The quest for legitimacy<\/p>\n
By Sidesh Kaul<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): While President B.J. Habibie was presenting his
\naccountability speech and defending his 16-month rule inside the
\nIndonesian legislature, the country was once again in the grip of
\na fresh wave of student-led protests. The government responded to
\nthese protests with a heavy hand and the state's Armed Forces
\nwere deployed to crush and mute the protests. A massive use of
\nforce reflects the ineffectiveness of coercion and the weakness
\nof the government's legitimacy. It also sadly reflects how remote
\nand isolated the ruling elite is from the masses.<\/p>\n
Legitimacy is an important issue and obsession with any
\ngovernment merits a closer look, especially in the contemporary
\nIndonesian context. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the social
\nphilosopher, laid the seeds of the debate on legitimacy when he
\nwrote his famous work The Social Contract.<\/p>\n
\"The strongest man is never strong enough to maintain his
\nmastery at all times unless he transforms his strength into right
\nand obedience into duty,\" he wrote.<\/p>\n
Legitimacy is the belief in the rightfulness of government, in
\nits authority to issue commands so that these are not just obeyed
\nout of fear or coercion, but are perceived as duty by the
\nsubjects.<\/p>\n
At the core of the issue of legitimacy lies the belief of the
\nsubjects that the government is morally right and that they, as
\nsubjects, are duty bound to obey.<\/p>\n
It is time for President Habibie and his \"reform era\" Cabinet,
\nas well as Gen. Wiranto and the Armed Forces, to sit up and
\nexamine the basis of their power and realize that legitimacy can
\nnever flow from the barrel of a gun.<\/p>\n
The powers that be must realize that in the absence of such
\nconvictions the relation between the ruler and the ruled will be
\none that is based on power and not on authority, and that the
\npolitical legitimacy of the government will be contested. This
\ncontest will go on until there is an accommodation on either
\nside; that is, either the ruler, the ruled or a new government
\nreplaces the old, or there is a birth of a new system of
\ngovernance that is able to satisfy the belief systems of ordinary
\nIndonesians.<\/p>\n
At the heart of any form of political organization is the
\nbasic tenet that states that the right to rule is fundamental,
\nand it is this founding principle that affects all political
\nactivities.<\/p>\n
Sociologist Max Weber postulated that in a modern nation state
\nthe government endeavors to regulate the vital interests and
\nactions of its citizens through a set of binding commands, rules
\nand laws backed by force, and that the basis on which the
\nlegitimacy is claimed will determine and influence the structure
\nof domination.<\/p>\n
The interesting fallout of this postulation is the fact that
\nthe government will develop appropriate delivery mechanisms for
\ntheir domination. Influencing the structure of domination is not
\nthe only facet that the quest for legitimacy influences -- it
\nalso determines the relationship framework between strategic
\ngroups, and between such groups and the public as they endeavor
\nto control the use of state power.<\/p>\n
In addition, the government's language of legitimacy often
\ndefines the boundaries of legitimate political activity that, in
\nturn, polarizes resistance against the incumbent government.<\/p>\n
Every government, even the most despotic, is under moral
\npressure to convert relations of power into relations of
\nauthority and to cultivate the perception that their power is
\nexercised on moral grounds and for the benefit of the general
\ngood of the citizens.<\/p>\n
This perception, and its perpetuation, is important for the
\ngoverned because it eases the pain of inequality and
\nsubordination and justifies their obedience. If the quest for
\nlegitimacy is based solely on power, either economic or coercive,
\nthen such authority will be challenged through resistance,
\nrebellion and revolution. In that case, the ruling elite will be
\nconsumed by their efforts at survival and will direct the bulk of
\nthe resources to hang onto power.<\/p>\n
A government that hangs onto power and seeks its legitimacy on
\nthe basis of money politics or force cannot be effective or
\nviable and will soon become a liability for the entire nation
\nstate. Let the Indonesian legislature be warned.<\/p>\n
The quest for legitimacy is not confined to Indonesia alone.
