UN presence in E. Timor a must<\/p>\n
By Budiawan Purwadi and Marcelino Ximenes Magno<\/p>\n
SINGAPORE (JP): Some analysts argue that Alexandre \"Xanana\"
\nGusmao's call on his supporters \"to take arms against the
\nIndonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) and pro-Indonesian forces in East
\nTimor\" should be understood as an act of self-defense against the
\naggression of ABRI-armed East Timorese civilians. As Xanana
\nhimself said, \"I call on the people to prepare themselves..., do
\nnot die like an animal, people cannot be killed just like that,\"
\n(The Jakarta Post, April 8, 1999).<\/p>\n
That call reflects how desperate the recent development of the
\nEast Timor situation is, following the either \"broad autonomy\" or
\n\"independent\" option announced by President B.J. Habibie last
\nJanuary. The Liquisa tragedy, in which, according to Bishop Belo,
\n25 people were killed, is just one example of the terrible
\nsituation. It is understandable, then, if Xanana -- from his
\ndetention house in Jakarta -- called for a UN peacekeeping force
\nin East Timor to disarm the civilian population and halt violence
\nin the incomplete decolonized Portuguese colony annexed by
\nIndonesia in December 1975. But ABRI Chief Gen. Wiranto rejected
\nthe call. He insisted that problems in East Timor are \"the
\ninternal concerns of the Republic of Indonesia\"; one argument
\nwhich seems to have been so dominant that it is taken for granted
\nin the Indonesian public discourse.<\/p>\n
So long as such arguments still persist, the problem of East
\nTimor will never be solved. It is because the key solution lies
\nin the intensive and extensive intervention of an international
\norganization, in this case the United Nations (UN). In addition,
\nas it has been considered as a non self-governed territory, East
\nTimor's legal status is still under the UN protectorate -- since
\n1960. So, the UN does not only deserve to, but is also obliged to
\ninterfere to East Timor.<\/p>\n
It is, indeed, acknowledgeable that the UN has, so far,
\nfacilitated various levels of talks and meetings concerning the
\nsearch for a solution on the problem of East Timor. But, this is
\nnot enough, even though several talks and meetings have seemed
\nprospective. If UN involvement is just limited to such a level,
\nany results can still be manipulated in the field. So, it is the
\nUN presence in East Timor which is urgently needed to achieve a
\ncomprehensive and effective solution.<\/p>\n
Some parties have, as has Xanana himself, proposed a UN
\npresence in East Timor as a peacekeeping force. We think that
\nthis proposal should be rectified. Since there is no peace yet,
\nor at least a kind of firm consensus to make peace, it is not a
\npeacekeeping force which must be present, but a peace-building
\nforces, instead.<\/p>\n
Such an idea has been proposed by an Australian scholar who is
\nvery deeply concerned with the issue of East Timor. The scholar,
\nGeoffrey C. Gunn, in his East Timor and the United Nations: The
\nCase for Intervention (1997), said that to achieve a
\ncomprehensive and effective solution for the problem of East
\nTimor, the UN should play \"a specific 'peace-building' role\".
\nWhat he meant by this idea was that the UN should play as prime
\nmover in a peace-building process and even in the management of
\nEast Timor.<\/p>\n
Opening a permanent UN human rights office in Dili is, indeed,
\na matter of high priority. But, Gunn argued, that it is not
\nenough. A further step should be the creation of a UN
\nTransitional Authority on East Timor (UNTAET). This body is
\nexpected to serve as an umbrella organization for all components
\nof a UN mission in East Timor for a specified time in the run-up
\nto a referendum and the reconstitution of civil society.<\/p>\n
Gunn specifically referred the term \"peace-building\" in the
\nsense of the one used by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his June 1992
\nreport, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy and
\nPeacekeeping. Peace-building, as such, involves the disarming of
\nwarring parties and the restoration of order, the repatriation of
\nrefugees, the monitoring of elections, the protection of human
\nrights, the meeting of humanitarian needs and the rebuilding of
\ncivil society. This all is quite different from peacekeeping, the
\none that comes after the war, the conflict, or the civil strife,
\nand is designed to prevent a lapse into war.<\/p>\n
In the case of East Timor, Gunn wrote, peacekeeping comes
\nafter the UN body failed to act on its own resolutions, actions
\nwhich may have prevented the tragedy. Given the right political
\ncues, then, the emphasis of peace-building is on the civilian
\nrather than the military aspects of the problem.<\/p>\n
By definition, Gunn continued, the East Timor case should be
\neasier to handle than almost any recent UN mission. The military
\nequation is so lopsided in Indonesia's favor that a conflict, or
\n\"civil-war\" dimension (such as in Angola), is almost entirely
\nlacking. Elements of the situation in East Timor bear more
\nresemblance to post-1979 Cambodia where the withdrawal of Vietnam
\nwas the \"conditio sine qua non\" of a political solution as part
\nof UN involvement. The immediate problem in East Timor is the
\nimperativeness for the demilitarization of East Timor through the
\ndrawdown of the Indonesian military presence. The tenor of
\nreports confirms the linkage between breakdown of civil society
\nin East Timor and militarization, as can be clearly seen in the
\nrecent tragedies.<\/p>\n
A UN presence, Gunn assured, could monitor and verify the
\nwithdrawal of ABRI. At the same time, it can assist in the
\ndemobilization of local Timorese adjuncts of ABRI. Falantil, or
\nat least the surviving rump of the Fretilin armed forces, has
\nalready signaled its willingness for a cease-fire, as was said
\nrepeatedly by Xanana before the recent Liquisa tragedy. It would
\nnot necessarily be the task of the UN to enforce the withdrawal
\nof Indonesian military forces from East Timor. Rather, it would
\nbe the international legal obligation of Indonesia to take that
\nstep, just as the Vietnamese armed forces made their timely and
\nlargely verified exit from Cambodia during the start-up phase of
\nthe UN operation in that country.<\/p>\n
Thus, the doctrine of UN involvement\/intervention in East
\nTimor must rest on a political solution, namely Indonesian
\nacquiescence in a UN-brokered solution. Necessarily, a UN
\npresence in East Timor would be a graduated process, just as the
\ncharacter of a UNTAET mission would change, in line with new
\npolitical realities engendered by each stage of the peace
\nprocess. Broadly, the transition would be from the strictly
\nhumanitarian to the political.<\/p>\n
But, again, this all requires the immediate withdrawal of the
\nIndonesian Armed Forces from East Timor. This is precisely the
\nvery first problem which should be overcome, since ABRI seems to
\nhave its own agenda, which may be quite different from Habibie's.
\nStronger international pressure might be able to help to break
\ndown this very first door to achieving a comprehensive and
\neffective solution for the problem of East Timor.<\/p>\n
Budiawan Purwadi, a graduate student of Southeast Asian
\nStudies Program, National University of Singapore. Marcelino X.
\nMagno is a member of the East Timor Study Group.<\/p>\n
Window: The immediate problem in East Timor is the imperativeness
\nfor the demilitarization of East Timor through the drawdown of
\nthe Indonesian military presence.<\/p>",
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