TNI must not repeat E. Timor mistakes<\/p>\n
Ardimas Sasdi, Staff Writer, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta,
\nardimas@thejakartapost.com<\/p>\n
The process of ending hostilities in troubled Aceh, which has
\nbeen underway for the last five months, has entered a new,
\ncritical phase, which if not handled properly, could wreck the
\npeace plan.<\/p>\n
Two of the most worrying developments threatening to derail
\nthe peace efforts were an attack by an angry mob of 1,500, who
\nransacked and burned a Joint Security Committee (JSC) office in
\nthe East Aceh town of Langsa on Sunday, and the killing of nine
\nrebels by the police and military in four incidents on Tuesday.<\/p>\n
The JSC withdrew its peace monitors from the regencies to
\nBanda Aceh on Tuesday following Tuesday's killings.<\/p>\n
Sunday's incident was the second attack by a mob on a JSC
\noffice in less than one month. Last month, hundreds of people,
\nwhose identities are still unknown, attacked a JSC office in
\nTakengon, Central Aceh, ostensibly over what the attackers'
\ncalled the committee's failure to maintain impartiality.<\/p>\n
The attack, which could be categorized as a criminal act, has
\nthe potential to ruin the peace process, which had been
\nproceeding relatively well since the government and the Free Aceh
\nMovement (GAM) signed a truce brokered by the Swiss-based non-
\ngovernmental organization, the Henry Dunant Centre, in Geneva on
\nDec. 9.<\/p>\n
The JSC was formed by the HDC to supervise the implementation
\nof programs to end the hostilities in Aceh. It comprises
\nrepresentatives from the Indonesian Military (TNI), GAM and
\ninternational peace monitors, mostly from Thailand, a country
\nviewed by both GAM and Indonesia as neutral.<\/p>\n
In response to Sunday's attack, the HDC has asked the
\ngovernment to take the necessary steps to prevent similar
\nincidents, and provide security for JSC members as all the JSC
\noffices in Aceh's eight regencies have faced the threat of
\nattack.<\/p>\n
The attacks on the JSC have occurred after a drive by GAM to
\nrecruit new members as part of its campaign for independence, and
\nthe failure to meet the deadline to disarm as stipulated in the
\nGeneva accord -- things considered by the military to be blatant
\nbreaches of the peace deal.<\/p>\n
This view has toughened the stance of the TNI and police
\nagainst GAM. The TNI is still the dominant force, at least as far
\nas Aceh and GAM are concerned. The Army, for instance, held a
\nmeeting of its top brass in Lhokseumawe, one of the hottest spots
\nin Aceh, a move seen by observers as a nothing less than a show
\nof force.<\/p>\n
The latest developments in Aceh, including the violations of
\nthe peace accord by both sides and exchanges of harsh words, have
\nsparked concerns in many quarters.<\/p>\n
Senior diplomat Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, the Indonesian
\ngovernment's chief negotiator with GAM, had earlier called on the
\nsecessionist movement to comply with the peace deal to avoid
\nplunging the province back into a bloody conflict with the TNI,
\nwhile a Golkar legislator from Aceh, T.M. Nurlif, urged the
\ngovernment and GAM not to abandon the peace agreement.<\/p>\n
The Dec. 9, 2002, peace agreement was seriously flawed from
\nthe beginning by GAM's refusal to renounce its 26-year-old armed
\nstruggle for independence.<\/p>\n
The road to peace between a government and rebels in any part
\nof the world is not easy as evidenced by the ongoing talks
\nbetween the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil rebels, which are
\nbrokered by the government of Norway and hosted by Thailand. Both
\nColombo and the rebels treaded lightly at the outset of the peace
\ntalks by discussing relatively uncontentious issues so as to
\nensure they would be able to move on to trickier issues during
\nthe later stages.<\/p>\n
Most Acehnese, as reflected by the turnouts for the
\nestablishment of the new peace zones and their expressed wishes
\nfor the extension of such zones, support the existing peace
\nprocess. The HDC, while not ignoring the violations, was also
\nquite happy with the way the efforts to end the hostilities were
\nproceeding.<\/p>\n
In addition, the international community had also invested
\nhigh hopes in the peaceful solution of the Aceh issue as
\nreflected in the commitment of world organizations and a number
\nof countries to take part in the reconstruction of basic
\ninfrastructure in the resource-rich province, such as the
\nbuilding of new schools, roads and irrigation schemes.<\/p>\n
The future of the peace deal in Aceh will largely depend upon
\nthe political will of GAM and Indonesian government leaders.<\/p>\n
The rebels, for instance, must forget their desire for
\nindependence, and instead accept Jakarta's offer of special
\nautonomy, while Jakarta also has its work cut out for it so as to
\nensure justice for the Acehnese.<\/p>\n
The military must shift from a heavy-handed approach to a more
\nhumane one in order to supplement concrete development programs
\nin a bid to win the hearts and minds of the Acehnese. The
\nmilitary and police will also have to train their personnel in
\nsociology, religion and communications, and tighten up the
\nselection procedures for the officers who are to be sent to the
\nstaunchly Muslim province.<\/p>\n
The military could also learn from the approach adopted by the
\nformer Dutch colonial government in Aceh to end the bloody
\nconflict, which has claimed more than 10,000 lives. The Dutch at
\none time employed Islamic scholar C. Snouck Hurgronye to research
\nan effective approach toward the Acehnese, who are known as
\nsimple but brave people who are immensely proud of their culture
\nand religion. For them, respect is worth much more than wealth.<\/p>\n
The military must also resist the temptation to take advantage
\nof the fact that the world's attention is currently focused on
\nIraq by launching a campaign of uncontrolled violence to crush
\nGAM as it did against the East Timorese following their decision
\nto secede from Indonesia in a referendum in 1999. Should
\nsomething like this happen again, it is unlikely it will be
\nforgotten, if not actually forgiven, so quickly by the world
\ncommunity.<\/p>\n
Evidence is mounting that the military intends to use force to
\ntry once again to exterminate the rebels. This may be gleaned
\nfrom the statement made by Megawati ordering the police and
\nmilitary to prepare themselves for an anti-insurgency operation,
\nand the preparations being made for the dispatch of a large
\nnumber of additional troops to the province.<\/p>\n
If the senior military leaders in Jakarta choose this path,
\nthey will be condemning themselves, as well as the younger
\nofficers who have no choice but to obey the orders of their
\nsuperiors, and run the risk of some time in the future being
\nhauled before an international court for crimes against humanity.<\/p>",
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