Understanding the past and predicting the future<\/p>\n
By Lance Castles<\/p>\n
YOGYAKARTA (JP): After four decades of dictatorship, thought
\ncontrol, world record nepotism and cronyism and some of the worst
\nmassacres the century has seen, democracy has broken out all over
\nIndonesia and developments are showing encouraging signals for
\nthe future.<\/p>\n
How strange it is then, that reviews of the past year are
\nmostly steeped in doom and gloom, and predictions of the future
\nspeak of chaos, anarchy, disintegration, a return to military
\ndictatorship and above all warn us against "euphoria".<\/p>\n
At best they tell us "nothing has actually improved", without
\nexplaining that, in their mental scheme, there is no way an
\nimprovement could be recognized if there was one. Even the
\nleading foreign experts on Indonesia say the future is impossible
\nto predict, but they are, in any case, still pessimistic.<\/p>\n
Let us begin by admitting that, ultimately, we cannot predict
\nthe future with certainty. Anything can happen, as some famous
\nexistentialist said. Furthermore, one could argue nothing matters
\nto human beings except birth, copulation and death (a character
\nin T.S. Eliot).<\/p>\n
International surveys show people in poor countries say they
\nare happier than those in rich ones, something any globe-trotter
\ncan confirm by a smile and conversation check. And yet many
\nreaders attribute some importance to justice, prosperity,
\ndemocracy, cultural freedom and protection from gross human
\nrights violations. They would like to know if it is true that a
\nlifetime of abuse is over, and freedom is here to stay. But when
\nthey ask for bread, they are given a stone.<\/p>\n
So why did Soeharto fall when he did? Was he forced out?
\n(Indonesians love to say he was dilengserkan or dilongsorkan,
\nmeaning "pushed aside" or "forced to step down".) In fact he did
\nstep down, or, as he envisioned it, stepped back, probably in the
\nbelief he would be able to come forward again in more favorable
\ntimes. (Note his remark on television implying B.J. Habibie as
\nPresident was an absurd idea).<\/p>\n
Though he had the character of a lone fighter who would put up
\nthe fiercest fight precisely when his back was to the wall, he
\nfailed to fight at the crucial juncture when he still could have
\nwon. Out of a mixture of complacency and confusion understandable
\nin one who was surrounded by sycophants for decades, he dropped
\nhis guard and now no doubt bitterly regrets it.<\/p>\n
One reason he was so complacent was because he had maneuvered
\nthe Army into helplessness. Especially after he ensured that in
\nJakarta the preponderance of military force was under the control
\nof one ("green") faction; to wit Prabowo of the Army's Special
\nForce (Kopassus), Muchdi of the Army's Strategic Reserves Command
\n(Kostrad) and Sjafrie of the Jakarta Military Command (Kodam),
\nwhile the formal leadership lay with "red-and-whites". If he got
\nwind of a coup from either side (and he was suspicious of both),
\nhe could turn to the other and authorize them to stage a
\ncountercoup.<\/p>\n
Many of our leading international pundits fail to understand
\nthis because they do not wish to be thought naive enough to
\nbelieve the New Order, at least in its last two decades, was a
\npersonal, not a military, dictatorship. But how right military
\nobserver Salim Said was when he wrote recently that under the New
\nOrder the military took their orders from Cendana (Soeharto's
\nresidence), not military headquarters.<\/p>\n
Was it the economic disaster which brought Soeharto down? It
\nis true that without the dramatic economic turnaround from bubble
\nto bust (it was not really a disaster except in terms of the
\nmoney illusion; the upheavals in prices and rates), Soeharto
\nwould still be in power. We know many strong and determined
\nregimes survive much worse economic times -- the North Korean
\nCommunists, Castro, Saddam Hussein and the Burmese military junta
\n(SLORC). Furthermore, the money economy (the rate of the rupiah
\nto the dollar) reached its nadir in January and February 1998, so
\na golden constitutional opportunity lay at hand in the impending
\nPeople's Consultative Assembly (MPR) to elect a successor to
\nSoeharto, preferably a trusted economic technocrat like Emil
\nSalim or Mar'ie Muhammad. Instead they reelected Soeharto 1,000-
\n0, even though Soeharto seemed dismayed and confused by the
\neconomic developments.<\/p>\n
This is indicated by the fact he repeatedly entertained Steve
\nHanke, yet refrained from taking the plunge of openly defying the
\nInternational Monetary Fund (IMF). But he had no intention of
\nstepping down, and behaved even more arrogantly than before, as
\nshown by his controversial appointments of Habibie, businessman
\nBob Hasan, daughter Siti Hardijanti and others.<\/p>\n
The actual precipitating event to Soeharto's downfall was his
\nreturn from Cairo after days of unprecedented rioting. He decided
\nto reshuffle the Cabinet, making Armed Forces Commander Gen.
