U.S. security strategy in SE Asia<\/p>\n
This is the second of two articles based on a paper delivered
\nby U.S. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen in Singapore on
\nJan. 15, 1998 during the officiating of the Institute for Defense
\nand Strategic Studies.<\/p>\n
SINGAPORE: The United Sates sees several patterns of change in
\nAsia's security environment in spite of the enduring features of
\nits security landscape -- the high stakes, American engagement
\nand presence, and the strong system of bilateral alliances.<\/p>\n
Unlike the cataclysmic changes in Europe at the end of the
\nCold War, change in Asia has been evolutionary. Thus far, the
\nregion has anticipated and adapted well to these changes in the
\nsecurity environment. Yet these remain turbulent times. Our
\ngreatest challenge thus remains to anticipate and manage change.<\/p>\n
The first of these changes is the emergence of multilateral
\nframeworks for discussion and cooperation, which in a few short
\nyears have become an important and permanent feature of the
\nregional security structure.<\/p>\n
The United States is actively engaged in a variety of
\noverlapping multilateral channels such as the (ASEAN) Association
\nof Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum, the so-called ARF; the
\nsub-regional confidence-building efforts, such as the trilateral
\ndialogues between the United States, China and Japan, and between
\nthe United States, South Korea and Japan, and; the conferences on
\npractical security cooperation and groups formed to address
\nspecific problems from Cambodia to the Four-Party Talks on the
\nKorean Peninsula.<\/p>\n
Some would like to see multilateral security dialogues and
\ncooperation replace bilateral relationships as the primary
\nfeature of regional stability in the coming era. The United
\nStates views these multilateral mechanisms as important, and
\nhaving a greater role to play in the future.<\/p>\n
But we also believe that they will be successful only if they
\nare built upon the foundation of solid bilateral relationships
\nand a continued U.S. forward presence in the region. That is why
\nthe United States will not support efforts that intentionally or
\notherwise constrain our military posture or operational
\nflexibility efforts that would only undermine, rather than
\ncontribute, to the region's security.<\/p>\n
Given the high stakes involved, security architectures, even
\nmore than financial architectures, must be built on a solid
\nfoundation, not shifting sands, if they are to provide protection
\nwhen the gale winds blow and tremors strike.<\/p>\n
A second element of change is the growing importance of
\nSoutheast Asia. Over the last 30 years, ASEAN has developed into
\na multifaceted power center in its own right, one that is
\nintegral to the entire Asia-Pacific.<\/p>\n
ASEAN has also distinguished itself by tackling such issues as
\nCambodia and the South China Sea, facilitating region-wide
\ndialogue through the ARF and by serving as a powerful example for
\nthe region and the world. Indeed, three decades of solving
\nproblems reducing tensions and working cooperatively for mutual
\nbenefit bodes well as ASEAN confronts the challenges of today.<\/p>\n
Given our shared interests, we look forward to Southeast Asia
\nas an increasingly important partner and facilitators of the U.S.
\nforward presence through such activities as port calls, repair,
\ntraining and logistics support. Much has been achieved in recent
\nyears to enhance our access, and we look forward to building on
\nthis cooperation in the future.<\/p>\n
Of course, the most anticipated change in Asia has been the
\nemergence of China. In many respects, China has already emerged.
\nToday, China is an Asian power, and rightfully so. The United
\nStates does not fear this, nor do we view China as an adversary.
\nRather, we seek to encourage China to step forward as a
\nresponsible and cooperative great nation.<\/p>\n
A nation that preserves its unique identity, but is more open
\non security matters and more respectful of the rule of law -- a
\nnation that adheres to international norms, including peaceful
\nresolution of disputes, the control of weapons of mass
\ndestruction and freedom of the seas, and a nation that joins us
\nin rejecting a zero-sum attitude toward security by recognizing
\nthe common interests we all share in a stable environment that
\nensures security and promotes prosperity.<\/p>\n
Indeed, no nation has benefited more than China from the
\nstabilizing effect of America's security engagement in Asia.<\/p>\n
So the United States seeks to deepen engagement with China.
\nThe October summit between Presidents Clinton and Jiang gave
\ngreat hope that the two nations can work together towards their
\ncommon goals of stability, security and prosperity.<\/p>\n
In the security realm, the two nations have already taken
\nseveral steps to increase mutual confidence and decrease
\nmiscalculation -- exchanging military personnel, conducting
\nreciprocal ship visits, adopting procedures for U.S. Navy ships
\nto continue to call in Hong Kong ports, and, last months at the
\nfirst-even Sino-American defense talks, signing an agreement to
\nshake information on humanitarian exercises.<\/p>\n
Later this week in Beijing, we will take the additional step
\nof signing a Military Maritime Consultative Agreement which will
\nboth help avoid incidents at sea and create a venue for dialogue
\nbetween operational naval officers. Such engagements gives hope
\nthat China is willing to work with us to our mutual benefit and
\nthe benefit of the entire region.<\/p>\n
A fourth element of change on the security landscape is in
\nNortheast Asia. We cannot say when and we cannot say how, but
\nchange will come to the Korean Peninsula. We are working on
\nseveral fronts to enable change there to be peaceful and orderly.
