The state losing control over 'preman' (2)<\/p>\n
This is the second of two articles on protected crime by Dr
\nTim Lindsey, Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Asian
\nLaw Centre at the University of Melbourne.<\/p>\n
MELBOURNE, Australia (JP): In order to transform the power
\nderived from its violence into wealth, the New Order consciously
\ncreated a parallel \"secret\" state to ensure elite access to
\nillegal or extra-legal rents; and it was through this system that
\nbusiness and administration were really carried out.<\/p>\n
The degree of this bureaucratic system of \"secret\" corruption
\nand state-managed violence was exposed by the extraordinary
\nevidence given by a local manpower ministry official at the
\nmurder trial of labor activist Marsinah.<\/p>\n
He testified that, despite the existence of a formal
\nindustrial relations system, labor disputes in the Sidoarjo
\nregion where Marsinah had worked were in fact conducted through a
\nsecret network of government, military and employer
\nrepresentatives known as the Sidoarjo Intelligence System.<\/p>\n
Run by the local office of the ministry of manpower, its
\npurpose was to coordinate the exchange of favors between military
\nand employers to ensure intimidation of workers. Identical
\nnetworks existed throughout the nation, he added.<\/p>\n
The New Order state was thus a standover operation offering
\nprotection (against \"wild street youth\" or communists, for
\nexample) and meting out punishment in the form of brutality, as
\nwith Marsinah, who was killed in May 1993. This is also the case
\nwith the August 1996 murder of the journalist Fuad M. Syafruddin.<\/p>\n
This was not simply an example of a powerful, centralist state
\ncommitted to economic development, whatever the cost. On the
\ncontrary, the New Order state's quest for illegal rents for the
\nelite often took place even if it impeded development, as
\nevidenced by the Timor national car fiasco or the Busang\/Bre-X
\ngoldmine scandal.<\/p>\n
Development occurred not principally for ideological reasons
\nor in response to the market but rather at elite direction to
\nfund Soeharto's corrupt \"franchise\" system.<\/p>\n
Again, this tradition of the state as the ultimate illicit
\nrent-seeker can be traced back to the revolution. The anti-
\ncolonial forces -- whether the republican government, its armed
\nforces or the civilian defense groups (lasykar) militias and
\nbandit forces -- required funds to continue their opposition to
\nthe Dutch. This funding frequently came from raising rents on
\ntrading within areas under Indonesian control.<\/p>\n
It was here that the roots of the New Order business-military
\nalliance began -- through such alliances as military commander
\nSoeharto's financial arrangements with Sudomo Salim.<\/p>\n
These corrupt alliances have existed for as long as the
\nIndonesian state, but really began to flourish after the
\nmilitary-backed killings of 1965-1966 removed any substantial
\npolitical opposition to the military.<\/p>\n
The romantic integralistic state envisaged by the 1945
\nConstitution was thus fragile from the start.<\/p>\n
All that was needed to facilitate its transformation into a
\npreman state was the Constitution's imagined \"benevolent father\"
\nto be substituted by a wicked stepfather: Soeharto.<\/p>\n
The prevalence of private or state-sanctioned brutality
\nunderstandably leads to a common perception that every aspect of
\nthe entire state system is unremittingly criminal.<\/p>\n
This manifests in the common attitude of absolute cynicism
\ntowards any form of authority; an assumption of the worst in any
\nassessment of government actions; the proliferation of widely
\naccepted conspiracy theories; and an expectation of violence as
\nthe state's response to any crisis.<\/p>\n
In late November last year, for example this lack of faith in
\nthe legal system led to the death of Sugeng Riyanto in Magelang,
\nCentral Java, when a riot broke out after a judge sentenced an
\nalleged murderer to death.<\/p>\n
The crowd was not protesting against the sentence -- they were
\nangry because they were not permitted to see the execution take
\nplace on the spot and thus assumed that the judge was bribed to
\nhelp the prisoner escape. The continuing Tommy Soeharto sage
\ndoubtless fed their anger.<\/p>\n
The expectation of corruption becomes a vicious circle. Police
\n-- who know that everyone believes they routinely steal
\nconfiscated goods or take protection money -- have little
\nincentive not to do so. Likewise, if civilians believe that the
\nstate lies and is implicated in violence and crime, then why
\nshouldn't they do the same?<\/p>\n
There is, of course, justification for many of the conspiracy
\ntheories implicating the state and former elite in corruption and
\nviolence. Like the \"formless organizations\" of the New Order,
\nhowever, the new bogeyman -- the Soeharto family or their close
\nassociates -- are imagined to be behind absolutely everything
\nthat goes wrong.<\/p>\n
The almost paranoid fear of illegal semi-secret activities
\nagainst citizens by the state has moved beyond reason to become a
\npervasive expectation.<\/p>\n
The protests and demands of reformasi initially forced the
\nstate apparatus to act against some of the preman, but this
\nappears to have been short-lived. The preman are back again.<\/p>\n
However, the increasing poverty brought on by the economic
\ncrisis has brought with it a backlash and a growth in anti-preman
\nvigilantism. The weakening of state control and the loss of
\ndirection among the military since Soeharto's fall have both
\ndiminished control over the \"masses\" and weakened protection for
\npreman.<\/p>\n
Attacks on preman have increased markedly over the last year
\nin Jakarta. There are no official figures, but Indonesian
\nnewspapers are full of reports every day, and Jakarta's Cipto
\nMangunkusomo hospital recently even set up a special unit to
\nhandle vigilante casualties.<\/p>\n
Unraveling the New Order system of violence and corruption --
\nwhich dates back not to 1966 but to 1957, when Sukarno suspended
\ndemocratic processes -- is not something that can be done quickly
\nor easily. Abdurrahman Wahid's government is an amalgam of
\ncompeting interests, many of them committed to the old system.<\/p>\n
The President thus has only limited ability to control the
\nstate apparatus and can offer little guarantee of the proper
\nfunctioning of the legal system.<\/p>\n
He has almost no ability to effectively prevent or punish
\nviolence or corruption through legal or political measures, as
\nthe continuing freedom of Tommy Soeharto and his father
\ndemonstrate.<\/p>\n
There can be little hope of any roll-back of the sophisticated
\npreman system built by Tommy's father, Indonesia's \"Godfather\".<\/p>",
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