U.S. engages in 'admiral diplomacy'<\/p>\n
Is Washington trying to make up for its lack of political
\nattention towards Southeast Asia by sending admirals to do its
\nwork? Derek da Cunha examines the issue.<\/p>\n
In recent months, increasing doubts have been cast about the
\ncredibility of the United States security commitment to the Asia-
\nPacific region in general, and Southeast Asia in particular.
\nThose doubts, raised in significant part by Asian analysts, have
\nsomewhat rattled the Americans.<\/p>\n
This is because, in the realm of defense and security, the
\nU.S. has, for the better part of 20 years, been given due
\ndeference and respect by its Asian friends and allies. During
\nthat period, U.S. policies and strategic initiatives went largely
\nunchallenged by those who were tied to or benefited from
\nWashington's regional military presence.<\/p>\n
Now, however, some of America's Asian friends and allies are
\nunveiling apparent flaws in U.S. security strategy in the Asia-
\nPacific like the fact that the U.S. forward-deployed presence,
\nconcentrated in Northeast Asia, is weighted towards ground
\nforces which have little relevance to Southeast Asian security,
\nthat the U.S. has cutback its surveillance of the South China
\nSea, and that senior U.S. officials have sent out wrong signals
\nwhose effect has merely been to encourage Chinese regional
\nassertiveness, and so on and so forth. U.S. officials are not
\nused to this pointed criticism by Asian friends, and have reacted
\nrather defensively.<\/p>\n
The Asian criticism and the attendant American defensiveness
\nis illustrative of two phenomena. First, there is now a small but
\ngrowing core of Asian defense analysts well-versed in various
\naspects of military strategy, from rudimentary policy
\nplanning, to rigorous hardware analysis, to the operating
\ndoctrines of specific armed forces. These analysts have
\ndemonstrated that they are not credulous in their approach
\nto official U.S. statements. Rather, they do their own analysis
\nand come up with their own conclusions.<\/p>\n
The second of the two phenomena has to do with the fact that
\nthe Americans have been slow on the uptake. The advent of
\nstraight-talking Asian defense analysts picking holes in U.S.
\nsecurity policy have caught the Americans by surprise, and they
\nhave failed to reconcile themselves to this new feature in the
\nAsian strategic landscape.<\/p>\n
American surprise at the new ground rules of the regional
\nsecurity discourse, is only surpassed by its surprise at Chinese
\nstrategic moves in the region. The U.S. was caught out in two
\nways by China's move onto Mischief Reef in the South China Sea.
\nOne, by not knowing about the move until the Philippines had
\nfound out about it through one of its fishermen. And two, by the
\nfact that a U.S. Defense Department official made the blunder of
\nconfirming that the U.S. had indeed been caught unawares, thereby
\nhanging out to dry the unpalatable truth -- the low priority
\naccorded to Southeast Asia in the hierarchy of U.S. global
\nsecurity interests.<\/p>\n
Faced with perturbed friends and allies in the region,
\nWashington embarked on a damage-limitation exercise. This was
\ndone through what this writer calls "admiral diplomacy". Within
\nthe space of about four weeks, from late February to late March,
\nthree four-star admirals coasted through the region, ostensibly
\non familiarization visits, but really in an attempt to provide
\nsome reassurance to the locals.<\/p>\n
The visits were kicked off by the Commander-in-Chief of the
\nU.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Ronald Zlatoper. In Singapore, on
\nFeb. 23, Adm. Zlatoper rebutted criticism that the U.S. was not
\ncommitted to a strong presence in the Asia-Pacific. To support
\nhis rebuttal, he asserted that there were now more U.S. Pacific
\nFleet ships forward-deployed in the region than five years ago.<\/p>\n
Two weeks later, Admiral Richard Macke, the Commander-in-Chief
\nof the U.S. Pacific Command, made a swing through Southeast Asia.
\nIn Indonesia, Adm. Macke seemed to contradict his Pacific Fleet
\nchief when, in response to a question from the Far
\nEast Economic Review, he said: "Any reduction we have in this
\nregion has nothing to do with the Philippines. Any reduction in
\nactivity has to do with a reduction in overall force levels and
\nwith commitments in other places." The Admiral's comment went up
\nlike a lead balloon.<\/p>\n
That the two most senior U.S. military officers responsible
\nfor the Asia-Pacific region could not get their stories straight
\nonly added to the general regional perception of American
\ndisarray in, and policy drift towards, the Asia-Pacific.<\/p>\n
To cap a less than successful spurt of U.S. "admiral
\ndiplomacy", the Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
\nAdmiral William Owens visited ASEAN capitals in the second
\nhalf of March. He was to drop a bit of a bombshell.<\/p>\n
On that trip, Adm. Owens said, among other things, that the
\nU.S. no longer wanted to be treated as a superpower but, instead,
\nas a "Super Partner" in the region. He did not quite elaborate on
\nwhat he meant by the new label. But the connotation, of a switch
\nfrom super power to Super Partner status, tended to indicate the
\nprospect of reduced U.S. regional responsibilities.<\/p>\n
Therefore, by the end of March, the damage-limitation
\nexercise, pursued under the ambit of "admiral diplomacy", turned
\nout to have the opposite effect.<\/p>\n
But beyond the verbal slip-ups, America's four-star admirals
\njust could not make up for one important fact - Washington's
\napparent political inattention towards Southeast Asia. And this
\nis something which the Americans continue to display a lack of
\ninterest in redressing.<\/p>\n
Dr. Derek da Cunha is a Senior Fellow at the Institute of
\nSoutheast Asian Studies and is Editor of Trends.<\/p>",
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