UNSC reform goes through take-and-give process<\/p>\n
By Hasan Kleib<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): One of the most hotly debated issues in the
\ncurrent session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is
\nthe Security Council reform.<\/p>\n
There has been a common perception that reform is needed, but
\nit appears that more work is needed before the reforms satisfy
\neveryone.<\/p>\n
The general concern that the current formation of the UNSC is
\nobsolete and needs to be changed derives from several facts.
\nFirst of all, the UNSC which has lived for a very long time under
\nthe antagonistic Cold War mentality suddenly finds itself in a
\ncompletely different set of circumstances.<\/p>\n
There is no more big bad red bear with a nice little veto card
\nto be watched, but there are a lot of other wolves -- which like
\nto devour roasted white pigeons -- that need to be tamed. The
\nUNSC needs new direction.<\/p>\n
Secondly, the UNSC's workload has increased in an
\nunprecedented manner. From January 1987 to January 1988 the UNSC
\nadopted 15 resolutions. But from January 1994 to December 1994
\nthe UNSC adopted 78 resolutions.<\/p>\n
Thirdly, membership of the UNSC is numerically unrealistic.
\nWhen it was founded in 1945, only 11 of the 51 UN member
\ncountries were UNSC members.<\/p>\n
From 1945 to 1963, as UN membership grew to 112 States, UNSC
\nmembership grew to 15 States. Four new seats for non-permanent
\nmembers were created. UN membership has since grown to 185.<\/p>\n
Fourth, there is the issue of balanced representation. Current
\ncircumstances demonstrate the damning fact that Europe is over-
\nrepresented, Asia is under-represented, Africa, Latin America and
\nthe Caribbean are not represented. This is indeed an anachronism
\nas most UN members are developing countries.<\/p>\n
The UNGA has established a Working Group which is mandated to
\ndeal with such critical issues as size, composition, and veto and
\ndecision making processes. Since 1994, its debates have mainly
\nbeen on size, composition and veto.<\/p>\n
A paper by the Chairman of the Working Group, Ambassador
\nRazali Ismail of Malaysia, proposed that membership be increased
\nto 24 by adding five new permanent members from developing
\nStates.<\/p>\n
He also proposed new non-permanent members -- one each from
\nAfrica, Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, and Eastern Europe.<\/p>\n
They will have no veto powers. New permanent members were to
\nbe elected by a two-thirds majority of GA members.<\/p>\n
It was proposed that election be on Feb. 28, 1998. And that
\nusing veto be limited only under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.<\/p>\n
However, there has been no agreement on the proposal.<\/p>\n
It is well known in multilateral forums that governments
\ndetest deadlines, especially when it concerns their own
\ninterests.<\/p>\n
The NAM request was for at least 11 new members, not nine,
\ntaking UNSC to 26 members. Africa, in particular, demands two
\nseats.<\/p>\n
Developed countries seem to agree on the composition as long
\nas Germany and Japan will soon join. And on the issue of the
\nnumber of permanent members, the United States has declared that
\nthere should not be more than 20 or 21 members.<\/p>\n
Despite its undoubted goodwill, this proposal appears to have
\nunforeseen negative consequences.<\/p>\n
Firstly, the proposed five new countries would have made up a
\nconfiguration of 10 permanent members which would create another
\nimbalance -- seven industrialized or big powers versus three
\ndeveloping countries.<\/p>\n
Secondly, the admittance of Germany and Japan would go
\nsmoothly, but choosing three developing countries would create
\ncompetition which could open old wounds.<\/p>\n
The West's inclination toward a quick-fix formula was rejected
\nby the developing countries which insisted on a comprehensive
\nsolution.<\/p>\n
Another proposal was forwarded, namely limited regional
\nrotation which would provide permanent seats for a number of
\nmajor developing countries which would take turns in filling the
\nseats for a certain agreed period.<\/p>\n
It was proposed that three permanent seats be allocated to
\nAsia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean respectively.<\/p>\n
Meanwhile Germany and Japan would maintain their status as
\ncandidates from the industrialized countries. This could
\neliminate the difficulty of reaching consensus among major
\ncountries to represent their respective region.<\/p>\n
It could also give middle-size and smaller states in the
\nregion more frequent access to nonpermanent membership.<\/p>\n
On the negative side of the ledger, this proposal carries an
\nobvious discrimination between developed and developing countries
\nsince it would create four classes of members of the UNSC.<\/p>\n
That is five-non rotating original permanent members with veto
\nrights, two-non rotating new permanent members without veto
\npowers (Germany and Japan), three-permanently rotating permanent
\nmembers; and the current two-year-term non-permanent members, to
\nbe fought for by 175 members of the United Nations.<\/p>\n
A number of issues fundamental to the reform surface such as:
\nWhich categories of membership, permanent or non-permanent,
\nshould be enlarged? Would it be acceptable to create a new
\ncategory? What is a more representative and balanced number and
\nhow would it be distributed geographically? What are the
\nobjective criteria for becoming a permanent member? Who will
\ndecide on the developing country members? Will the permanent
\nmembers have veto powers? Will the existing veto powers be
\nmaintained, limited or eliminated? And will a deadline be set for
\na consensus.<\/p>\n
Priority should be focused on an objective which would
\nguarantee fairness and impartiality in determining the new
\npermanent members.<\/p>\n
Back in 1945 permanent UNSC members were chosen by certain
\ncriteria as clearly demonstrated by the fact that they are either
\nthe winners of World War II or big regional powers with enough
\nclout to maintain peace and security.<\/p>\n
On the question of German and Japanese admission, the criteria
\nis again the currency in the market.<\/p>\n
It has been argued that their economic prowess, high political
\nstanding and influential roles in their respective regions have
\nmade them eligible to assume a bigger role in the international
\ncommunity.<\/p>\n
It is clear that the international community has indeed
\nemployed a set of criteria to determine UNSC permanent members.
\nAnd for current non-permanent membership. Although there are no
\nwritten criteria, members are chosen largely on their ability to
\nassume responsibilities for the membership.<\/p>\n
This may explain why certain countries have been reelected
\nconsecutively or several times.<\/p>\n
These point to another important facet, i.e objective criteria
\nmay also be defined regionally, since specific regional features
\ncould demand differing criteria.<\/p>\n
What the international community really needs is flexibility
\nand readiness to accommodate.<\/p>\n
Developed countries should stop being recalcitrant and realize
\nthat the membership of the UNSC does not reflect current
\nrealities.<\/p>\n
They should accept the demand for larger membership and avoid
\nimposing a quick-fix formula which would leave developing
\ncountries behind in a chaos of unhealthy, bickering competition.<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, developing countries need to show their flexibility
\nby not pressing on the castration of veto power.<\/p>\n
Flexibility is required by developing countries if they want
\nto consolidate their positions at all levels, ranging from
\npolitical groupings to regional interests.<\/p>\n
The reforms should be treated as a give and take process
\nbetween developed and developing countries as well as among
\ndeveloping countries themselves.<\/p>\n
Competition that could diminish the peaceful co-existence of
\nnations should always be avoided.<\/p>\n
The writer is an observer of international affairs and was
\nassigned to a diplomatic mission in the UN Headquarters. The
\nviews expressed in this article are strictly personal.<\/p>",
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