\nFrom promoting dialogue on the peninsula in the Four-Party talks
\nthat for the first time brought together North and South Korea,
\nthe United States and China, to continuing implementation of the
\n1994 Nuclear Agreed Framework.<\/p>\n
While the United States and the Republic of Korea will
\ncontinue to work side-by-side on these matters, every Asian
\ncountry has a stake in the outcome and must play a role by
\nproviding political support, supporting KEDO and other measures.<\/p>\n
Even after the immediate threat to stability has receded on
\nthe peninsula, the alliance will serve to keep the peace and
\nstability in Northeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region as a
\nwhole. Following in-depth dialogue, our government agreed last
\nmonth on the need to maintain our bilateral security alliance for
\nthe long-term, while adapting it to changing circumstances.<\/p>\n
A fifth change in the Asia-Pacific is the enlargement of the
\nregion. As a geographic entity, the region has become more
\nelastic. India is a growing actor, Russia is a potential player,
\nand Europe is increasingly linked to the region through a variety
\nof dialogues and entities.<\/p>\n
Anticipating and managing this sea of change will continue to
\nrequire the stable anchor of American forces that provide
\ncertainty and confidence. This has been summarized in our
\ncontinued commitment to maintain approximately 100,000 U.S.
\npersonnel forward-deployed in the Asia-Pacific, although we all
\nrecognize this is shorthand for a panoply of measures of our
\nsecurity engagement and military capability in the region.<\/p>\n
We seek to enhance both, the former through deepened
\ncooperation, and the latter through new technologies, operational
\nconcepts and organizational structures that will transform our
\nforces in the coming decade and beyond.<\/p>\n
Managing change also requires us to have more open and candid
\nstrategic dialogue, particularly with our defense colleagues in
\nthe region, to enhance transparency, confidence and understanding
\nof shared security interests. We will work to encourage
\nappropriate mechanisms for such dialogue.<\/p>\n
In closing, let me, as one who was an elected U.S. official
\nfor the past quarter century, recount some recent history that
\nseems pertinent to the primary issue of the day. It was not that
\nlong ago that American strategic thinkers were debating \"the
\ndecline of America\".<\/p>\n
Ronald Reagan persuaded the American people in 1984 that it
\nwas morning in America, but by the late 1980s quite serious and
\nthoughtful people argued that America's day in the sun was ending
\nand that the sun was rising on a new global power.<\/p>\n
America was in decline, we were told, as part of an
\nhistorically inevitable \"Rise and Fall of Nations.\" And even many
\nwho do not adhere to historical determinism looked at the U.S.
\nfederal government's US$200 billion deficits as far as the eye
\ncould see and declared defeat in the face of trends that were
\nundermining our economy.<\/p>\n
This declinist school among intelligentsia was accompanied by
\nunderstandably disgruntled portion of our population whose
\nlivelihoods were destroyed or endangered by corporate downsizing.
\nKey industries were seemingly being hollowed out, leaving some
\nregions of America so economically desperate that comparisons
\nwith the great depression were commonplace.<\/p>\n
At both ends of our political spectrum, economic populists and
\nnationalists emerged and, while they offered cures worse than the
\ndisease, they gained considerable support. And friends and allies
\naround the world beseeched us to get our house in order.<\/p>\n
Just a few years later, this picture has been turned on its
\nhead. American industry is vibrant. U.S. unemployment is at its
\nlowest level in over two decades. Our federal budget is about to
\nbe in surplus for the first time in three decades, and recent
\nreports suggest there will be large surpluses as far as the eye
\ncan see, a string of surpluses not seen since the 1920s. And few
\nspeak of an America in decline.<\/p>\n
What accounts for the dramatic reversal? One factor
\nundoubtedly is the human tendency to view things more starkly
\nthan they really are, both the hard times and the good times. But
\nmore fundamentally, we took the advice of our friends around the
\nworld to get our house in order.<\/p>\n
Our people have adapted to the discipline imposed by markets,
\ndespite the difficulty involved at the time and the ongoing
\nanxiety that affects many. And despite significant pressure at
\ntimes, political factors have not overridden economic and
\nbusiness factors as restructuring has occurred. Will Durant
\nreminded us that, \"the present is the past rolled up for action,
\nand the past is the present unrolled for understanding.\"<\/p>\n
It is not hard to find some lessons in this history, as well
\nas a perspective that can justify the statement that we have
\nconfidence in the future of Asia notwithstanding the present
\ndifficulties.<\/p>\n
The energy, creativity and discipline of our Asian partners
\nand allies continue undiminished. And with continued self
\nconfidence in these strengths and a determination to pursue the
\neconomically sound path, our partners and allies in Asia can
\nemerge from the crucible of current crisis fundamentally
\nstronger.<\/p>",
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