Too much talk obstructs rebuilding process<\/p>\n
By Meuthia Ganie-Rochman<\/p>\n
BOGOR, West Java (JP): Transition to democracy is a process
\ninvolving many factors. There are countries that are lucky enough
\nto go through the process without social turbulence. In those
\ncountries, the democratization process was in most cases
\ninitiated by the ruling elite, who were aware on the global
\ndemocratic tendency of modern societies.<\/p>\n
However, there are more countries for which the road to
\ndemocracy is dangerous. The initial process is signified not only
\nby the battle cry of the ruling elite striving to maintain their
\npolitical and economic privileges, but also by political groups
\ncompeting among themselves to decide the direction of
\ndemocratization.<\/p>\n
In such cases, the politics of discourse emerge and dominate
\nthe public arena. Arguments, indignation, accusations and self-
\naffirmation explode on it, and other important requirements of
\nthe process of democratization receive less attention, at least
\nfor a while.<\/p>\n
Indonesia is a case in point for the second category; it could
\nbe said to be an extreme example. Before the fall of Soeharto,
\nIndonesia was an authoritarian country. Centralization of power
\nhad been developed for 30 years. It was a great success in the
\nsense that the government became the center of political power
\nand the source of legitimacy for social organizations.<\/p>\n
When all these achievements were swept away by financial
\ncrisis, Indonesians realized how their former patron had betrayed
\ncommon goals such as justice and general prosperity. Then there
\nwas an urge for a democratic form of government. Democratic
\nappeals become the new banner for every group to raise in the
\npublic sphere.<\/p>\n
Along with it, political groups from all corners pursued
\npositions and recognition in the building of a new governance. In
\nthis era of scarcity, the widespread feeling of anxiety among the
\npolitical elite is mounting, and leading them to search out areas
\nof political and economic resources that are still available: the
\nstate institutions.<\/p>\n
The prominence of the politics of discourse at this stage of
\nthe democratization process in Indonesia has various causes. The
\nfall of Soeharto was a dramatic one. Soeharto was one of Asia's
\nstrongest authoritarian leaders. So powerful has he been that
\nobservers consider him as an equal to the entire New Order
\ngovernment.<\/p>\n
Critical groups once argued that if Soeharto retired it would
\nbring the country toward democracy. When Soeharto eventually
\nstepped down, people were realized that his retirement from the
\npresidency was one thing, but to change the regime was quite
\nanother. New political groups emerged, and for some time paid
\nlittle attention to building common programs for the reform of
\nstate institutions. Instead, they have busily endorsed their
\npositions in the new political environment.<\/p>\n
However, on the opposite spectrum of the new political
\nlandscape, the old regime has not disappeared at all. The same
\nleaders with the same old political practices are still in place.
\nIt is true that some important changes in the political system
\nhave successfully been brought about by reformist groups.
\nHowever, these changes relate mainly to allowing wider political
\nparticipation: freedom of the press and the freedom to establish
\npolitical organizations.<\/p>\n
Unfortunately, the aspect of wider political participation is
\nonly one requirement of democratization. The political system
\nitself needs to be responsive to various demands by different
\npolitical groups. Otherwise, the public sphere where demands are
\nvoiced is only an institution within a series of political
\nprocesses.<\/p>\n
The direction of democratization is determined by the priority
\nof the reformists as to which parts of state institutions need to
\nbe revised first. It has become a popular opinion that
\ndemocratization is about controlling power. Therefore, the
\nreformists, partly because of their own beliefs and partly due to
\npublic pressure, press their demands on this aspect. They have
\nbeen particularly vocal on the abolition of the Indonesian
\nMilitary (TNI)'s dual function, the limiting of president power
\nand devolution of power to the regions. These issues have
\ncrystallized and become yardsticks for measuring one's political
\nstance.<\/p>\n
As already said, the politics of discourse has its own merits
\nin the process of democratization. Discourse sharpens views,
\ncreates a people critical of political issues and develops
\ncertain moral controls to every political actor.<\/p>\n
However, too much political discourse may be ineffective.