\nLaos and South Vietnam chronically opposed the legitimacy of
\ntheir governments between 1954 and 1975. Cambodia's struggle to
\nquestion legitimacy started in early 1970 and is not settled yet.<\/p>\n
The moral authority of the Malaysian government came under
\nfire after the race riots of 1969 and in present times after the
\nrecent economic crisis and the imprisonment of dismissed deputy
\nprime minister Anwar Ibrahim.<\/p>\n
Attempts by former president Ferdinand Marcos of the
\nPhilippines to hold onto office in the mid-1980s, despite his
\nfailure at fraudulent polls where he attempted to regain his
\ndomestic and international legitimacy, were derailed by protests
\nfrom ordinary Filipinos who bravely took their battle to the
\nstreets.<\/p>\n
The legitimacy of military-backed rulers of Myanmar came under
\nheavy fire in 1985-1986 when stagflation, poverty, hunger and
\nunemployment culminated in widespread political demonstrations
\nagainst the military junta in 1988. This struggle continues until
\ntoday.<\/p>\n
In an interesting and unique development, the military in
\nMyanmar launched a coup against itself and has since ruled the
\ncountry in the name of the State Law and Order Restoration
\nCouncil (SLORC). The quest for legitimacy by the SLORC, driven
\nthis time by international pressure, forced them to hold
\nelections in May 1990. The SLORC, to their utter disappointment,
\nlost out to the opposition party, the National League for
\nDemocracy (NLD).<\/p>\n
In a determined bid to hold onto power, the SLORC has yet to
\ntransfer power to the NLD and continues to detain the leader of
\nthe opposition, Aung San Suu Kyi, to date. The legitimacy of the
\nChinese government was questioned in the wake of the student
\nprotests in June 1989 and the recent crackdown on believers of
\nthe Falun Gong sect.<\/p>\n
For the last several decades, the New Order in Indonesia
\nsought its legitimacy on the dual basis of political stability
\nand strident economic growth while popular representation and
\naspirations were sacrificed at the altar of material gain. The
\npolitical instability and the economic chaos that pervaded the
\ncountry during Sukarno's brief flirtation with guided democracy,
\nbecame the New Order's cherished obstacle to be surmounted in
\ntheir quest for legitimacy.<\/p>\n
The onset of the economic crisis in late 1997 blew off the
\nprotective cover that growth and wealth provided and destroyed
\nthe very basis of this legitimacy. With the fall from grace of
\nthe New Order, the caretaker government of President Habibie was
\nfaced with the difficult task of captaining a country that was
\nbeset with a plethora of problems on the economic, social and
\npolitical fronts.<\/p>\n
In the absence of the comfort that strong economic numbers and
\nwealth provide, the weak and unpopular government under President
\nHabibie sought its legitimacy on other fronts. While it is easy
\nto pontificate on legitimacy with the benefit of hindsight, the
\ndebate on legitimacy is important and cannot be ignored as
\nIndonesia prepares to experiment for a second time with
\ndemocracy.<\/p>\n
Habibie and most of the members of his \"reform Cabinet\" are
\nvery much a part of Soeharto's New Order and despite their
\nfrequent public statements of commitment to the cause of reform,
\nthey have failed miserably in convincing the public at large
\nabout their credibility or willingness to reform.<\/p>\n
Habibie did his level best at maintaining a healthy distance
\nfrom his mentor Soeharto and went to great lengths to project
\nhimself as a responsible patriot who only had the good of the
\nnation at heart.<\/p>\n
Early in his tenure, he released the first batch of political
\nprisoners and despite his well-known inclination for promoting
\nindigenous interests, was among one of the first public figures
\nin Indonesia to lend a shoulder to the grieving Chinese community
\nin the wake of the May riots.<\/p>\n
While comforting the Chinese minority, he did away with the
\nlong practiced and hated racist identification system in a
\ncountry that identified the Chinese as an identity that was
\nseparate from the indigenous community.<\/p>\n
On many occasions Habibie made strong and bold statements
\nabout the due process of law and about how he would spare no
\nefforts at bringing the guilty to the docks. Habibie even met
\nwith Joseph Estrada of the Philippines in an act of solidarity to
\nplead for the release of the jailed proreform activist and former
\ndeputy prime minister of Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim, all in the name
\nof reform and democracy.<\/p>\n
The media was given a breath of fresh air as journalists
\nenjoyed their newfound freedom. Elections were announced and a
\nfree and fair election was conducted. Habibie postured publicly
\nabout his dislike for corruption, collusion and nepotism, and
\nvowed several times to put an end to this scourge.<\/p>\n
The rupiah appeared to strengthen. The bank capitalization
\nprogram, apart from a few hiccups, appeared to be well on its
\nway. The international community applauded Habibie's brave stance
\non the East Timor independence issue.<\/p>\n
Like a man possessed, he spoke about accountability,
\ntransparency, democracy and human rights. Was this a repentant
\nman who, in the evening of his political career, wanted to
\ncorrect the wrongs of the New Order with missionary and patriotic
\nzeal? Or was this a sinister cover up for perpetuating the
\nwrongs? Or were these merely the actions of a selfish man,
\nsupreme and confident in his ability and the weaknesses in the
\nsystem at correcting the history books at whatever cost?<\/p>\n
Only history can truly answer these questions and be in a
\nposition to judge the man and his government. When viewed under
\nthe legitimacy microscope, the perspective that unfolds is of a
\nman who basically was in a hurry to garner as much legitimacy as
\npossible, both domestically as well as internationally, in a
\nbrazen attempt to retain power.<\/p>\n
The Bank Bali scandal, in essence, has unveiled and laid bare
\nthe facade that was being played out in the name of reform.
\nCornered by growing cries for transparency both at home and
\nabroad, Habibie has chosen to obfuscate the issue by taking a
\nbureaucratic approach that prevents the PricewaterhouseCoopers
\nreport on the scandal from being made public and the highly
\nplaced culprits being brought to justice.<\/p>\n
To make matters worse, the courts fully acquitted former
\npresident Soeharto and his son Hutomo \"Tommy\" Mandala Putra in
\nseparate charges of grafts, and that, too, just before the
\nlegislature was to convene to hear Habibie's accountability
\naddress and to select the next president. Habibie's quest for
\nlegitimacy has come to an end. The farce is over and it is time
\nto move on.<\/p>\n
The concern here is should this legislature decide to betray
\nthe aspirations of the people, then it would lay the ground for a
\ncrisis of mammoth proportions.<\/p>\n
The writer is a commentator on economic and political affairs
\nbased in Jakarta.<\/p>",
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