TNI makes strategic retreat from formal politics<\/p>\n
Tiarma Siboro, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta<\/p>\n
The Indonesian Military (TNI) sprang a major surprise in
\nAugust when it announced that it would relinquish all its seats
\nboth in the House of Representatives (DPR) and the People's
\nConsultative Assembly (MPR) as of 2004, five years earlier than
\noriginally scheduled.<\/p>\n
Because the TNI took the nation completely by surprise --
\nthere was not a single hint of any of this before the MPR's
\nannual session opened in August -- the announcement was greeted
\nwith skepticism and not a small dose of suspicion.<\/p>\n
Most analysts agreed that the TNI's withdrawal from politics
\n(at least relinquishing one of its political privileges) was a
\ncalculated move that would leave the military in an even more
\npowerful position than had it insisted on retaining the seats.<\/p>\n
This is more a strategic retreat.<\/p>\n
The move will free the TNI from the constraints of formal
\npolitics without its relinquishing its real political power.<\/p>\n
After 2004, the TNI will remain one of the best organized and
\ndisciplined institutions in the country, unequaled by any
\ncivilian institution. It would be naive to suggest that the TNI
\nwill not exert its power and influence given its massive
\npolitical clout.<\/p>\n
The TNI is not quitting politics. It is simply going to play
\nthe game differently, and in all likelihood, far more
\neffectively, hopefully, for better.<\/p>\n
At any event, the TNI's decision to relinquish its DPR and MPR
\nseats after 2004 removed one of the many contentious issues that
\nthe MPR had to overcome as it debated the fourth package of
\namendments to the 1945 Constitution in August.<\/p>\n
There were signs that the talks over the constitutional
\namendments would be deadlocked in the MPR in August because of
\nmajor disagreements on several issues. Agreement was essential,
\nhowever, as the nation must begin preparations for the 2004
\ngeneral election based on the amended Constitution.<\/p>\n
TNI chief Gen. Endriartono Sutarto moved the debate forward
\nwith a stern warning that lest the MPR political factions come to
\nan agreement, the nation might be forced to return to the
\noriginal text of the basic law as it was written in 1945.<\/p>\n
But he also made it easy for the MPR.<\/p>\n
Had it not been for the surprise announcement, the MPR would
\nhave been faced with the awkward question of what to do with the
\nTNI's representation in the two state organs. On the one hand,
\nthe proposed constitutional amendments abolished the TNI seats in
\nthe DPR and MPR. On the other hand, a 2000 MPR ruling states that
\nthe TNI can maintain its seats until 2009.<\/p>\n
This dilemma was resolved by the TNI's own decision.<\/p>\n
Lt. Gen (ret.) Agus Widjojo, who led the TNI\/Police faction in
\nMPR, explained the rationale for quitting formal politics early:
\n\"We might as well start focusing on our primary function as the
\nnational defense force\".<\/p>\n
But there were other indicators during 2002 which suggested
\nthat the TNI would continue to be a political force to be
\nreckoned with and that it would not hesitate to flex its muscles
\nfrom time to time.<\/p>\n
The Army, by far the most powerful of the three services, for
\nexample, wrested back the TNI leadership with the appointment of
\nGen. Endriartono in April to replace Navy Admiral Widodo A.S.<\/p>\n
Endriartono virtually muscled his way through, giving no
\noption to President Megawati but to appoint him, even though it
\nwas supposed to have been the turn of the Air Force to take over
\nthe joint chiefs of staff baton.<\/p>\n
In another exercise in influence, the Army managed to persuade
\nPresident Megawati to approve the sending of additional Army
\nbattalions to troubled Aceh throughout the year to crack down on
\nthe separatist rebels there.<\/p>\n
Any suggestions that the Army should dismantle its territorial
\ncommand structures, through which it exercises political control
\nmore effectively than any of the formal political institutions,
\nhave been sidelined.<\/p>\n
Nothing like such a dismantling is likely to happen any time
\nsoon. In fact, the revival of the Aceh military command points in
\nthe opposite direction.<\/p>\n
The military remains undecided about whether or not to allow
\nits troops to vote in the 2004 elections. The TNI relinquished
\nthe rights of its personnel to vote in previous elections in
\nreturn for guaranteed seats in the DPR and MPR. Now that it is no
