Party be able to retain the
\nmonopoly of power? How far should iron-clad discipline be
\nexercised and how much freedom should be allowed within the
\nparty? And how about individual and private property?<\/p>\n
Social vision is also related to the ability to question any
\nnumber of aspects of a situation with which, up to now, no one
\nhas been able to or allowed to take issue.<\/p>\n
After the end of the Cold War, as well as the collapse of both
\nthe Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Vietnam is faced with a
\ndilemma: Should they maintain socialism -- like China, or should
\nthey open themselves up to political pluralism that will be
\naccompanied by economic reformation?<\/p>\n
What they have apparently decided to do is the latter:
\nEconomic development now, and political development later.<\/p>\n
After all, following the example of China means maintaining
\nthe supremacy of the party.<\/p>\n
Political renovation will always take casualties. A greater
\npolitical openness will inevitably shake the existing regime.<\/p>\n
One more time we are witnessing the actualization of the
\neternal model that Vietnam has followed in the walk of its
\nhistory: To follow the example of China and to keep a safe
\ndistance from that very mentor.<\/p>\n
Regardless of whichever model Vietnam follows, there is merit
\nin reminding ourselves of what De Tocqueville said more than a
\ncentury ago: "The most critical moment for a regime is when it
\nstarts reformation ..."<\/p>\n
Dr. Asvi Warman Adam is an observer of Vietnam at the
\nIndonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI).<\/p>",
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