Unfairness likely to cloud polls<\/p>\n
By J. Sumardianta<\/p>\n
YOGYAKARTA (JP): The 1999 general election, scheduled for next
\nJune, may be regarded as the \"soul\" of the entire reform process.
\nHopefully it will produce a legitimate and credible government.<\/p>\n
It has become an important issue since some still question the
\nlegitimacy and credibility of President B.J. Habibie's
\ngovernment.<\/p>\n
The coming general election has put that government at its
\ngreatest political risk. If it fails, there may not be any reason
\nfor Habibie to retain his position until the end of 1999.<\/p>\n
Some fear that the next general election will be inconsistent
\nwith the \"reform spirit\". Such fear stems from the political
\nbills currently being deliberated by the House of Representatives
\n(DPR).<\/p>\n
Domination by government elements and the idea of allocating
\n55 DPR seats to the Armed Forces (ABRI) are two \"fragile spots\"
\nin the political bills.<\/p>\n
The Golkar ruling party and ABRI still continue to represent
\nthe status quo, while they are the major targets of the reform
\nmovement. Excessive adherence of the bills to the power machine
\ninherited from the former regime is indeed incompatible with
\ncommon sense and a sense of justice.<\/p>\n
General elections from 1971 through 1997 became national
\nagenda. The major problem was that the general elections were not
\nused as a means of rejuvenating the political system.<\/p>\n
Instead, the election process was solely used as a means of
\ngaining political legitimacy. People's participation was only
\nlimited to a few minutes of casting votes at the polling
\nstations. It was doubtless a part of the New Order government's
\npolitical grand design, in which people were only seen as vote
\ngivers.<\/p>\n
The general elections were a part of contrived political
\nschemes to maintain the status quo and manipulate the formal
\nrules for the interests of the regime. The administration was not
\nyet aware of the importance of transparent leadership
\nregeneration.<\/p>\n
During the New Order era, general elections were simply used
\nas a means to extend and preserve the regime's legitimacy.
\nManipulative practices were plotted at both the conceptual and
\noperational levels.<\/p>\n
They were aimed at securing Golkar's targeted number of votes
\nand perpetuation of the political hegemony of the regime. The
\ngeneral election principles of directness, openness, freedom and
\nconfidentiality remained a meaningless slogan.<\/p>\n
The New Order era's general elections involved three major
\nproblems.<\/p>\n
First, public participation at the structural level and in the
\nentire election process was lacking. The government dominated the
\norganizing committee and the whole election process -- voter
\nregistration, nomination of representatives, campaigns, as well
\nas casting and counting of votes and monitoring. Members of the
\nIndonesian Election Committee, for instance, were all government
\nministers.<\/p>\n
In addition, the General Election Institute was chaired by the
\nMinister of Home Affairs and the Election Monitoring Committee
\nwas headed by the Attorney General. At lower levels, election
\ncommittees were also dominated by government elements.<\/p>\n
Second, general elections were always slanted with unfair
\npractices because the bureaucratic apparatus sided with Golkar.
\nIt became distorted as government officials in the election
\ncommittee were also sitting on Golkar's board of directors.
