The role of intelligence and counterinsurgency<\/p>\n
Kusnanto Anggoro, Senior Researcher, Center for Strategic
\nand International Studies, (CSIS), Jakarta<\/p>\n
The importance of espionage in military affairs has been
\nrecognized since the beginning of recorded history. The Egyptians
\nhad a well-developed secret service, and spying and subversion
\nare mentioned in the Iliad and in the Bible. The ancient Chinese
\ntreatise on the art of war devotes much attention to deception
\nand intelligence gathering, arguing that all war is based on
\ndeception. In the modern age, Joseph Fouche is credited with
\ndeveloping the first modern political espionage system, and
\nFrederick II of Prussia is regarded as the founder of modern
\nmilitary intelligence.<\/p>\n
Any textbook on counterinsurgency describes the importance of
\nintelligence, in which espionage is one important aspect. Ask
\npeople on the streets, and some would likely say that Indonesia's
\nintelligence is unprofessional. They may be well equipped with
\nthe worst-case scenario and the essentials of preventive and\/or
\npreemptive strategy. But they simply miss the real target in most
\ncases, suggesting a wide gap between strategic zealot and
\noperational competence.<\/p>\n
Indeed, intelligence everywhere tends to be zealous officers,
\nas was the case with Mexican counterinsurgency against the
\nZapatista rebels and the Colombians in their counter-narcotics
\noperation. Post Sept. 11 the police and intelligence community in
\nthe U.S. appeared to replicate the zeal with which, for instance,
\nthe principally white officers undertook their jobs against
\nAfrican-Americans after the urban riots of the 1960s.<\/p>\n
But this could well be problematic in the absence of checks
\nand balance and unity of command. These two are the biggest
\nriddles of the intelligence service. During Soeharto's era,
\nintelligence operatives were given carte blanche to crush the
\narmed rebellion instigated by the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). And
\ndespite pulling out from Aceh in 1999, many more from the
\nIndonesian Military (TNI) remained, mainly as intelligence
\nofficers operating out of uniform.<\/p>\n
The result was the alleged forming of militias in, among other
\nareas, Takengon, Meulaboh, South Aceh and Singkel (The Jakarta
\nPost, May 15). The tendency of mobilizing them for either
\npolitical parties or to create conflict with other groups in
\nsociety could well be enormously strong, especially considering
\nmany military personnel now in charge in Aceh had backgrounds in
\nintelligence and included veterans of special anti-terror units
\nin some areas, including in East Timor.<\/p>\n
One has to be skeptical, without being pessimistic, with
\nrespect to Indonesian intelligence. The military remain in
\ncontrol of a surveillance network and have the capacity to
\nintervene by whatever means deemed necessary. Nonetheless, the
\nregional command in Aceh does not appear to perform passive
\nsecurity measures such as registry information and source of
\ncontrol or even prepared plans and estimates.<\/p>\n
More seriously, they may be somewhat ignorant during what
\nbecame the later stages of insurgent activities. Should all these
\nintelligence function properly, then, they would have been able
\nto detect how GAM were going to respond to TNI deployments in
\nAceh, and hundreds of schools might have been prevented from
\ndestruction. Interestingly, just one day before the deployment,
\nthe military had claimed to know the strength of GAM and their
\ncontingency plan for the possible total failure of the Cessation
\nof Hostilities Agreement.<\/p>\n
For the intelligence to have missed an operation of this
\nmagnitude indicates how intelligence agencies have seemingly
\nbecome worn down over the last three years. Perhaps, separation
\nof the National Police from the armed forces has become their
\nmajor obstacle for fulfilling their intended roles in state
\nsecurity. This may be of relevance to the cases of bombing of
\nchurches across Indonesia on Christmas Eve of 2000, which
\nmilitary intelligence knew of in advance, but certainly not in
\nthe case of Aceh when the region was already declared a state of
\nmilitary emergency.<\/p>\n
Professional intelligence is a matter of adequate outlook,
\neffective use of resources, and appropriate targeting -- and
\nthere is a great demand for change in such respects. First is in
\nthe hearts and minds of intelligence officers. Dominated by a
\nmilitaristic culture, they remain in a statist point of view, and
\ntend to regard any \"anti-regime\"-sounding party as an enemy of
\nthe state. To them GAM comprises not only the military-wing of
\nthe separatist movement but also those who adopt political means,
\nincluding students and NGO activists.<\/p>\n
Second, they should not rely on the destruction of particular
\nimmediate targets as the primary goal, while relying on the
\nintention to create generalized terror as they did against
\nalleged criminals in 1983-1985, simply to scare prominent
\nopponents of the Soeharto regime, or in East Timor in the wake of
\nthe referendum in 1999 when the plan was intended to domesticate
\nlocal leaders and supporters of the Fretilin guerrillas.<\/p>\n
Third is unity of command. This is another serious challenge
\nfor the government. The relationship among agencies, for example
\nbetween the State Intelligence Agency (BIN) and the Armed Forces
\nStrategic Intelligence (BAIS), has been shifting constantly.
\nDuring the New Order, everybody just centered on Soeharto as each
\nand every military commander was responsible to him on a more or
\nless personal level. In post-Soeharto Indonesia, the intelligence
\ncommunity was thrown into disarray. It appears that they have
\nalways been more a player than a servant of its master.<\/p>\n
Thus it is a serious question whether we can rely on
\nintelligence for the success of the military operation in Aceh.
\nSure, technical competence is important, but, considering the
\navailable intelligence resources, the challenge insurgency poses
\nto the intelligence community is wider than other types of
\nconflict.<\/p>\n
In counterinsurgency operations, intelligence must be on alert
\nat all stages of insurgency, mostly by using psychological
\ninstruments rather than force and violence methods. When
\ninsurgent groups form, intelligence agencies should identify them
\nand make recommendations for future surveillance or
\nneutralization operations. Later, the use of intelligence also
\ncalls for the identification of all issues around which the
\ninsurgents mobilize and to which groups respond.<\/p>\n
It is now the time for the intelligence services to prove
\ntheir competence; and both the government and the commander in
\nthe field to make the best of it. Limiting civilian casualties
\nrequires minimum use of forces and appropriate targeting. For the
\nintelligence, identifying wrong targets and using harsh methods
\nwill only mean the continuation and almost certainly the
\nintensification of massive human rights abuses.<\/p>\n
The intelligence headquarters in Jakarta should not follow the
\nexperience of the U.S. \"black operation\" in South Vietnam (the
\nPhoenix Program) and Nicaragua. No one can win the hearts and
\nminds of the people by using terror.<\/p>\n
The writer also lectures in Strategic and Security Studies at
\nthe post-graduate program at the University of Indonesia,
\nJakarta.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/the-role-of-intelligence-and-counterinsurgency-1447893297",
"image": ""
},
"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}