\nlonger represented in these institutions, technically, the TNI
\nshould allow its members to vote. This issue remains unresolved.<\/p>\n
The military's decision to withdraw from formal politics also
\ncomes with a big price tag: the TNI says that its budget must be
\nbolstered in order to turn it into a professional fighting force.<\/p>\n
The sad, if not pathetic, reality is that the money the
\ngovernment forks out on the defense sector each year barely
\ncovers about 30 percent of the TNI's operational needs. The
\nshortfall has been covered all these years by the respective
\nservices through the businesses that they own and manage.<\/p>\n
The military businesses, however, only supplement the
\noperational budget, and not the budget for the procurement of
\nmilitary equipment.<\/p>\n
In an apparently open display of rivalry for a greater share
\nof the budget, the Navy and the Air Force both exposed the
\nweaknesses of their outdated equipment, even to the point of
\ncompromising national defense capabilities.<\/p>\n
The Navy, for example, suggested that its warships were not
\ncombat-ready, while the Air Force claimed that the nation could
\nno longer patrol, let alone protect, the airspace of the entire
\narchipelago.<\/p>\n
The military's extensive involvement in business has attracted
\na lot of criticism, but it seems unrealistic to demand the
\nmilitary to quit the corporate world without proposing how the
\nTNI should plug the hole in its budget.<\/p>\n
As Gen. Endriartono has repeatedly said: \"We (the TNI) will
\nhappily leave our businesses once the country is able to provide
\nus with a sufficient budget\".<\/p>\n
Even with the hefty increase in defense spending in 2003 to Rp
\n17.8 trillion from Rp 9.5 trillion in 2002, the country is still
\na long way from meeting the TNI's budget needs so as to ensure
\nits professionalism.<\/p>\n
For some years to come, it looks like the military's
\ninvolvement in business will be the norm. But at least, the
\ngovernment has finally required the TNI to audit all its
\nbusinesses to ensure a modicum of transparency and
\naccountability.<\/p>\n
The global war on terror has been something of a blessing in
\ndisguise for the TNI.<\/p>\n
In 2001, when the National Police was formally separated from
\nthe military, the TNI's job was reduced solely to national
\ndefense. National security became solely and exclusively the
\ndomain of the police. The military would only be brought in if
\nthe police needed assistance.<\/p>\n
But that distinction was blurred by the increasing global
\nconcerns about terrorism after the Sept. 11, 2001, attack in the
\nUnited States, and reinforced after the Oct. 12, 2002, attack in
\nBali.<\/p>\n
The military has since been brought back into the fold in the
\nfight against terrorism and, effectively, national security
\nissues, and the government has even asked the intelligence unit
\nof Kopassus (the Army's Special Forces), to help the police in
\ntracking down the terrorists in this country.<\/p>\n
The police, while doing a good job in investigating the
\nterrorist attacks in Bali, simply cannot be expected to do the
\njob of countering the threat of terrorism effectively by
\nthemselves.<\/p>\n
This has also been fully recognized by the United States to
\nthe point where the White House is now lobbying congress to lift
\nthe military embargo against Indonesia, imposed after the 1999
\nmilitary fiasco in East Timor.<\/p>\n
To begin with, the United States has revived the International
\nMilitary and Education Training (IMET) program for Indonesian
\nofficers. Talks are now underway on having the embargo on the
\nsale of lethal weapons to Indonesia lifted.<\/p>\n
There is no doubt, however, that with the TNI moving out of
\nformal politics as well as national security, the military should
\nnow face less criticism than before.<\/p>\n
This should allow the military to proceed with its internal
\nreforms at a pace it is more comfortable with.<\/p>\n
The events of 2002 indicate that reforms in the TNI are taking
\nplace probably faster than many people had anticipated, and
\ncertainly faster than the slow-moving reforms in the civilian
\norganizations, like the bureaucracy, the legal institutions and
\nthe political institutions.<\/p>\n
Given that these reforms are designed to bolster the TNI's
\noverall strength, the question is then, where will the TNI stand
\nvis-vis the civilian political institutions in 2009?<\/p>",
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