The TNI shoots itself in the foot in Aceh<\/p>\n
Ong Hock Chuan, Maverick, Jakarta<\/p>\n
It is too early to say who will win the war in Aceh but one
\nthing is for certain: the Indonesian Military (TNI) is taking a
\nlicking on the public relations front. Ironically, its biggest
\nenemy here is neither the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) or the media,
\nbut itself.<\/p>\n
Barely two weeks into the war, the TNI is realizing that it is
\nanything but all quiet on the Western front. GAM, it has
\nrealized, shoots back not only bullets but also verbal missiles
\naimed at destroying the TNI's morale, credibility and whatever
\nsupport it has for the war. The TNI, however, is reacting in the
\nworst possible way to this attack: It is now trying to introduce
\ncurbs on journalists covering the war against quoting GAM leaders
\nand calling the media irresponsible for reporting news from the
\nother side.<\/p>\n
If this keeps up, all the TNI will achieve is to alienate and
\nanger the local and foreign media, prompting them to be more
\nsympathetic toward GAM and eroding any support it might have
\namong reporters.<\/p>\n
What the TNI should do, instead, is to realize that in modern
\nwarfare the media is a fact of life and the technology that makes
\nthe media a pervasive presence is part of life. You either deal
\nwith it skillfully with a modern, sophisticated communications
\nstrategy or you can, like what the TNI is doing now, twist in the
\nwind and blame the whole world for going against you. Then you
\nsound churlish and the whole world really starts to turn against
\nyou.<\/p>\n
What the TNI can do to dig itself out of this mess is to
\nconsider whether it has the expertise and skill among its
\npersonnel to implement its communications strategy, if it has
\nany.<\/p>\n
Whether it has a communications strategy remains a mystery but
\none obvious media strategy it has adopted is to \"embed\"
\njournalists among TNI troops. This is a strategy that by and
\nlarge served the Americans well in Iraq and can potentially work
\nfor the TNI.<\/p>\n
Why? Consider the parallels. The U.S. went to war with
\ndoubtful media support, even from its domestic media. Overseas
\nreporters were unprepared to believe anything coming out of
\nWashington. The TNI has similar credibility problems, both with
\ndomestic and foreign journalists.<\/p>\n
Faced with this situation, the U.S. was in a vulnerable
\nposition. Iraqi ruler Saddam Hussein could have easily eroded any
\nmedia and popular support of the war by playing the victim,
\nblaming any atrocities on the U.S. and claim -- as he tried to do
\n-- that the allies were suffering serious setbacks. GAM can
\neasily do all these things and erode whatever support the TNI has
\nlocally and overseas.<\/p>\n
Faced with this situation, observed Clarke S. Judge, the
\nmanaging director of the White House Writers group in the Asian
\nWall Street Journal, the U.S. opened its operations to \"the kind
\nof risks that no one would take if he were planning to lie. Spin
\nwas out of the question. Good or bad, the story is there for the
\nreporter to see.\"<\/p>\n
Hence the embedding of journalists among the troops. What went
\nlargely unnoticed by the public, however, was the number of
\ntrained and skilled media handlers the U.S. military had on the
\nground, in its field headquarters and in Washington itself. These
\nwere soldiers who had been highly trained to handle the media and
\nexecute their communications strategy. This is where any
\nparallels between the Pentagon and the TNI diverge.<\/p>\n
Recall, for instance, that the U.S. soldiers never seemed
\nflustered when leveled with even the most hostile of accusations
\nfrom the media. When the media misreported they did not lose
\ntheir cool but sought to correct the \"facts\" as they saw them.
\nAnd when they were faced by inconvenient questions they \"bridged\"
\n(a technique for avoiding tricky questions in the world of PR)
\ntheir way to the key messages Pentagon had carefully crafted.
\nThey also staged daily briefings which were made for TV.<\/p>\n
In contrast, the TNI overreacts to even when the media quotes
\nthe other side. It lectures journalists to be responsible,
\nimplying that they are not. And it tries to put curbs on what and
\nwho the reporters can quote or write. And where are the daily
\nbriefings which are excellent opportunities for the TNI to reach
\nevery Indonesian household via TV?<\/p>\n
To experienced PR practitioners, Pentagon's performance is a
\nreflection of how seriously the Americans take their
\ncommunications battle, while the TNI's performance to date is a
\nreflection of how low communications is placed on the priority
\nlist of the TNI.<\/p>\n
The TNI must realize that with a free press in Indonesia and
\nthe pervasive presence of foreign reporters control is not an
\noption where the media is concerned. Influence is, but to be
\neffective you need specialized skills born out of a realization
\nthat the media exists as a neutral force that can be made to work
\nfor or against you.<\/p>\n
Maverick is a public relations consultancy that specializes in
\ncrisis and issues management as well as brand strategy. It also
\ntrains corporate executives in media handling skills.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/the-tni-shoots-itself-in-the-foot-in-aceh-1447893297",
"image": ""
},
"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}