\nDiscourse distracts people's attention from the real work of
\ninstitutional building. Because discourse often overlooks well-
\ndefined formulations and is less imbued with complete facts, it
\ntends to blur issues and become emotional. It also tends to
\nattach to primitive views and become personality-oriented.
\nAnother weakness is that because discourse is to serve one's
\nposition, it ignores the language of compromise.<\/p>\n
What is the impact of too much of this politics of discourse?
\nFor sure, the politics transforms into stages where performances
\nare more important than the backstage realities. Whether you like
\nit or not, political actors must spend a lot of their energies in
\nperforming. Maybe this situation is enjoyed by political
\nadventurers because they are most ready to play with words.<\/p>\n
Politics of discourse also makes people delay the real task of
\nthe building of the new government, which is expected to be
\nreformist, democratic, and transparent. Whereas nothing
\nguarantees that the new government will be strong or democratic
\nenough to press on with democratization.<\/p>\n
Moreover, crystallized issues will become weapons of criticism
\nfor the opponents -- whatever their reasons are. On the one hand,
\nit may be good to guide the direction of reform. But on the
\nother, such yardsticks create an inflexibility and hamper
\ncreativity in taking alternative methods of democratization.<\/p>\n
The institutional building of democratization is therefore a
\ncrucial aspect. This is the task to build a new power base. It is
\nthe way resources in society are managed. There is already
\nabundant criticism of the state's performance in policy
\nimplementation and bureaucratic practices.<\/p>\n
Indonesia is known to have the most corrupt government in the
\nworld. This status has not changed in spite of the democratic
\ntendency in this country. The Far Eastern Economic Review
\nmagazine reported that some businesspeople consider that
\ncorruption has even become worse in some cases. The tremendous
\ntask of reducing corruption in order to improve common welfare is
\na huge task for the new government.<\/p>\n
From a technical point of view, the politics of
\ninstitutionalization rely on laws and a system of enforcement. In
\nthe era of political openness, laws are not created by the ruling
\nelite but are open to public debate. At least, the government or
\npeople's representatives ask the involvement of experts from
\nuniversities or the business world. Competency is the basis of
\narguments.<\/p>\n
It does not mean, however, that the politics of
\ninstitutionalization is a matter of technical capacity. In the
\nmaking of regulations and bodies to enforce them, interests are
\naccommodated. Take an example in the area of privatization. The
\nregulation must take into account the interests of government,
\nthe investors, the consumers, and the workers. There are problems
\nof equality -- for the nation's economy and representativeness --
\nand of who is going to protect the workers' interests.<\/p>\n
The politics of institutionalization must remain within the
\nframework of creating a new governance. It is not only a matter
\nof regulation, but must cover the question of the new position of
\nthe state as much as the question of how to involve society in
\nthe new governance. In the New Order era, the state has been the
\npatron to dominate financial resources, expertise, and problem
\nformulation. The new politics of institutionalization must rely
\non the dynamics of society. Competent social organizations must
\nbe embedded in the process.<\/p>\n
New forms of cooperation and networks need to be developed
\nbetween state institutions and various social organizations.
\nTherefore, increasing the capacity of social organization must be
\none of the nation's priorities. For example, the country must
\nstrengthen its educational institutions. In the past, the share
\nof education in the national budget was only around 5 percent.
\nViewed from the perspective of nation building, this is a crime.<\/p>\n
Transparency is another norm that needs to be developed. Co-
\noperation that involves different parties cannot work without it.
\nPeople need to trust each other. Trust, in turn, needs a method
\nto maintain itself. In implementing the norms of transparency,
\ndebates on new regulations must invite competent people from the
\npress, for example. The press community must, of course, increase
\nits influence in the legislative arena.<\/p>\n
Indonesia does not only need a new legitimate government, but
\nalso a government that is willing and able to develop new forms
\nof cooperation among different groups.<\/p>\n
The writer teaches in the Department of Sociology at the
\nUniversity of Indonesia.<\/p>",
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