Today's calm may turn to chaos<\/p>\n
By Hermawan Sulistyo<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Renewed student demonstrations have marked the
\nlocal political landscape in the last three months. Many might
\ncontend the rallies serve as an indicator of political and social
\ntensions.<\/p>\n
Along with mounting and subsequently declining student
\ndemonstrations, some small-scale riots also erupted here and
\nthere. With student demonstrations used as a social indicator,
\nthe riots also serve a similar function.<\/p>\n
If the assumption is true, then what is likely to happen in
\nthe near future?<\/p>\n
As the situation was similar to today a year ago, it is
\nhelpful to compare the two to understand possible scenarios which
\nmay be played out.<\/p>\n
During the fasting month of Ramadhan, the political climate is
\nalways more subdued. Everyone, including students, restrains
\nherself or himself from any actions that could be counter-
\nproductive to their cause.<\/p>\n
Another factor is at play. Most companies are striving to
\nprovide their employees and workers with the Tunjangan Hari Raya
\n(THR), an annual allowance to be given before Lebaran, or Idul
\nFitri, the religious holiday marking the end of Ramadhan.<\/p>\n
The situation, however, is pseudo in nature. Lebaran is a
\nreligious and social event that is economically most draining
\nthroughout the year.<\/p>\n
This means that within days after Lebaran, members of the
\nlower class will have no money left to survive. Worse than last
\nyear, today's lower purchasing power will make their survival
\nendurance shorter. It is unlikely that they can maintain the
\nminimum costs of living for more than one or two weeks, unless
\nthey receive some fresh money to help the situation.<\/p>\n
The scenario might be that the first stage of riots will occur
\nsome time after Lebaran; a moderate estimate for the timeframe is
\nbetween Jan. 27 and Feb. 7.<\/p>\n
After this period, social tensions will depend on how the
\nsecurity apparatus reacts to the riots. If the security forces
\nuse excessive violence, the result will be more violent
\nresistance. By contrast, a more lenient reaction will be more
\neffective in controlling the spread.<\/p>\n
In nature, such riots will, at first, be local, sporadic,
\nsmall-scale and without any pattern of triggering factors. Any
\nsmall incidents, such as a fight between children, might spark a
\nlarger brawl and even a riot.<\/p>\n
If a riot is a sociological category to refer to a collective
\nrunning amok by a crowd, such unrest might be better termed
\nsocial anarchy. Collective running amok is a short-term outburst,
\nmarked by the presence of violent actions. Anarchy is marked more
\nby continuing criminal actions rather than a short-term,
\nunfocused action by a crowd.<\/p>\n
Where is the anarchy likely to occur? From a political
\ndemographic perspective, regions with a nonagricultural base will
\nbe the most vulnerable. These areas will include, but not be
\nlimited to, industrial towns and cities, or places that are based
\non services. Thus, around Jakarta, the most likely areas to have
\nsuch explosive potential are Bekasi, Tangerang and North Jakarta.
\nBut due to North Jakarta's more intense exposure to political
\nactivities, this area is the least likely among the other areas
\nto witness the first explosive anarchy in Jakarta.<\/p>\n
In Java, cities and towns with trade, services and industry as
\nthe societal base will be the more likely to be affected by
\nanarchy. Not all cities and towns along the north coast of Java
\nare based on agriculture; some are trading ports and industry-
\nbased communities. For such a situation, anarchy is an imminent
\nthreat in the post-immediate period of Lebaran.<\/p>\n
On the other islands, similar situations can be found. In
\nSumatra, for example, there are some vulnerable areas along the
\nroute between Medan in North Sumatra and Aceh, and others in the
\nhinterland areas. In Kalimantan, towns and cities in East
\nKalimantan, which have no food production areas, have the weakest
\nresilience to resist anarchy.<\/p>\n
An interesting feature is that in some places where
\nagriculture is not the primary support for local life, there is
\nstill no serious threat of anarchy. These places are most likely
\nthe \"suppliers\" of urban migrants. Padang in West Sumatra and
\nWonogiri in Central Java are only two examples.<\/p>\n
The main reason for their resilient social systems is that the
\nmigrants bring home economic resources from other areas when they
\nreturn during Lebaran. The influx of travelers from the capital
\nis a good supporting economic source for local residents.<\/p>\n
In general, the countryside is more resilient to the potential
\nanarchy, since food stocks will sustain at least the subsistence
\nlevel of life or maintain the minimum standard of living.<\/p>\n
Therefore, the agriculture-based society will be among the
\nleast prone to experience anarchy. But, without any significant
\nchanges in agricultural policies, it is difficult to imagine that
\nthe rural society will keep its quiet and calm social performance
\nduring the post-immediate period of Lebaran.<\/p>\n
In March or April, after the harvest, farmers will have to
\nstart planting again. With an unsubsidized fertilizer in the
\nmarket, it will be extremely difficult for them. Today's planting
\nseason, which falls in December, is not as critical for the
\nfarmers as it will be in April for many, if not most, of them
\nstill have enough stocks of fertilizer. But after the next
\nharvest season, the boiling tensions in the countryside will be
\nas high as those in the urban areas.<\/p>\n
In such a scenario, when will Jakarta experience the anarchy?
\nIt is unlikely that this city will see it before mid-February.<\/p>\n
First, many of Jakarta's middle to lower class residents will
\nnot return to city within a couple days after Lebaran from their
\nhometowns. When such migrants, either permanent or temporary,
\nreturn to Jakarta, they usually use some small savings to survive
\nbefore they lose their hope because of the worsening crisis.<\/p>\n
Jakarta students face a similar situation, with a longer
\nperiod of losing hope and adjustment. Say if, by the end of
\nJanuary, they have returned to the city, it will be no less than
\ntwo weeks that they may consolidate their strength to launch
\nsignificant rallies again. Thus, do not expect them to move to
\nthe streets again before mid-February.<\/p>\n
The scenario of possible anarchy and even riots might be
\nexaggerated. But signs of such a trend are clear from the
\nbeginning. Macroeconomic figures might be misleading -- deflation
\nis not a good sign, for instance, because lost purchasing power
\nshifts the normal supply-demand balance -- for they are not
\nexpressing the political-economic conditions of the poor. In this
\ncase, statistical mistreatment will cause a great impact on
\nsocial coherence.<\/p>\n
With apparent social dislocation and anarchy, what should we
\ndo? Most likely, many of us will doubt such a gloomy scenario
\nuntil it explodes into real danger for us. Precautionary and
\nconscientized policies are needed to anticipate such local
\ndoomsdays. Otherwise, we will see history repeating itself; last
\nyear, it was bad, but now it will be worse.<\/p>\n
The writer is a researcher with the Research Institute for
\nDemocracy and Peace.<\/p>\n
Window: The scenario might be that the first stage of riots will
\noccur some time after Lebaran; a moderate estimate for the
\ntimeframe is between Jan. 27 and Feb. 7.<\/p>",
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