The seminar could reopen old wounds of yesteryear<\/p>\n
The government's plan to hold a seminar on Nawaksara, the late
\npresident Sukarno's accountability speech before the Provisional
\nPeople's Consultative Assembly (MPRS) in 1966, has been further
\npostponed until after next year's presidential election.<\/p>\n
Nawaksara, which means nine points or topics, was rejected by
\nthe assembly and resulted in Sukarno's dismissal as president.
\nThe assembly named Soeharto acting president in 1967 and he
\nbecame president a year later.<\/p>\n
Skeptics have described the turn of events as a disguised coup
\nd'etat, but President Soeharto has repeatedly denied this.
\nPolitical scientist Arief Budiman, was one of the student
\nactivists at the time who publicly rejected Sukarno's speech. He
\ntalked to The Jakarta Post about looking at the issue from a
\nwider perspective.<\/p>\n
Question: What do you think of the government's latest
\ndecision to delay the seminar on Nawaksara until after the
\npresidential election<\/p>\n
Answer: For the sake of the president's and the government's
\ninterests, it's a good decision. It's also good for the sake of
\npolitical stability. I did not think senior officials like
\nMinister Moerdiono, or others, would let it happen.<\/p>\n
Nevertheless, since the plan was widely known and people were
\nvery enthusiastic about it, it would be better not to delay it
\ntoo long. Let the people have the seminar, with better
\npreparation and if possible by getting scientists with expertise
\nto discuss the topic.<\/p>\n
Q: Are you trying to say there is a possibility of further
\npostponements?<\/p>\n
A: Yes. Who knows? I'm very skeptical about it. The topic,
\nhowever, is still valid, politically. It's not yet history. It's
\na current political issue. It will be difficult, therefore, to
\nlook at it objectively. Remember, it's only the connection with
\ntoday's life which differentiates politics from history. History
\nis the past politics and politics is the present history.<\/p>\n
Q: What did you think of the plan to hold a seminar on Nawaksara?<\/p>\n
A: Bringing Nawaksara back into open discussion is nothing but
\nopening an old wound caused by many controversies. I myself am
\nhappy to hear that the seminar will be held. It shows that there
\nmust be a problem with Nawaksara. President Soeharto, at least,
\nfeels there is a suspicion (among the community) that he grasped
\nthe presidency from first president Sukarno after a coup attempt
\nin 1965.<\/p>\n
For me, it's an interesting topic. From the New Order's
\npragmatic point of view, however, the discussion won't do any
\ngood. Had the seminar been held, it is possible that only pro-
\ngovernment speakers would have been invited and they would
\nreconfirm that Nawaksara was not good and that it was rejected by
\nthe Provisional People's Consultative Assembly. This would not
\nsurprise me.<\/p>\n
It would be difficult, therefore, to find discussion on, for
\nexample, how the assembly was formed. In fact, most of the
\nmembers of the assembly were obviously appointed. Those who were
\nmembers of the Communist Party or other left-wing groups were all
\nreplaced by new ones. The assembly was arranged in such a way
\nthat it had to say no to Nawaksara, no matter what the speech
\nsaid.<\/p>\n
Q: Are you saying that it was not the content of the speech that
\nhad made the Assembly reject it?<\/p>\n
A: That's right. Everything was engineered to create the
\nsituation. That's why I wonder whether the government wants to
\nre-open discussion on Nawaksara. It's a very weak loophole indeed
\nfor the New Order.<\/p>\n
If it's true that looking for an objective truth is the moral
\nof the decision (to hold the seminar), they should also invite a
\nrange of speakers, including those from abroad. Sources like Ben
\nAnderson, for example, who do not fear intimidation, can give us
\nimportant information. Although no one can guarantee the accuracy
\nof his information, it would at least challenge others.<\/p>\n
It's also important to invite local speakers who can talk
\nobjectively. Historians like Taufik Abdullah, for example, or
\nOnghokham, may not be as outspoken as Ben Anderson, but they
\nwon't lie. They have integrity as well as historical data.<\/p>\n
Q: As one of the students who staged rallies against Sukarno's
\ngovernment in 1966, you must have been well informed about the
\nevents surrounding Nawaksara...<\/p>\n
A: I was indeed with those who were against Sukarno. He was very
\nauthoritarian at that time. Recommending the assembly reject
\nNawaksara was only one of our strategies (to dethrone Sukarno).
\nWe did a lot of campaigning and political manipulating to fight
\nthat.<\/p>\n
As a matter of fact, one of the New Order's strategies (in
\ngetting rid of the Old Order) was fulfilling the formal
\nconstitution while at the same time manipulating the material.
\nSoeharto, therefore, was not supposed to take the position of
\npresident away from Sukarno without being appointed by the
\nassembly. The New Order was very careful to abide by the formal
\nconstitution.<\/p>\n
That was why (to make Soeharto president) we had to first do
\nsomething to the assembly (replace unfavorable members) so that
\nit would reject Sukarno's speech and dismiss him.<\/p>\n
It was not surprising, therefore, that we knew Nawaksara would
\nbe rejected by the assembly even before it was delivered in front
\nof it.<\/p>\n
Q: If that was the case, is it right to say that constitutionally
\nthere was no coup d'etat at that time?<\/p>\n
A: Coup d'etat means using violence to take control of a state.
