{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1088092,
        "msgid": "un-intervention-in-east-timor-1447893297",
        "date": "2001-02-14 00:00:00",
        "title": "UN intervention in East Timor",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "UN intervention in East Timor I was surprised to read an article by former Australian Ambassador to the United Nations and Australian Ambassador to Indonesia, Mr. Richard Woolcott, published in this newspaper on Jan. 29, 2001. The article goes to great lengths to describe what the writer perceives as the negative consequences of the international intervention in East timor in September 1999.",
        "content": "<p>UN intervention in East Timor<\/p>\n<p>I was surprised to read an article by former Australian<br>\nAmbassador to the United Nations and Australian Ambassador to<br>\nIndonesia, Mr. Richard Woolcott, published in this newspaper on<br>\nJan. 29, 2001. The article goes to great lengths to describe what<br>\nthe writer perceives as the negative consequences of the<br>\ninternational intervention in East timor in September 1999. The<br>\nessence of this article appears to be that the international<br>\nintervention approved by a 15-0 vote of the United Nations<br>\nSecurity Council was a mistake that has had numerous negative<br>\nconsequences for the entire region.<\/p>\n<p>He cites a number of very tenuous arguments in support of his<br>\nview, including the need to revise the Timor Gap Treaty in order<br>\nthat additional royalties accrue to the region's inhabitants at<br>\nthe expense of Australia and the proposition that Indonesia is<br>\nless stable now than in 1998 (when I recall Jakarta was engulfed<br>\nin massive riots and the rupiah plummeted in value to below Rp<br>\n15,000 to the U.S. dollar).<\/p>\n<p>Woolcott makes some rather dubious negative comments about the<br>\nrole of the United Nations, and particularly Australia, in<br>\ncurtailing the post-ballot violence in the former Indonesian<br>\nadministered territory. However, he fails to address the critical<br>\nquestion of what the cost might have been of a failure to act at<br>\nthis critical juncture in East Timor's history and the failure to<br>\nbring a halt to the bloodshed at that time. My suggestion is that<br>\nit would have been almost impossible both morally and politically<br>\nfor the UN not to have taken the action it did by a unanimous<br>\nvote of the Security Council on Sept. 15, 1999 that led to the<br>\nlanding of Interfet forces in East Timor on Sept. 20<\/p>\n<p>One might reasonably question not only the effect on East<br>\nTimor of the Indonesian military's failure to stop the violence<br>\nand apparent scorched-earth policy (despite the declaration of<br>\nmartial law on Sept. 7), but also the effect of a failure to act<br>\nby the UN on Indonesia itself. However unpalatable it might be<br>\nfor some Indonesians to consider, it is likely that harsh<br>\nSecurity Council resolutions would have been issued, forcing<br>\nIndonesia to bring an end to the violence and to implement the<br>\nresults of the UN-supervised popular consultation on Aug. 30,<br>\n1999 in which 78.5 percent of East Timorese voted in favor of<br>\nindependence.<\/p>\n<p>Given the behavior of the Indonesia military at the time,<br>\ndespite their wide-ranging power pursuant to the declaration of<br>\nmartial law some two weeks before the arrival of the<br>\ninternational force, it might be reasonable to assume that there<br>\nwould have been no compliance with such a resolution. Having<br>\nregard to the degree of international outrage at the time,<br>\nIndonesia may well have been left in the position of a virtual<br>\npariah state with total cut-off of IMF, World Bank and other<br>\nInternational funding and a consequent disastrous effect on the<br>\nnation's struggling economy.<\/p>\n<p>It is further worth noting that Mr. Woolcott does not have a<br>\nparticularly good track record in predicting the outcome of<br>\nevents in this country and the Indonesian people's desire for a<br>\nmore clean and democratic style of government. One need only<br>\nquote his statements published in this newspaper in an article<br>\ntitled Indonesia is not about to erupt published on Aug. 31, 1996<br>\nin the wake of the July 27 riots in which he was quoted: \"ABRI<br>\nremains the guarantor of the security of the state. The next<br>\npresident in 1998 could still be Soeharto but, if not, it will be<br>\na Javanese Muslim with a military background like Soeharto\"<br>\n(wrong on two counts out of three). Even more tellingly, he goes<br>\non in the same article to state that \"it would be misguided ...<br>\nto expect rapid or radical change or even serious instability in<br>\nthe near future\" in Indonesia.<\/p>\n<p>ROGER SMITH<\/p>\n<p>Jakarta<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/un-intervention-in-east-timor-1447893297",
        "image": ""
    },
    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}