{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1178957,
        "msgid": "the-restructuring-of-ris-intelligence-service-1447893297",
        "date": "2005-07-30 00:00:00",
        "title": "\"The restructuring of RI's intelligence service\"",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "\"The restructuring of RI's intelligence service\" Aleksius Jemadu Bandung The preservation of democracy and the upkeep of national security are two equally important challenges that Indonesia is facing today. While many agree that this country needs special legislation to regulate its intelligence services, there is little discussion about concrete proposals on how to restructure the current organization of intelligence services.",
        "content": "<p>\"The restructuring of RI's intelligence service\"<\/p>\n<p>Aleksius Jemadu<br>\nBandung<\/p>\n<p>The preservation of democracy and the upkeep of national <br>\nsecurity are two equally important challenges that Indonesia is <br>\nfacing today. While many agree that this country needs special <br>\nlegislation to regulate its intelligence services, there is <br>\nlittle discussion about concrete proposals on how to restructure <br>\nthe current organization of intelligence services.<\/p>\n<p>From the perspective of international cooperation on fighting <br>\nterrorism, Indonesia has been pressured by its neighbors not to <br>\nbecome the weakest link in the intelligence networks of <br>\nsoutheastern Asia.<\/p>\n<p>The operation of Indonesian intelligence today is based on at <br>\nleast two regulations made by the president.<\/p>\n<p>First, Presidential Instruction No. 5\/2002 on the assignment <br>\nof the Head of National Intelligence Agency (BIN) to coordinate <br>\nall intelligence activities and Presidential Decree No. 9\/2004 on <br>\nthe position, function, authority, organizational structure and <br>\nworking procedures of all non-departmental agencies. Not only are <br>\nthe two stipulations too simple and vague, there are no explicit <br>\nregulations regarding special powers of the intelligence service <br>\nwhose implementation may lead to the violation of civil <br>\nliberties.<\/p>\n<p>It is understandable that some civil society organizations <br>\nremain suspicious about the existence of an intelligence service <br>\nwith a new mandate. However, we have to develop a new mindset <br>\nthat the existence of an open democratic society and a <br>\nprofessional intelligence service can be made equally subject to <br>\nthe same principle of the rule of law.<\/p>\n<p>As a starting point, we need to learn from the best practices <br>\nin other democratic countries. In order to convince the skeptical <br>\npublic we need to make a clear distinction between intelligence <br>\nservices and law enforcement bodies. Such distinction implies <br>\nthat intelligence officials should never be allowed to detain <br>\npeople.<\/p>\n<p>By law, only the police have the authority to arrest people if <br>\nthere is enough evidence of criminal action. The task of the <br>\nintelligence services should be limited to the gathering of <br>\ninformation in order to make an accurate and timely assessment of <br>\nthreats to national security. Based on such threat assessments, <br>\nthe policymakers will take necessary action to prevent the <br>\nmaterialization of the threat.<\/p>\n<p>On top of that, the citizens need a legal guarantee that the <br>\nexceptional powers that are often given to the intelligence <br>\nservice will not be misused by the ruling power.<\/p>\n<p>Another best practice that we need to apply in the <br>\nrestructuring of the intelligence service is concerned with the <br>\nissue of coordination. Under the current regulation, the National <br>\nIntelligence Agency (BIN) finds it structurally difficult to <br>\ncoordinate the gathering of information from various elements of <br>\nintelligence community in order to establish the imminence of a <br>\nthreat. The restructuring of the U.S. intelligence services after <br>\nThe Sept. 11 terrorist attacks can be used as an example from <br>\nwhich we may take lessons about the importance of a clearly <br>\nauthorized coordinating agency.<\/p>\n<p>Thus, based on the recommendation of the Sept. 11 Commission <br>\nReport, the U.S. government has created the office of the <br>\nNational Intelligence Director whose function is to unify the <br>\nwhole structure of the U.S. intelligence community for the sake <br>\nof an effective coordination and integrated policy <br>\nrecommendation. The Director of National Intelligence who has now <br>\ngreater political leverage than the Director of Central <br>\nIntelligence Agency (CIA), is directly responsible to the U.S. <br>\nPresident.<\/p>\n<p>If indeed coordination among different elements of the <br>\nintelligence community is of supreme importance for Indonesia <br>\ntoday, some political analysts propose the establishment of the <br>\nNational Intelligence Coordinating Agency (Lembaga Koordinasi <br>\nIntelijen Nasional or LKIN), which is parallel to the position of <br>\nthe office of the director of national intelligence in the U.S.<\/p>\n<p>The Head of LKIN is directly responsible to the president with <br>\nthe main task of providing timely and accurate information on the <br>\nimminent threat to national security. He or she is expected to be <br>\nthe analyst-in-chief for the government.<\/p>\n<p>The establishment of LKIN reminds people of the State <br>\nIntelligence Coordination Agency (BAKIN) that was notorious for <br>\nits past abuses of civil liberties. This is a legitimate <br>\ncomplaint that the new intelligence bill should address.<\/p>\n<p>The Indonesian Working Group on Intelligence Reform tries to <br>\ndeal with this issue by proposing that LKIN is only responsible <br>\nfor the coordination function. The operational function of <br>\nintelligence activities is divided into two separate <br>\ninstitutions.<\/p>\n<p>First, we need to establish the (new) National Intelligence <br>\nAgency (BIN), which is responsible for domestic intelligence with <br>\nthe main task of gathering and analyzing information related to <br>\nthe imminent domestic threat to national security. For the sake <br>\nof ministerial oversight this agency can be put under the <br>\nMinistry of Home Affairs or the State Ministry of National <br>\nSecurity.<\/p>\n<p>Second, the current Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS), <br>\nwhich is currently under the Indonesian Military (TNI) to be put <br>\nunder the Ministry of Defense. The combat intelligence will <br>\nremain attached to the TNI structures.<\/p>\n<p>Taking into account the important role of the intelligence <br>\nunits that are so far attached to various agencies like the <br>\npolice, attorney general, immigration and customs, it is proposed <br>\nthat as members of the intelligence community, they too are <br>\nsubject to the coordination conducted by LKIN.<\/p>\n<p>Hopefully, with the restructuring of our intelligence service, <br>\nnot only can we facilitate an effective coordination, but we can <br>\nalso ensure that future intelligence operations will not go <br>\nbeyond the mandate given by the national legislature on behalf of <br>\nthe Indonesian people.<\/p>\n<p>Aleksius Jemadu is the dean of the Department of International <br>\nRelations at Parahyangan Catholic University in Bandung, as well <br>\nas a member of the Indonesian Working Group for Intelligence <br>\nReform. He can be reached at aleks@home.unpar.ac.id.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/the-restructuring-of-ris-intelligence-service-1447893297",
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    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}