\nIt is usually done by military forces directly against the head
\nof the state, without the people's participation. Thus, if the
\nprocess of taking control is done in a democratic way, through a
\ngeneral election, in which all the people are involved in the
\nprocess, there is no way to call it a coup d'etat.<\/p>\n
In this case, what the New Order did was a Javanese style
\n\"coup d'etat\". The formal process, in fact, was done
\ndemocratically in the sense that the president (Soeharto) was
\nelected by the assembly. But the members of the assembly were
\nappointed, not elected.<\/p>\n
I was one of those who supported the assembly's election of
\nSoeharto as president. We supported the New Order's political
\nengineering. We hoped the New Order (Soeharto) -- along with the
\nmilitary force that backed it -- would bring democracy to the
\ncountry. As I said, by the end of his reign, Sukarno was very
\ndictatorial. That's why I thought that any change, no matter who
\ndid it, would be good.<\/p>\n
Q: Could you explain how the members of the assembly were
\nreplaced?<\/p>\n
A: Those who were members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)
\nor involved in PKI activities were all ousted from the assembly,
\nand so were the left-wing generals. Their seats were then given
\nto people appointed by Soeharto after the historical Supersemar
\n(the 11 March, 1966, letter issued by Sukarno authorizing
\nSoeharto to restore order after PKI's failed 1965 coup attempt).<\/p>\n
Q: How many members were replaced at the time?<\/p>\n
A: I'm not sure about the number but it was a substantial one.
\nThe PKI was the fourth largest party at the time. That excluded
\nmembers of other left-wing parties, including the Indonesian
\nNational Party's (PNI) and Moerba's members.<\/p>\n
Q: What actually was the content of Nawaksara that was rejected
\nby the assembly?<\/p>\n
A: I myself hardly remember it. It happened a long time ago and
\nNawaksara was not that important. As I said the rejection had
\nnothing to do with the content. Whatever the content was, it had
\nto be rejected anyway. Rejecting it was a part of the scenario.<\/p>\n
One of the reasons pointed out by the assembly was Sukarno's
\nrefusal to liquidate the PKI. If I'm not mistaken, Sukarno
\nrepeatedly said that the political settlement was completely
\nunder his authority and that the PKI incident was just a small
\nripple on a big ocean.<\/p>\n
He also said that PKI had a share in the nation's struggle for
\nindependence. In another of his accountability speeches, Nasakom,
\nhe even said the state would be crippled if there was no unity
\nbetween nationalist, religious and communist groups.<\/p>\n
There was also a time when Sukarno tried to get communists in
\ncabinet but he never succeeded. At that time communist party
\nmembers were given cabinet positions without portfolios, for
\nexample as coordinating ministers.<\/p>\n
Q: If it was not the content that made the assembly reject
\nNawaksara, what is the relevance of talking about it?<\/p>\n
A: That is also my question. It would certainly do more harm than
\ngood (to the present government). People had apparently forgotten
\nit. Now everyone is talking about it. I myself see it as a good
\npoint in the sense that the seminar will, at least, draw reaction
\nfrom other sources (who are not invited to the seminar) and bring
\nthem into a (public) debate.<\/p>\n
Q: Can we say that the government's idea to hold the seminar was
\nirrelevant?<\/p>\n
A: It depends on whose interest. To me, for example, it's good,
\nimportant and very relevant. It's certainly not to the
\ngovernment. Doing it is like opening Pandora's box for them. The
\nNew Order's legitimacy (to rule the country) will be questioned
\nin the seminar. It could even be easily driven to a discussion of
\nSupersemar which, according to me, makes the New Order's
\nlegitimacy status much more vulnerable. It's subject to different
\ninterpretations.<\/p>\n
Thus, to answer the question of whether the New Order was a
\nresult of a coup d'etat or was a natural change that all the
\npeople wanted, now becomes our problem. It's a very important
\nmatter for the whole nation, but not for the present government.<\/p>\n
Q: From some government officials' statements, it appears the
\nseminar was intended to show that there was nothing wrong with
\nthe New Order's step to power...<\/p>\n
A: The objective (of holding the seminar) is to legitimate the
\ngovernment's authority over the country during 1966-1967. The
\nidea of holding the seminar, however, cannot be separated from
\nthe accusations that surfaced recently. One of those remarks came
\nfrom Soebadio -- in his newly-launched book -- who said that the
\nNew Order did not have the license to govern the country.<\/p>\n
One of the reasons given by Soebadio was the last clause of
\nthe Supersemar which said that Soeharto was given (only) the
\nfunction (authority) to restore order and to report it to the
\nArmed Forces Top Commander (Sukarno). The letter didn't give him
\nthe power to govern the nation. Saying that Supersemar is a
\nletter of transfer of authority, therefore, is only exaggerating
\nthe meaning of the statement itself.<\/p>\n
Q: Do you accept Soebadio's argument?<\/p>\n
A: It's very acceptable. It can be clearly seen from the
\nstatement in the clause.<\/p>\n
Q: Some people say that Supersemar is actually a disguised coup
\nd'etat. Are they right?<\/p>\n
A: Yes, they are. But that's only my opinion, anyway. There are
\nothers who have different opinions and arguments. That's why a
\ndiscussion is needed to look at the matter objectively. There,
\neveryone will be able to supply strong arguments and proofs to
\nsupport his or her opinions. (swa)<\/p>",
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