Trends in internal security problems<\/p>\n
Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, Jakarta<\/p>\n
The year 2005 will end in just a few days. During the year,
\nIndonesia faced quite a number of internal security problems,
\nsuch as the prolonged communal conflicts in Poso and Palu in
\nCentral Sulawesi, the terrorist attacks in Jimbaran and Kuta in
\nBali in October 2005, conflicts related to industrial relations
\nfollowing the fuel price increases in October 2005 in some areas
\nin Java and so on.<\/p>\n
However, 2005 was also an important year for Indonesia when
\nthe Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM)
\nsigned a memorandum of understanding in Helsinki, Finland, to end
\nthe separatist conflict in Aceh. It is hoped that in the near
\nfuture Aceh will no longer be a \"flash point\" in Southeast Asia.<\/p>\n
We also saw in 2005 that Indonesia still has problems handling
\nits internal security issues. Since the separation of the
\nNational Police from the Indonesian Military (TNI) in April 1999,
\nwhich was formalized through People's Consultative Assembly
\nDecree No. VI\/2000 on the separation of the police from the (TNI)
\nand Assembly Decree No. VII\/2000 on the role of the TNI and the
\npolice, there have been problems between the two institutions
\nabout who should handle internal security issues.<\/p>\n
According to Law No. 34\/2004 on the military, the TNI has the
\nobligation to undertake military operations other than war, most
\nof which are related to internal security issues, such as
\nhandling armed separatist movements and armed rebellions,
\nfighting terrorism and dealing with piracy and illegal
\nimmigrants.<\/p>\n
This is why after the Bali bombings on Oct. 1, 2005, President
\nSusilo Bambang Yudhoyono, in a speech to mark the anniversary of
\nthe TNI on Oct. 5, asked the military to assist the government in
\nthe fight against terrorism. The military responded to the
\nPresident's request by offering to reintroduce its territorial
\ncommands from the provincial level to the village level. The
\nmilitary also established a new antiterror detachment in several
\nregional military commands, similar to the National Police's
\nDetachment 88.<\/p>\n
Although high-ranking officers said the military's response to
\ninternal security issues would depend on requests from the
\npolitical authorities (the President), and the guidelines set
\ndown in the law, there are still no regulations about when and
\nhow the military will assist the police in dealing with internal
\nsecurity.<\/p>\n
There is also still a question about how to coordinate the
\nmilitary, the police, intelligence agencies, government
\nministries and other institutions in the fight against terrorism.
\nThere are still no new rules of engagement for the military in
\ndealing with terrorism. Apart from that, the antiterror desk at
\nthe Office of the Coordinating Minister for Social, Legal and
\nPolitical Affairs has not been upgraded to become a national
\nantiterror board able to coordinate the fight against terrorism.
\nIt is necessary that the President do something about this issue.<\/p>\n
However, if the military reestablishes its territorial command
\nstructure down to the village level, it will be a waste of money
\nand resources. It is better for the military to focus on
\npromoting a maritime strategy to face security threats related to
\ntransnational crimes or any conflict related to boundary
\ndisputes, such as Ambalat, and to guard all of the maritime and
\nland borders between Indonesia and neighboring countries.<\/p>\n
It seems that terrorism will remain a security issue in 2006.
\nAlthough Azahari was killed in Malang in November, 2005, another
\nalleged terrorist mastermind from Malaysia, Noordin M. Top, and
\nhis followers are still around. There are also quite a number of
\nsmall independent terrorist groups in Indonesia with no links to
\nJamaah Islamiyah (JI) or al-Qaeda.<\/p>\n
Apart from that, there are also a small number of police and
\nmilitary deserters in Aceh, Maluku and Central Sulawesi who are
\nable to destabilize the security situation in those areas or
\nother places in Indonesia.<\/p>\n
Besides terrorism, it is possible for communal conflicts and
\nconflicts related to local elections to occur in areas around the
\ncountry, particularly in conflict areas such as Central Sulawesi,
\nWest and Central Kalimantan, Papua and Aceh.<\/p>\n
In Aceh, for example, security forces must maintain their
\npreparedness so they can respond to possible conflicts during
\nelections for the governor and district heads. Apart from that,
\nthere have been political activities in Aceh and Jakarta to
\nestablish two new provinces in Aceh, namely Aceh Leuser Antara
\n(ALAS) and South West Aceh (Abas), which is not in line with the
\nHelsinki agreement that states the 1956 borders are the official
\nborders of Aceh.<\/p>\n
Security problems could also occur in Aceh when the government
\nstops its financial assistant to former GAM members. So far, for
\nsecurity reasons, GAM leaders have never submitted the names of
\ntheir members. It is possible that after the Aceh Monitoring
\nMission (AMM) completes its mission in Aceh in 2006, there will
\nbe a new conflict between former GAM members and the security
\napparatus in Aceh.<\/p>\n
However, if the reintegration of former GAM members into
\nsociety, the process of making a new law on Aceh province, which
\nhas to be finalized by the end of March 2006, the process of
\nholding local elections and reconstruction and rehabilitation in
\nthe province all go well, there will be no big conflicts in Aceh.<\/p>\n
Papua is another potential conflict area that must be managed
\ncarefully. Vice President Jusuf Kalla's decision in November,
\n2005, to postpone the election for the governor of West Irian
\nJaya were welcomed by Papuans. In accordance with Law No. 21\/2001
\non special autonomy for Papua, it is up to the Papuan People's
\nAssembly (MRP) and the local legislature to decide whether to
\napprove the establishment of West Irian Jaya province.<\/p>\n
If these two bodies do so, there will be two local elections
\nin Papua, namely to elect the new governor of Papua province and
\nthe new governor of West Irian Jaya province. Although clanism is
\nstill part of local politics in Papua, it seems that local
\nelections in Papua will go well. Papuans are tired of conflict,
\nso local communities, NGOs and religious leaders have all agreed
\nto help prevent any big conflicts in Papua.<\/p>\n
Maluku and Central Sulawesi are two conflict areas where
\n\"invisible hands\" are still trying to disturb the peace. Although
\nthere is still segregation between Muslims and Christians, it is
\nhighly likely that both Islamic and Christian leaders in those
\ntwo areas are trying to communicate with each other and work
\ntogether to prevent any small communal conflict from blowing up,
\nas happened in 1999-2000.<\/p>\n
Ambon and Poso are also two areas where the intelligence
\napparatus is very active gathering information. The problem is
\nhow the intelligence apparatus from the police and the military
\nare able to share information about sociopolitical and security
\nconditions in those areas in order to prevent conflict.<\/p>\n
People in Ambon and Poso are tired of the violence and they
\nknow exactly who are the \"actors\" trying to create conflict in
\ntheir areas. However, because there is no protection for people
\nwho come forward, they are reluctant to inform security
\nauthorities about the actors.<\/p>\n
There were communal conflicts between the Dayaks and Madurese
\nin West Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan several years ago.
\nUnless these two communities resolve their disputes and deal with
\nthe roots of the problem, it is possible the communal conflicts
\ncould flare up again.<\/p>\n
In conclusion, conflict is possible in a multiethnic society
\nlike Indonesia. There is no one formula or remedy to prevent
\nconflict in the country. It depends on local leaders and the
\nsecurity forces to handle these issues, and also the political
\nleaders to decide whether to enhance the police's capability or
\nto use the military to handle conflicts or specific internal
\nsecurity issues such as terrorism.<\/p>\n
The writer is a senior researcher at the Research Center for
\nPolitics at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (P2P-LIPI).<\/p>",
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