\nWiranto "carry the can" for the security breakdown.<\/p>\n
Wiranto, though a cautious, routine-oriented man, decided
\nthat, to save himself, Soeharto would have to go. He pressured
\nthe chairman of the House of Representatives (DPR), Harmoko, to
\ncall on Soeharto to resign.<\/p>\n
The usually unctuous and beaming face of Harmoko, pale and
\ntense, berated on television by Buyung Nasution and other
\nlawyers, was witness to the nation's viewers of the pressure he
\nwas under. At the same time, DPR deputy chairman Syarwan Hamid's
\nthumbs up indicated at least a part of the Army had at last
\njoined the far more courageous students, intellectuals, human
\nrights groups and some retired generals and senior statesmen in
\ndemanding the president make good his hinted willingness to step
\ndown and become a sage.<\/p>\n
But then the anxious disappointment when, nearly an hour, if I
\nremember correctly, after the announcement, Wiranto appeared to
\nendorse Soeharto, dismissing Harmoko's call as a personal opinion
\nand threatening to crack down violently on demonstrators. Perhaps
\nthis was part of a deal between the president and Wiranto.<\/p>\n
In return for the latter's support, Soeharto promised to step
\ndown at his own pace, as the nation also observed on television
\nthe next day. Perhaps there was a further part of the deal:
\nSoeharto conceded the removal of Prabowo and Muchdi. That night
\nSoeharto learned coordinating minister for economic and financial
\naffairs Ginandjar Kartasasmita had resigned with the other
\neconomic ministers, and the people he wanted for his reformation
\ncouncil would not play ball. Such refusals were unknown to the
\npolitical culture of the New Order.<\/p>\n
But the bite to Soeharto was that he believed only Army
\npressure produced such events. Perhaps weary, but also still
\nhoping to reculer pour mieux sauter (reverse for a better jump),
\nhe stepped down. For a couple more days the city was tense.<\/p>\n
Would armed units do battle in the streets? Senior generals,
\nreputedly for security purposes, were sleeping in secret places.
\nWhy did Prabowo, with a character and ideology so different from
\nWiranto, not fight? Respect for Soeharto? Patriotism? Fear of
\nfailure? Perhaps we will never know. But remember that no putsch
\nfrom below has ever succeeded in Indonesian history.<\/p>\n
Only two days after Prabowo was transferred, Harold Crouch was
\nreported as saying by phone from Canberra that Wiranto now had
\nHabibie where he wanted him, i.e. he could depose him any time he
\nwanted. This describes the power situation ever since. Wiranto's
\nrelationship to Habibie is quite different from his relationship
\nto Soeharto. This can be shown by a simple exercise in empathy.<\/p>\n
Suppose Wiranto had decided in February 1998 to depose
\nSoeharto. He summons his most loyal major and tells him to take a
\ncrack company to Jalan Cendana and arrest the president.
\nPresumably the major could refuse, declaring the order illegal.
\nIn the event that he attempted it, he probably would be arrested
\nby his own men to the hilarity of the Soeharto entourage.<\/p>\n
But if Wiranto were to decide to end Habibie's presidency, he
\nwould have no such problem. He would simply invite him to
\nmilitary headquarters and give him a letter of resignation to
\nsign.<\/p>\n
He would, of course, not do this because he is a routine man
\nand is under no compulsion to change his routine. But if Habibie
\nwere to decide to stay on after the electoral decision, the law
\nas Wiranto perceives it would take its course. He may already
\nhave shown his ascendancy by insisting the President immediately
\nmeet Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid, even though Habibie had said he
\ndid not wish to do so.<\/p>\n
To understand Wiranto's position, we have only to realize the
\nvast majority of armies happily accept being just armies and
\nleaving politics to the politicians.<\/p>\n
Things are happening which are quite contrary to the New Order
\nrecipe of rigged elections, tame media and "floating mass". The
\nnew parties are building parallel organizations right down to the
\nvillage level. (Any idea that the ruling Golkar will do well
\nbecause only it has a presence in the village is a myth).<\/p>\n
The media blare into most homes the message that the New Order
\nis discredited and criminal, and Habibie, the ministers and the
\nDPR are Soeharto cronies.<\/p>\n
Even the Army and its dwi-fungsi (dual sociopolitical
\nfunction) come in for their share of abuse. But presumably the
\nWiranto leadership can live with that. They are certainly not so
\nunprofessional as to do what the SLORC did -- hold an election,
\nand then prevent the winner from taking office.<\/p>\n
To repeat, there is nothing especially self-denying about what
\nthe Wiranto leadership is doing. But couldn't we have a
\nmoratorium on the constant criticism, ridicule and impossible
\ndemands? What is the man supposed to be able to do better?<\/p>\n
To sum up, it is not true that nothing has really happened.
\nJust as it was impossible to predict until early 1998 that
\ndemocracy was coming to Indonesia, so it is now hard to see how
\nit will go away. And within a year or so economic growth will
\nresume its upward trend, though perhaps at a slower rate than
\nbefore. So what about a bit of elation instead of gloom? For the
\nreligiously minded: Praise God from whom all blessings flow.
\nInstead, the tone of media comment is: "How long, O Lord, how
\nlong?"<\/p>",
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