The terrorrists' videos: A new tactic or a propaganda ploy?<\/p>\n
Rohaiza Ahmad Asi, The Straits Times, Asia News Network\/Singapore<\/p>\n
The discovery of three videotapes by the Indonesian police
\nduring raids on hideouts of the now-deceased Azahari Husin is a
\nsignificant development.<\/p>\n
No group in the region has, thus far, been known to film
\nsuicide bombers before the act. Nor has the leader of the group
\nappeared in a video, issuing threats against the West. Thus, this
\nis a new phenomenon. Why has the Jamaah Islamiah (JI) switched
\ntactics?<\/p>\n
The first video shows a militant, Tedi, believed to have been
\ntrained by Azahari, giving step-by-step instructions on how to
\nuse various explosives and fabricate detonators from different
\ndevices, including a mobile phone.<\/p>\n
The second video shows the three suicide bombers in last
\nmonth's Bali bombings explaining their motivations, followed by a
\nwarning from a hooded man, reported to be Noordin Mohamed Top,
\nwho is still at large, warning the United States, Britain and
\nAustralia of more attacks to come. The third video shows masked
\nmen practicing shooting and jumping from moving vehicles at an
\nunnamed training camp.<\/p>\n
All these portrayals may be common practice among radical
\nIslamic groups in the Middle East but had never been used in this
\nregion. Clearly, terrorists learn from one another but, more
\nimportantly, why is JI doing this now?<\/p>\n
Most terrorist groups are aware that violence alone is no
\nlonger sufficient. The use of propaganda -- thus the issuing of
\nsuch videotapes -- may be just as effective in spreading terror
\nand could even have a more profound impact, psychologically
\nspeaking.<\/p>\n
JI has been heavily constrained by a series of arrests and
\nraids that the Indonesian authorities have conducted. Its freedom
\nto operate has also been curtailed as a result of intense
\nsurveillance by the authorities. Also, fissures have deepened
\nbetween the pro-bombing factions such as those led by Noordin and
\nAzahari, and those factions that believe more in long-term
\nproselytisation.<\/p>\n
These two factors together make it harder for JI to find
\nrecruits. Recent developments indicated that JI has been trying
\nto recruit from other Islamist militant groups in Indonesia such
\nas Darul Islam as well. In this context, the videotapes may well
\nbe propaganda to attract recruits besides providing motivation to
\nexisting members.<\/p>\n
After all, in their video, the three suicide bombers also
\nissued a call for more volunteers to sign up as suicide bombers.
\nSaying that they were dying for a \"noble cause\", they portrayed
\nsuicide bombing as being worthy of emulation. The videos could
\nhave easily been copied and passed around within the Muslim
\ncommunity. Perhaps the morale of JI members may have been waning
\nwith the arrests and raids, so the videos were also meant to keep
\nthe jihad spirit among members burning.<\/p>\n
Having said that, JI certainly wants a larger audience. Why
\nelse would Noordin -- the Indonesian authorities seem convinced
\nthat he is the masked man in the video -- make threats against
\nthe West? He clearly wanted the message seen and heard widely.
\nThis also reflects JI's lack of access to the mass media.<\/p>\n
True, there are many jihadist websites based in Indonesia but
\nnone of these JI videos has been posted on them. Recently, an
\nIndonesian-language website set up to teach tactics on how and
\nwhere to kill foreigners in Jakarta also included messages from
\nUstadz Mukhlas on how Muslims should conduct themselves. He is
\nlikely to be Mukhlas, alias Ali Ghufron, who was sentenced to
\ndeath for his role in the October 2002 Bali bombings. The website
\nwas removed shortly after it was discovered by the authorities.<\/p>\n
Unlike its more sophisticated cousins in the Middle East, JI
\ndoes not have its own television channels and radio stations.
\nThis constrains JI's reach, and raises another possibility that
\nthe videos could have been left behind intentionally to see if
\nthe security forces have discovered its safe houses. If the tapes
\nare discovered and broadcast, the cell involved will know which
\nsafe house has been compromised.<\/p>\n
This assumes that the occupants of a particular safe house are
\nable to escape capture. Not so in Azahari's case. In any case,
\nthe group's messages do become known to a wider audience through
\nreports in the mass media. This could be yet another reason for
\nleaving the videos where they can be found. That is, JI could be
\ntrying to use the police as its mouthpiece in a roundabout way.<\/p>\n
Since JI has no channel to release its videos that can garner
\nthe world's attention, the Indonesian authorities could be
\nplaying right into its hands by publicizing its videos and
\nmessages. After all, no publicity is bad publicity.<\/p>\n
In existence since at least 1993, JI gained notoriety
\nfollowing the October 2002 Bali bombings. But the fact that it
\nhas only now resorted to video-taping its message implies an
\nimportant internal development. Its military capability has waned
\nin recent years with the discovery of training camps in the
\ncountry, increased raids and intense surveillance by the
\nauthorities.<\/p>\n
Thus, these videos signal a significant tactical shift from a
\nheavy emphasis on bombings to the active use of propaganda to
\nkeep the JI ideology alive. That is, if JI is no longer as able
\nto sow terror through large-scale attacks, such videos can help
\nkeep its campaign alive.<\/p>\n
As such, Muslim groups must get together to condemn such JI
\npropaganda. The showing of the videos to religious leaders in
\nIndonesia and the plan to distribute them to other ASEAN
\nauthorities so they can enlist the help of Muslim clerics in
\ntheir countries are important countermoves being taken. The
\nauthorities also need to be more proactive in educating the
\npublic so that suspicious activities do not go unreported. All
\nmust act in concert to cut JI off from its supply lines of new
\nrecruits since its shift in tactics is now clear for all to see.<\/p>\n
The writer is a research analyst at the Institute of Defense
\nand Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University.<\/p>",
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