Understanding corruption in RI<\/p>\n
By Hendardi<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Discussions about corruption have re-surfaced
\nrecently. This issue became topical during general election
\ncampaigning for members of the House of Representatives and the
\nregional legislative assemblies. The three contesting parties
\nboasted anticorruption themes and pushed for the eradication of
\ncorrupt practices.<\/p>\n
During a campaign speech, the general chairman of the
\nfunctional group (Golkar), H. Harmoko, said the Edy Tansil case,
\ninvolving a Rp 1.3 trillion loan scam, was uncovered by Golkar
\ncadres. But he was reluctant to talk about a high-ranking
\nofficial's informal note, allegedly linked to the scandal.<\/p>\n
Late last year there was a lot of fuss about Minister of Mines
\nand Energy IB Sudjana reportedly having ministry funds in his
\nname. Rumor had it that Rp 280 billion in funds, stemming from a
\ncontractor's concession of 13.5 percent of coal mining at PT
\nBatubara Bukit Asam (TABA), went into the minister's private bank
\naccount. Some people surmised that the sums were deposited on the
\nbasis of Presidential Decree No. 21\/1993. The problem is that the
\ndecree does not stipulate that money should be deposited into the
\nminister of mines and energy's bank account. His ministry was
\nalso hit by the Busang gold mine scandal.<\/p>\n
Minister of Tourism, Post and Telecommunications Joop Ave was
\nonce alleged to have channeled Rp 30 billion into his private
\nbank account. This money came from the government's dividend
\nprofits earned from the public listing of state-owned domestic
\ntelecommunications company PT Telkom. Joop Ave argued that the
\nmoney was used for the construction of the statue of Garuda Wisnu
\nin Jimbaran, Bali. The government later abolished such private
\nbank accounts in a policy called the July 1997 deregulatory
\npolicy.<\/p>\n
The Indonesian Forum for Environment once queried the
\nchanneling of the forestry ministry's reforestation funds,
\namounting to Rp 400 billion, into the state-owned aircraft
\nmanufacturing industry PT IPTN. This interest-free loan was later
\nconverted into capital for the government's participation in
\nIPTN.<\/p>\n
It was later reported that the forestry ministry allocated a
\nstand-by loan facility worth Rp 250 billion. Forestry minister
\nDjamaludin Suryohadikusumo stressed that a presidential decree
\nhad been issued regulating the improvement of the financial
\nposition of IPTN. (Panji Masyarakat, July 7, 1997)<\/p>\n
Other similar problems have cropped up. Members of the
\ncommunity were once stirred by fund-raising on the basis of a
\npresidential instruction on backward villages. Now they are
\nbothered by the establishment of partnership funds and a 2
\npercent levy to be imposed on those earning over Rp 100 million
\nannually. Recently there has also been the problem of the sales
\nof SEA Games stickers -- Rp 1,000 per sticker -- by the National
\nSports Council. Added to these are levies imposed on the
\nbusinesspeople who manage to survive.<\/p>\n
The Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) has revealed that the state's
\nmoney has been manipulated in both central and regional
\ngovernment agencies. The agency has examined 338 cases. In the
\nMinistry of Public Works alone, a case involving the
\naccountability of over Rp 1.5 billion for a design review job has
\nbeen uncovered. BPK can audit only 10 percent of the total Rp 101
\ntrillion earmarked in the state's budget.<\/p>\n
In the meantime, the Development Finance Comptroller (BPKP)
\nhas detected many more cases. Last year the BPKP exposed over
\n15,000 cases which contributed to state losses totaling Rp 2.698
\ntrillion. Unfortunately, BPKP could audit only 25 percent of the
\ntotal number of cases, leaving the remainder untouched (Forum
\nKeadilan, July 14, 1997)<\/p>\n
After BPK and BPKP exposed irregularities in the state's
\nfinances, BPK suggested that the government revise the Corruption
\nLaw to combat misuse of the budget. BPK's chairman, JB Sumarlin,
\ndoubted the effectiveness of the provisions in Law No. 3\/1971 to
\neradicate corruption-related criminal acts. It is therefore
\ninteresting to ponder whether corruption is simply a legal matter
\nor whether it is more of a political problem.<\/p>\n
Indonesia is endowed with abundant natural riches, including
\nnatural oil and gas, gold, copper, tin and iron deposits and
\nforest produce such as timber and rattan. With all these
\nresources, the New Order administration has built the country's
\neconomy and established political stability.<\/p>\n
It is easy to guess that abundant riches concentrated in the
\nhands of the government without well-thought-out plans and
\nstringent discipline can easily be transferred into the hands of
\nofficials to accumulate their private wealth. When the government
\nenjoyed windfall revenues from oil and gas, a program called
\n\"Industrialization to Substitute Import\" (ISI) was devised. When
\nall this \"oil money\" was spent on the program, ISI-based
\nindustries were still far from being competitive.<\/p>\n
Government ministries considered as \"wet\" (involving a lot of
\nmoney) have given rise to the nouveau riche. Businesspeople close
\nto high-ranking officials can easily obtain loans, subsidies,
\nlicenses and even protection and domestic market monopoly from
\nthe government.<\/p>\n
The relationship between officials and prospective
\nbusinesspeople or those enjoying facilities and protection from
\nthe government is one of patronage. Certain government officials
\nhelp facilitate and protect these businesspeople to build up
\ntheir business empires. They obtain, in return for these
\nposition-related services, material incentives in the form of
\ncorporate shares, for example.<\/p>\n
Patronage must be seen as the most significant corruptive
\nrelationship in the New Order state system. To ensure that this
\nsystem of patronage runs smoothly, government officials often
\nunder such a system enforce loyalty into the ranks of the
\nbureaucracy. It is here that the way is paved for nurturing a
\nbureaucracy's corruptive character.<\/p>\n
Therefore it is no wonder that in this country corruption is
\nlike an octopus whose tentacles are everywhere and at all levels:
\nfrom the neighborhood association (RT) desks, for document
\nprocessing, to those of high-ranking bureaucrats. Corruption is a
\nplague that spreads endlessly. Even the Corruption Law is
\npowerless to stop the plague.<\/p>\n
As I have often stated, corruption cannot be viewed from the
\nlegal standpoint as simply a matter of legal violation.
\nCorruption must be seen as a political and economic matter. If
\nthe movement for political reform cannot thrive and grow strong,
\ncorruption will continue to be rampant in Indonesia. Corruption
\ndevelops at all bureaucratic levels.<\/p>\n
So, the eradication of corruption cannot rely solely on the
\nimprovement of the Corruption Law. Political reform is needed to
\ncleanse the New Order bureaucracy at all levels. This movement
\nwill not come as a gift from heaven but one we must be
\ncollectively fight for on Earth.<\/p>\n
The writer is executive director of the Indonesian Human
\nRights and Legal Aid Association (PBHI) in Jakarta.<\/p>\n
Window: If the movement for political reform cannot thrive and
\ngrow strong, corruption will continue to be rampant in Indonesia.
\nCorruption develops at all bureaucratic levels.<\/p>",
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