Troubled Indonesia: It is sailing around a flat earth<\/p>\n
By Kusnanto Anggoro<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Post-Soeharto Indonesia has learned the nuances
\nof democracy: from street demonstrations to party organizing,
\nfrom \"retreat of the general\" to militarizing civilian, from
\nutopian philosophizing to the beginnings of coalition building.<\/p>\n
But nobody knows what direction Indonesia is taking and if its
\nfractured societies can coexist within one nation. It is
\nimpossible to overestimate the sheer magnitude and complexity of
\nIndonesia's economic and political problems. Paradoxes abound,
\nthreatening the newly born democracy and the (multi) nation-state
\nof Indonesia as well.<\/p>\n
The New Order's end has not brought eternal peace but a
\nresurgence of old conflicts. Disintegrating forces have come full
\ncircle with ethnic conflict in Maluku, and an independence
\nmovement at both ends of Indonesia's frontier: Aceh and Irian
\nJaya.<\/p>\n
No less important, muted calls for self-government are
\nreverberating in Riau, East Kalimantan and North Sulawesi. In
\nWest Kalimantan, gruesome clashes involving Malays and other
\nindigenous groups against settlers have flared periodically in
\nthe region. Social unrest in urban areas has seriously challenged
\nthe authority. A new movement for democracy is growing around the
\nissues of violence and politics.<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, national politics has become a failing spectator
\nsport. Transitional politics have bedeviled the political elite,
\nwho, in the past, joined forces against the Soeharto regime.
\nPresident Abdurrahman \"Gus Dur\" Wahid is locked in a take-no-
\nprisoners battle with his opponents.<\/p>\n
The House of Representatives (DPR), far from functioning as a
\nlegislative body, has presented itself as a collection of people
\nserving either their selfish interests or the interests of
\nparties to which they belong. They are all too busy in a
\nDarwinian struggle for survival.<\/p>\n
The President's second Cabinet, inaugurated on Aug. 23 last
\nyear, was initially welcomed as a move to get the haphazard
\ngovernmental system under control. It consists of more
\nprofessionals, and also reflects the President's consolidation of
\npower, after his distress during the Annual Session of the
\nPeople's Consultative Assembly in August.<\/p>\n
Yet the political team is struggling to cope with the
\ncountry's challenges of settling regional conflicts in Aceh and
\nIrian Jaya. The economic team started \"flirting\" with the
\ncountry's unscrupulous tycoons, who owe enormous debts to the
\ngovernment.<\/p>\n
A tug-of-war between President Abdurrahman and the House will
\nlikely reach an apex again early this year. Dozens of legislators
\nare preparing a motion to use the right of inquiry over Buloggate
\nand Bruneigate.<\/p>\n
Early last month (December), more than 150 delegates formed a
\npolitical caucus. The way ahead could well be more perilous to
\nthe President, though, according to House Speaker Akbar Tandjung,
\nwho is also the leader of the Golkar Party, the right of
\ninterpellation does not carry any political consequences and will
\nnot harm the President's position. Abdurrahman could well share
\nthe same fate as Joseph Estrada of the Philippines and Chen Shui-
\nbian of Taiwan.<\/p>\n
Certainly, no one ever said achieving a peaceful, prosperous
\nand democratic Indonesia would be easy. All of us should not
\ndespair just because things are messy at the moment.<\/p>\n
Indonesia is a pluralistic community. Unlike modern (nation-
\n)states of Western Europe, in which nations exist before states,
\nthe state institutions in Indonesia were meant to become
\ninstrumental of nation-building. Civilian and military
\nbureaucracy, state ideology and an education system were meant to
\nintegrate the country. All have achieved nothing, and have
\nderailed the country.<\/p>\n
The roots of conflict are not so much in the struggle for
\neconomic and political resources as in a whole range of
\nrecognition, which was ignored or simply suppressed during the
\nthree decades of authoritarian rule.<\/p>\n
Other contemporary factors have made matters much worse. The
\nunseen hands behind them may include military plotters, local
\npower blocs, ambitious politicians and people from the former
\ngovernment.<\/p>\n
In Maluku, for instance, the arrival of thousands of well-
\nfunded Muslim militants from Java was detrimental to a resolution
\nof the conflict and\/or the restoration of peace.<\/p>\n
Some sections of the political and military elite are at least
\ntacitly encouraging violence. Evidence is hard to come by. But
\nsuch a pattern has been emerging since the mid-1990s.<\/p>\n
Unrest and political intrigue follow every struggle that takes
\nplace among the elite. Various people in Jakarta have a lot of
\nmoney, and it is easy for them to take advantage of young,