\nGovernors and regents, down to village heads, besides chairing
\nregional election committees, also chaired Golkar's advisory
\nboards in their own regions.<\/p>\n
Third, vote counting did not involve any personnel from
\npolitical parties other than Golkar, which subsequently led to
\nunfair and manipulative practices. The government apparatus could
\nnot conduct this justly and fairly in view of its commitment to
\nGolkar.<\/p>\n
That was why general elections could not represent political
\nlegitimacy, or transfer power in a peaceful way and promote
\npolitical education.<\/p>\n
The New Order government's legitimacy obtained through general
\nelections was prone to be formal and procedural rather than moral
\nand essential. It was more pragmatic than ethical.<\/p>\n
These typical attributes in turn caused political crisis,
\nremoved from internal and external factors. Formal legitimacy of
\nthe regime was always loaded with contradictions, one of them
\nbeing its claim to perpetuate political stability, which then
\nturned out to be the major root of the government's illegitimacy.<\/p>\n
The founding fathers' obsession with a true parliament derived
\nfrom, elected by, and devoted to the people, and able to control
\nthe government, did not turn into reality during the New Order
\nera.<\/p>\n
The DPRs produced by the 1971 to 1997 general elections were
\nprone to represent the state's corporate interest more than that
\nof the people. Their representativeness was questionable because
\nalmost 60 percent of the members came from the Greater Jakarta
\narea.<\/p>\n
Turnover of government officials, which usually occurred after
\ngeneral elections, could not be regarded as a process of change
\nin the elite as it was no different from changing \"spare parts\"
\nfor the political machine, which contrived to preserve power.<\/p>\n
The political elite were not responsive and sensitive to
\nsocio-political dynamics. They continued to carry on with their
\npast ways of imposing their will in order to silence public
\ndemands for democratization.<\/p>\n
The absence of power limitation led to a simplified function
\nof general elections. Politicians at the infrastructure and
\nsuperstructure levels were lacking in self-confidence. They were
\nfearful they would be ousted from the political throne.<\/p>\n
Overprotection of the DPR compound from outsiders during the
\nMPR's Special Session in November was an instance. That is why
\nthis period after the New Order's fall is called the age of
\nextremes.<\/p>\n
We must be on the alert for a coming general election that
\nmight be carried out in the New Order style because unfair
\npractices still threaten through the political bills. Efforts to
\ndeflect the coming general election into a means of perpetuating
\nthe status quo still prevail.<\/p>\n
According to the political bills, the new MPR will be composed
\nof 700 seats, including 150 seats divided between 81 regional
\ndelegates and 69 group delegates. The problem is that the 81
\ndelegates will not be appointed by the president but by members
\nof local councils (DPRD), which resulted from the 1997 Golkar-
\ndominated general election.<\/p>\n
It is very likely that those seats will be controlled by those
\nwho support the status quo. On the other hand, the 69 group
\ndelegates will likely represent organizations such as the
\nIndonesian National Youth Committee (KNPI), the Indonesian
\nJournalists Association (PWI), the Indonesian Farmers Association
\n(HKTI) and the Federation of Indonesian Workers Associations
\n(FSPSI), which actually served as political machines of the New
\nOrder government.<\/p>\n
Thus, those who back the status quo will definitely earn 69
\nseats. As a result, 150 seats in the MPR will still be controlled
\nby Golkar. If these are combined with 55 seats for ABRI, the 205
\nseats are already at hand. To win the presidential election, they
\nwill only need 351 out of the 700 seats in the MPR. That means
\nthat Golkar will only need to gain 146 more seats in the DPR from
\nthe 1999 general election.<\/p>\n
Golkar will only need 30 percent of the collected votes to win
\nby practicing money politics. During the New Order era, money
\nproved itself to be a powerful tool to prop up power. Newly-
\nformed political parties are unlikely to win the coming general
\nelection.<\/p>\n
The solution is for pro-reform parties, such as the National
\nMandate Party (PAN), Megawati Soekarnoputri's Indonesian
\nDemocratic Party (PDI) and the People's Awakening Party (PKB),
\nall of which have a huge level of support, to form a coalition
\nparty to intercept the return of Soehartoism.<\/p>\n
The urgency of election reform does not lie in the system, be
\nit district or proportional representation. Rather it lies in the
\ncommittee structure and the election process. The organizing
\ncommittee and the monitoring committee for the 1999 general
\nelection should be an institution independent from intervention
\nby the military, bureaucracy and Golkar.<\/p>\n
It is high time ABRI started to consider withdrawing its
\nintervention from the DPR and DPRD because it has proved that it
\nblocks the democratization process.<\/p>\n
The writer is a researcher at Lembaga Studi Sovranita
\nIndonesia and a teacher at the Kolese De Britto High School in
\nYogyakarta.<\/p>\n
Window: We must be on the alert for a coming general election
\nthat might be carried out in the New Order style because unfair
\npractices still threaten through the political bills. Efforts to
\ndeflect the coming general election into a means of perpetuating
\nthe status quo still prevail.<\/p>",
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