Urgent, an exit strategy for Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam<\/p>\n
Kirsten E. Schulze
\nSenior Lecturer
\nInternational History
\nLondon School of Economics<\/p>\n
The military operation against the Free Aceh Movement (GAM)
\nhas entered the fourth month of what increasingly looks like an
\nindeterminate period. Politicians have ruled out returning to
\nnegotiations in the near future. Indonesian Military (TNI)
\ncommanders on the ground and in Jakarta have stated that a year
\nor more may be required to achieve their aims.<\/p>\n
These military, and above all, political goals, however,
\nremain unclear in many ways. Beyond the immediate security
\nobjectives of dismantling GAM's shadow government, reducing the
\nmovement's military capacity, and cutting its finance, logistics
\nand communications lines, there does not seem to be a long-term
\nstrategic game plan. So not surprisingly there has been little
\ntalk of an exit strategy.<\/p>\n
Why, one may ask, is there a need for an exit strategy? After
\nall TNI has already registered a number of successes such as
\nsecuring the urban areas and breaking down GAM into smaller
\nunits. The simple answer is because no military operation,
\nirrespective of success and professionalism, is sustainable in
\nthe long-term without a political end-goal.<\/p>\n
For one, there is the issue of decreasing returns. Once an
\ninsurgent movement has been broken down into smaller groups and
\npushed into the jungle, they are more difficult to hunt down and
\ntend to have the operational advantage.<\/p>\n
Alongside decreasing returns are rising costs, the actual
\nfinancial expenditure as well as the human and ultimately
\npolitical cost. The salaries and special allowances for an
\nestimated 43,000-45,000 troops are only a small part compared to
\nthe financial sting from the logistics support chain, which
\nincludes high cost items such as aircraft and ship resupplies.<\/p>\n
The human costs are even greater as they are borne by the
\ncivilian population. Not only are they on the receiving end of
\nviolence by GAM but they are also the main victims of erosion of
\ndiscipline by TNI and the police.<\/p>\n
This undermines the operation by losing the hearts and minds
\nof exactly those people the state purports to defend. Above all,
\nan exit strategy is needed because it is not possible to resolve
\nthe insurgency in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) by force alone.
\nThe conflict is a political one and thus any military operation
\nis by definition limited in scope, remit and length. It can only
\never be a means to a political end not an end in itself.<\/p>\n
So if the military operation is only a means to an end, what
\nis that end? Here there are broadly three politico-military
\nstrategies for which the current military operation could be
\ninstrumental.<\/p>\n
The first is to return to the negotiating table in the hope of
\nreaching an agreement with GAM. If this is the political goal
\nthen the military aim is to reduce GAM's capacity on the ground
\nto such an extent that the leadership will be more open to
\ncompromise and ultimately sign up to autonomy.<\/p>\n
TNI seems to prefer a variation on this option, namely using
\nits operation as a means to compel GAM to renounce separatism and
\nto accept what had been previously on offer by Indonesia -- an
\nautonomy agreement -- but without further negotiations.<\/p>\n
The possibility of getting GAM to sign up to autonomy either
\nthrough negotiations or force is, of course, predicated upon
\nGAM's ideological and psychological ability to conclude an
\nagreement that falls short of independence. According to most
\nestimates this is unlikely to happen.<\/p>\n
However, even if GAM did conclude such a deal, it would never
\nbe more than the product of the movement's lack of choices, in
\nparticular, the absence of a credible military option. In that
\nsense the decision to enter a political agreement could be purely
\ntactical. It may only postpone further armed confrontation. Yet
\nit may also transform the struggle into a purely political one
\nfought through the ballot box.<\/p>\n
The second option is a variation upon the first in the sense
\nthat negotiations are central. These negotiations, however, are
\nnot bilaterally with GAM and the aim is not an agreement with the
\nseparatists. Instead, the dialog is with the people of NAD and
\nthe aim is to reach consensus in NAD, amongst the Acehnese, on
\nthe governance of NAD. In such a dialog there is, of course, no
\nreason for not including GAM as part of the Acehnese people
\nprovided it plays by democratic rules for which at least a
\ncredible ceasefire is necessary.<\/p>\n
In support of this option the aim of the military operation
\nbeyond reducing GAM's capacity on the ground is to increase the
\npeople's options and to create the space for open dialog with and
\namong the Acehnese.<\/p>\n
Yet this option, too, has drawbacks. GAM may not be interested
\nin pursuing a dialog in which it is only one among many players.
\nIt may not agree to a ceasefire or to an internal negotiation
\nprocess in NAD rather than overseas.<\/p>\n
The movement may even resort to violence in an attempt to
\nsabotage this kind of dialog. But that does not mean this option
\nis not worth pursuing. In fact, it could be argued that the
\nbroadening of the negotiations is a way to marginalize GAM.<\/p>\n
The third option assumes that negotiations of any type are
\neither not desirable or possible. In that case, the political
\ngoal is to stabilize NAD as an integral part of the Republic of
\nIndonesia. This means a narrowly defined and carefully executed
\nsecurity operation to reduce GAM's military capacity and to
\ncreate the space for a broad policy of development -- roads,
\neducation, public health, and sanitation as well as providing
\nopportunities for a better future such as scholarships, micro
\ncredit, and vocational training.<\/p>\n
Key to the success of this strategy is to win the hearts and
\nminds of the people of NAD -- not GAM and not the Acehnese
\npolitical elite.<\/p>\n
On the difficult side, this option requires the strength to
\nignore GAM provocations on the ground and statements by the
\nleadership in exile. Equally, if not more important, is an
\nabsolute commitment to cleaner and more effective government in
\nNAD.<\/p>\n
These options show clearly that there is no easy answer for
\nmanaging the conflict in NAD but that it is, nevertheless,
\npossible. For a successful outcome a clear political goal, a
\ndefinition of acceptable level of violence, and an exit strategy
\nare needed.<\/p>\n
Another crucial factor is socio-economic development. However,
\nthe choice of strategy -- and they are not mutually exclusive --
\nwill to a large degree depend upon the assessment of whether GAM
\nis capable of compromise as well as the inherent "price" of each
\nof the strategies.<\/p>\n
The writer is currently a visiting fellow at the Centre for
\nStrategic and International Studies, Jakarta.<\/p>",
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