\nunemployed people. Many suspect that wealthy people from
\nSoeharto's circle are behind the recent outbreaks of unrest in
\nIndonesia, including in Maluku. Their message is: \"Back off or
\nwe'll make problems\".<\/p>\n
Indonesia is in a race of Balkanizing tendencies and attempts
\nat dissolving the central authority by establishing autonomous
\nregions. This could well be the answer for some cases, especially
\nin Aceh and Irian Jaya. In other cases, Maluku included, the most
\npressing concern is reconciliation, both at local and national
\nlevels.<\/p>\n
The government of Abdurrahman will not be able to go forward
\nuntil this reconciliation is accomplished. An appropriate formula
\nfor reconciliation is a must. A blanket amnesty would ease the
\npressure on the President from the status quo elite, but could
\nerode popular support for him.<\/p>\n
At a systemic level, unnecessarily related to the need for
\nnational reconciliation, the installation and consolidation of
\ndemocratic institutions are all the more problematic.<\/p>\n
Indonesia may have a fair and free election. But democracy is
\nstill a far way off. We have no more than a democratic charade.<\/p>\n
What last year's elections brought home was something we
\nalready know. Voting in Indonesia is not a means by which
\ncitizens discipline their rulers. The elections do not create
\npower but only mirror the power that already exists. Candidates
\nfind their supporters in hidden networks and do not draw their
\npower, in any way, from the majority of average voters. The
\nfailure of Megawati Soekarnoputri to clinch the presidency is a
\ncase in point, though she enjoyed massive popular support.<\/p>\n
To put it another way, authority lies somewhere else. This is
\na gigantic challenge for Indonesia. It is imperative to argue
\nthat democratic procedures are of value only if they establish
\nsome sort of dependency of public officials on ordinary citizens.<\/p>\n
In a democratic society, there ought to be a kind of
\n\"political contract between the political elite and voters\".
\nWhile citizens are dependent on the government for the exercise
\nof their rights, incumbents elected popularly and pro tempore
\npresumably have a reason to behave responsibly, to act as the
\nagent of society and to produce benefits of palpable value to the
\nmajority of voters.<\/p>\n
Indonesia seems to be a broken hourglass society, in which the
\nprivileged do not exploit or oppress or even govern, but simply
\nignore the majority. Many officials live in a secretive bubble,
\nsupported -- here I exaggerate to make a point -- by stolen
\nassets, the International Monetary Fund and various cliental
\naffiliations.<\/p>\n
There is a strong tendency that the underlying character of
\nsocial contract in Indonesia can probably be described as an
\nexchange of unaccountable power for untaxable wealth. This is a
\ncontract among the elite, a sleazy deal between political and
\neconomic insiders -- who, in bed with each other, engage in
\nmutually beneficial unpunishable misdeeds, much like the
\nIndonesian version of criminal -- nomenclature symbiosis in
\nRussia.<\/p>\n
Our new millennium is an age of reckoning, and among our
\nprimary tasks at the century's end is to reconcile the democratic
\ninstitution with citizen politics. The time is ripe for
\nIndonesians to develop a new, value-based approach to nationhood
\nand politics in which citizens and politicians can articulate
\nissues in the public arena without being sectarian.<\/p>\n
Among the political elite, searching for a common ground must
\nbecome more important than merely organizing against opponents.
\nMeanwhile, people should move beyond the old entrenched battle
\nlines, and talk about democratic values that should undergird its
\nsocial and political life.<\/p>\n
Indonesia must find an antidote for the violence and
\ndemocratic malnutrition that can result in terrible tragedies.
\nThis is exactly where problems lie. While there is still no
\ndirection as to whether Indonesia will land in a more democratic
\npolity, national leadership requires the ability to keep public
\nimpatience in check, to convince the people to endure the current
\nsituation and to assure them of the sunshine behind the clouds.<\/p>\n
Needless to say, such an ability can come only from someone
\nwith a clear vision and a strong commitment to the future as well
\nas a consistent rulership to lead and a solid leadership to rule.<\/p>\n
Sadly, those in the current national leadership are far from
\nbeing the answer to Indonesia's needs. Abdurrahman fails to
\nexercise his authority to set a completely new image of a clean
\nand transparent government.<\/p>\n
We are sailing around a flat earth.<\/p>\n
The writer is a senior researcher at the Centre for Strategic
\nand International Studies and a lecturer at the Postgraduate
\nStudies Program of the University of Indonesia, Jakarta.<\/p>",
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