Uniting ethnic groups key to Afghan future<\/p>\n
Riza Sihbudi, Chairman, Indonesian Society of Middle Eastern
\nStudies, Jakarta<\/p>\n
The swift defeat of the Taliban was due to two factors. First,
\nthey do not have a military force and structure like in other
\ncountries - they do not even wear military uniforms. Most members
\nof the Taliban militia consist of ordinary citizens who are
\ncalled upon to be soldiers whenever required. While their main
\nasset is a fighting spirit, their military skills tend to be
\nsomewhat basic. As a consequence, the U.S.-led military attacks,
\nwhich used the latest modern weaponry, easily split the Taliban
\napart. Their situation has been worsened by their few, outdated
\nweapons.<\/p>\n
Second, albeit a smaller possibility, the Taliban are
\ndeliberately \"conceding defeat\" by retreating from urban areas to
\navoid civilian victims during the holy month of Ramadhan. It is
\nalso an attempt to lead the fighting into mountainous terrain, an
\nenvironment they are better accustomed to. They seem to be fully
\naware that their advantages lie in guerrilla warfare. As
\nfrequently asserted by their leaders, they will continue their
\nstruggle even after being forced out from strategic cities, such
\nas Mazar-i Sharif, Kabul and Kandahar.<\/p>\n
By their reckoning, the Northern Alliance's current
\nsuperiority is only due to the support of the United States and
\nBritain. When the time comes for these two powers to leave
\nAfghanistan, then it is almost certain that the strength of the
\nNorthern Alliance will crumble.<\/p>\n
Since the Taliban's defeat, the future of Afghanistan is
\nbecoming ever more uncertain.<\/p>\n
First, what is known as the Northern Alliance is in fact no
\nmore than a loose coalition formed for the sole temporary
\nobjective of fighting the Taliban. Hence, after defeating the
\nTaliban, the Northern Alliance is likely to face internal
\nfriction, especially on issues such as the form of government and
\nleadership. The latter is thornier because the three largest
\ngroups dominating the Northern Alliance have different ethnic and
\nideological backgrounds: The Tajik with their Sunni Islam, the
\nHazara embracing Syiah Islam and the predominantly pro-communist
\nUzbeks.<\/p>\n
Second, there is a difference in interests between the
\nNorthern Alliance and its supporting countries, particularly
\nPakistan and the United States. These two countries obviously
\nwant the formation of a government with a wider base, which means
\nthe inclusion of the largest ethnic group, the Pashtuns.<\/p>\n
On the other hand, conflict between the Northern Alliance and
\nthe mostly pro-Taliban Pashtuns has long been deeply rooted and
\nwill be hard to solve in the near future. Furthermore, the United
\nStates clearly wishes the return of Afghanistan's former king,
\nZahir Syah, even though he is not popular among the majority of
\nAfghans and, to top it off, he is not well liked by many in the
\nNorthern Alliance.<\/p>\n
Third, the strength of the Taliban has not been depleted
\nentirely. This means there is a great possibility that the
\nTaliban could retaliate with the support of huge funding from
\nOsama bin Laden's al-Qaeda group. Past experience also indicates
\nit is likely that a certain faction in the Northern Alliance,
\nfeeling discontented with the power-sharing setup, might flirt
\nwith the Taliban.<\/p>\n
It is also common knowledge that, so far, the friendship and
\nenmity among Afghanistan's warlords have always been based on
\ntheir own temporary or short-term interests, rather than long-
\nterm benefits for the public and the nation.<\/p>\n
Traditional politics in Afghanistan is not easily separable
\nfrom its three divisions of communal identity -- qawm (solidarity
\ngroup), tribe and ethnic group.Qawm is the communal segmentation
\nbound by feelings of solidarity such as large families, clans,
\ngroups of immigrants and villages. The formation of qawm is based
\non family and patron-client relationships and ranks below tribal
\nor ethnic groups rather than particular districts.<\/p>\n
Tribalism is the main feature of the Pashtun in southern and
\neastern Afghanistan. The Pashtun have the Pashtunwali -- a set of
\nvalues, customs and laws to adhere to. They also have an
\ninstitutional framework called jirga or tribal council with a
\nrole to draw up and adopt policies through a consensus under the
\nleadership of the elders.<\/p>\n
Ethnic units in Afghanistan are akin to a maze, each having a
\ndifferent authority from the other. And ethnic groups do not show
\nmuch symmetry.<\/p>\n
A Pashtun, for example, is not merely a person who speaks in
\nthe Pashtun vernacular but also one of tribal identity. While,
\nthe Haraza refers more to a religious sect, such as Shia or
\nShiite, rather than ethnicity. It is therefore difficult to
\ndefine the ethnic groups as a heterogeneous and symmetrical unit.<\/p>\n
The war that broke out in 1978 caused dramatic social changes
\nsuch as urbanization, particularly Kabul and Mazar-i Sharif, as
\nwell as migration to other countries. Since then, an estimated
\nfive million people have fled the country to seek refuge in Iran,
\nPakistan and other countries.<\/p>\n
Afghan politics has become more complex due to several
\nfactors such as qawm, tribes and ethnicity as well as ideological
\nand political elements and the strong influence of other
\ncountries, especially Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. At the
\nlocal level, the main issue is still qawm affiliation.<\/p>\n
Therefore, the future of post-Taliban Afghanistan depends
\nheavily on the kind of agreement reached by the large ethnic
\ngroups -- Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek -- as well as the
\nwarlords. A sincere willingness is also called for from outside
\nparties involved in the Afghan conflict, especially Pakistan and
\nthe United States. Otherwise, stability for Afghanistan will
\nremain a distant hope and the suffering of its people will
\ncontinue for a long time to come.<\/p>",
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"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
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