Towards productive EU-ASEAN dialog<\/p>\n
By Aurora Ferrari<\/p>\n
Europe can play a more effective role in its relations with
\nASEAN.<\/p>\n
SINGAPORE: The relationship between ASEAN and Europe goes back
\nmany years. Indeed, the European Community (EC) became ASEAN's
\nfirst dialogue partner in 1972. However, Europe has failed to
\ncapitalize on the opportunities provided by ASEAN's early
\novertures.<\/p>\n
Europe has so far lacked a clear strategy for South-east Asia.
\nAbove all in recent years, European Union (EU)'s ASEAN policy has
\nbeen on a zigzag course between realpolitik and moralism and
\nbetween principles and embarrassing opportunism.<\/p>\n
From 1993, the EU seemed to adopt a realist policy in order to
\nstrengthen its economic presence in South-east Asia. It toned
\ndown human rights issues at high-level meetings and concurred
\nwith ASEAN's line towards Myanmar.<\/p>\n
ASEM, in particular, seemed to be the climax of this process.
\nYet, it is clear that the EU's strategy of giving priority to
\neconomic objectives without sacrificing the normative
\nunderpinning of its foreign policy requires a precarious
\nbalancing act. Unfortunately, the EU has so far been unable to
\nstrike the right balance. The EU has simply swept the
\ncontroversial issues under the carpet, without settling a clear
\nagenda.<\/p>\n
A day-by-day decision-making approach would be efficient if
\nthe EU were capable of an effective common approach. However,
\nforeign policy-making in the EU has been mostly characterized by
\nan inter-governmental process dominated by national executives
\nand the Council of Ministers. Hence, EU's ASEAN policy proved to
\nbe a misleading deferment policy and controversial issues soon
\nresurfaced, as the developments after ASEM have shown in the case
\nof East Timor and Myanmar. The consequences of such a precarious
\npolicy have been disastrous: contradictory statements from the
\nmember states, from the European bodies and even from the same
\nEuropean institutions.<\/p>\n
The 1992 Dutch-Indonesian controversy over aid proved how
\nmember states do not act in unison. Moreover, the controversy
\nshowed how countries can react when pressured too hard. In the
\nend, the damage can be greater for the donor than for the
\nreceiving country. At the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC)
\nin 1994, the German Foreign Minister representing the Presidency
\nsoftened, in his speech, European criticism of the Myanmarese
\njunta and the ASEAN policy of constructive engagement. On the
\nsame occasion, the EU Commissioner responsible for political
\nexternal relations seemed to accord a much higher priority to
\nhuman rights and democracy in his speech. The commission launched
\ntwo strategy papers dealing with South-east Asia in 1994 and
\n1996. Although intensified economic cooperation continues to
\nfigure as the overriding objective, the 1996 paper puts a much
\ngreater emphasis on human rights.<\/p>\n
Abrupt policy shifts and a cacophony of contradictory
\nstatements generate only great confusion. Moreover high moral
\nattitudes are not credible when they are easily dismissed for
\nshort-run economic gains, as it was shown in the 1992 aid
\ncontroversy in Indonesia.<\/p>\n
Clearly these policy reversals signify weakness in Asian eyes,
\ncausing a loss of prestige for the EU. Such a lack of trust and
\nrespect inevitably inhibits the effort to develop channels of
\ncommunication and fora where disputed issues can be discussed.
\nThis is even more true if we consider that ASEAN cooperation is
\ndependent on a high level of harmony, consensus and informal
\npersonal relations.<\/p>\n
Indeed the success of Europe in South-east Asia very much
\nrests on the assumption of a common and new approach. Given the
\nstrong influence of the U.S. and Japan in the region, none of the
\nindividual member states can build up an equally significant
\npresence in the area alone.<\/p>\n
All member states in one way or the other would benefit from
\n\"economies of scale\", rather than struggling for their luck on
\ntheir own in the region. (In this respect, the French and British
\nattempt to obtain a special status separate from the EU in the
\nASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) can have negative consequences for the
\nEU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), since ASEAN
\ncountries can exploit this request to their advantage by driving
\na wedge into the EU).<\/p>\n
Ultimately, the problem of a common approach can be solved
\nonly through a substantial reform of CFSP, as conceived in the
\nMaastricht Treaty. If the EU really wants to become an
\nindependent political actor, it should, at least, fully subject
\nits foreign policy to the rule of majority voting.<\/p>\n
As far as the new approach is concerned, the success of the EU
\npolicy does not lie in the creation of new devices but in deeper
\nunderstanding, even cultural empathy. The solution does not lie
\nin a value-based or a realist policy, rather in a bi-dimensional
\nstrategy, which means, on the one hand, pragmatic official
\nrelations and, on the other, the creation of new channels of
\nunofficial communication which avoid public confrontation and may
\nbe better suited for dealing with issues involving values.<\/p>\n
This does not mean that fundamental issues such as human
\nrights should be sacrificed on the altar of economics. It must be
\nclear that there are limits to the toleration of human rights
\nviolations (like genocide, massacres perpetrated by security
\nforces, torture, and so forth) whatever European economic
\ninterests maybe. However, given Europe's relatively weaker
\neconomic position, these fundamental values must be pursued in a
\nway that makes the economic costs tolerable. It should not be
\nforgotten that European economic competitiveness and jobs are
\nvital interests for the union because they are the foundations of
\nthe European model of social peace and security.<\/p>\n
If high-level official and public relations concentrate on
\nmore practical matters, for example economics, public
\ncondemnations of Asian governments by Western leaders could be
\navoided. In Asian eyes, these attacks can only be interpreted as
\na deliberate affront and another example of colonial paternalism.
\nIn order to avoid unnecessary public humiliations, the EU could
\ninstall early warning mechanisms at the non-public level.<\/p>\n
Finally, divisive political issues should be taken up in a
\nmore sophisticated manner than hitherto. For this purpose, there
\nshould be an incentive to shift controversial themes from the
\nofficial \"track one\" to an informal track. This approach could
\nalso be extended to the business sector, as the Commission
\nencouraged in its 1996 strategy paper, something that ASEAN
\ncurrently does not engage in.<\/p>\n
\"We should concentrate our activities on the things that bind
\nus, instead of those that divide us,\" said the Singaporean
\nForeign Minister. As far as the European side is concerned, this
\ndoes mean renunciation of values that have often guided its
\nforeign policy, but pursuit of them in a constructive way. A two-
\ntier strategy seems to be an essential condition.<\/p>\n
Aurora Ferrari is a Visiting Associate at the Institute of
\nSoutheast Asian Studies, Singapore.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/towards-productive-eu-asean-dialog-1447893297",
"image": ""
},
"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}