UN Council reform questioned<\/p>\n
By Omar Halim<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): The intense pressure which Germany and Japan
\nhave exerted to become permanent members of the Security Council
\nand the air of reform circulating these days in the United
\nNations has made the issue a major focus of discussions.<\/p>\n
Pronouncements on the topic were made by the open-ended
\nworking group of the General Assembly, headed by Malaysia's
\nRazali Ismail, assigned to look into the reform of the council,
\nand foreign ministers of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in their
\nrecent meeting in New Delhi.<\/p>\n
The objectives of making the council more effective,
\nrepresentative and accountable are commonly held by these bodies.
\nBut the discussions have also focused on expanding the size in
\norder to increase the representation of developing countries;
\nwhether the additional members should be permanent members or
\nnot; and whether they should have veto power.<\/p>\n
This approach reflects what is considered politically feasible
\nfor instituting change in the council. But it is important for us
\nto look into the matter with a fresh and objective perspective.<\/p>\n
The council, according to the UN Charter, has the \"primary
\nresponsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
\nsecurity\". Disputes would preferably be settled by peaceful
\nmeans, such as mediation, arbitration or judicial settlement,
\neither between the parties themselves or through the appropriate
\nregional organization. If the parties fail to reach a peaceful
\nsettlement, the council may recommend solutions, including terms
\nof settlement which it considers appropriate.<\/p>\n
If a situation is deemed to be a \"threat to the peace, breach
\nof the peace, or (an) act of aggression\", the council can impose
\nsanctions on the guilty state or resort to enforcement measures,
\nwhich were taken against Iraq when it invaded Kuwait in 1991.
\nBefore taking such drastic measures, the council could deploy,
\nwith the agreement of the contending states, a peacekeeping force
\nto \"prevent the aggravation of the situation\".<\/p>\n
During the Cold War, one superpower could effectively block
\nthe other by using its veto power, and the council was frequently
\nunable to take collective action to restore or maintain peace.
\nOnly 13 peacekeeping missions were launched by the council from
\nits inception in 1945 to 1988, and these only occurred because
\nthe two superpowers deemed it in their interests to prevent the
\nsituation from deteriorating further. The most notable examples
\nwere the missions interposed between Israel and her Arab
\nneighbors.<\/p>\n
The end of the Cold War brought 22 new missions from 1988
\nthrough 1996 but the nature of the conflicts were different than
\nearlier ones. The new conflicts were intrastate in nature and the
\nUN was not well prepared to deal with them. Examples of major
\nfailures were Somalia, Bosnia and, to a lesser extent, Cambodia.<\/p>\n
The huge costs incurred in these missions prompted the council
\nto be even more selective in deploying new missions. Many say
\nthat conflicts in Europe have been given much more attention than
\nin other regions, especially in Africa.<\/p>\n
The inaction of the UN in Rwanda, where genocide occurred in
\n1994, exemplifies this point.<\/p>\n
Council decisions have been primarily influenced by its
\npermanent members. The present permanent membership is based on
\nwho were the victorious forces during World War II, even though
\nthe global power structure more than 50 years later is markedly
\ndifferent. Two of the defeated powers, Germany and Japan, are now
\nknocking hard at the door of this exclusive club. The incongruity
\nof their situation is shown by the UN Charter which still
\ncategorizes them as \"enemy states\", defined as any country which
\n\"during World War II has been an enemy of any signatory of the
\npresent Charter\".<\/p>\n
Furthermore, overall membership of the UN has increased from
\n51 in 1945 to 185 today. NAM, the Organization of African Unity
\n(OAU) and Secretary-General Kofi Annan have called in unison for
\nthe council to be \"more representative' of the present UN
\nmembership, and more accountable, in order to have 'even greater
\nlegitimacy and support\". It is therefore necessary to democratize
\nthe council, and \"democratization\" is one of the catchwords in
\nthe world today.<\/p>\n
But democratization does not automatically mean expansion in
\nmembership because, in addition to Germany and Japan, there are
\nat least three countries from each region of Africa, Latin
\nAmerica and Asia that aspire to the same permanent membership
\nstatus. This would severely constrain the council's
\neffectiveness. We need therefore to examine what system could be
\nappropriate for the next 50 years.<\/p>\n
Democratization means that every region should have equal say
\nover decisions, including veto power. But democratization further
\nalso means that the position of the veto holding member should
\nreflect the position of the region it represents, and not its
\nnational interest.<\/p>\n
The solution may be for permanent membership, with veto power,
\nto be conferred on regions, and not specific states. A state
\nelected by each region should establish a mechanism to have full
\nconsultations with the other members.<\/p>\n
Since every member should have equal opportunity to represent
\nthe region (although not all would be ready to do so), an
\nelection could be held every three or four years. The question
\nnow is the number of regional groupings. This could depend upon
\nthe political, economic and cultural factors to determine
\nmembership of a group.<\/p>\n
For example, Western
\nEuropean states have formed a European Union, and this could thus
\nbe judged as a group.<\/p>\n
Eastern Europe could be another. Africa and Latin America,
\nplus the Caribbean, are groups that have already shown more
\ncohesiveness than others. North America could be a region. The
\nbig \"region\" of Asia could be broken down into West Asia; South
\nand Central Asia; and East Asia and the Pacific.<\/p>\n
All these would make eight regional groups. In order to allow
\nmore states to participate in the work of the Security Council,
\nthere could be another eight states, elected every two years,
\nwhich would not hold veto power. This would bring total
\nmembership to 16, or one more than the present number. Such a
\nSecurity Council would be small enough to be effective,
\nrepresentative of the whole membership of the UN and transparent
\nto all in taking its decisions.<\/p>\n
Resistance to change would no doubt come from those members
\nwho already have veto power. But if membership is not determined
\non a more rational basis, and if change must inevitably take
\nplace, the council will continue to be expanded in order to
\naccommodate the dire need to be more representative
\nof the world community. Eventually, it will lose its
\neffectiveness. Now could be the best time to make a clean break.<\/p>\n
The writer is an Indonesian observer who worked in the
\neconomic, social, public information, political and peacekeeping
\nfields of the United Nations for more than 28 years.<\/p>\n
Window: But democratization does not automatically mean
\nexpansion in membership because, in addition to Germany and
\nJapan, there are at least three countries from each region of
\nAfrica, Latin America and Asia that aspire to the same permanent
\nmembership status.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/un-council-reform-questioned-1447893297",
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