The pros and cons of manpower bill<\/p>\n
By Teten Masduki<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): It seems that the manpower bill will smoothly
\npass through the House of Representatives as all House factions
\nhave reached a consensus to complete the discussion in three
\nmonths, that is before the tenure of the present legislative
\nassembly expires.<\/p>\n
Unless something is in the way, the plenary session of the
\nHouse will pass the manpower bill into a law on Sept. 10, 1997.<\/p>\n
Many NGOs as well as labor activists and intellectuals have
\nsuggested postponing the discussion of the bill until the next
\nHouse begins. They argue that the manpower bill contains some
\nbasic weaknesses which cannot be put right in a relatively short
\ntime.<\/p>\n
The manpower bill consists of 18 chapters and 159 articles and
\nis expected to replace 6 ordinances and 9 laws on labor affairs
\nissued between 1887 and 1969.<\/p>\n
The bill will regulate industrial relations and manpower
\nplanning involving workers from the formal sector, profit-seeking
\nor otherwise, workers from the informal sector, alien workers and
\nmigrant workers. The bill will later serve as an umbrella law for
\nall legislation in manpower affairs.<\/p>\n
Compared with the ordinances and laws it is expected to
\nreplace, the bill shows a substantial setback in terms of rights
\nprotection of workers.<\/p>\n
To sum it up, the manpower bill is aimed at (a) revoking laws
\nwhich so far have relatively protected the basic rights of
\nworkers and (b) legalizing unfair labor practices into law.<\/p>\n
It seems that such a legal reform is indeed oriented toward
\nensuring that doing business in Indonesia is more comfortable,
\nwhich in the context of global competition means winning more
\ninvestment and enhancing the competitive edge in trade.<\/p>\n
Under these conditions, the first thing to do is prepare the
\nflexibility of the labor market to facilitate business companies
\nto apply a subcontract system or that of a short-term work
\ncontract in manpower recruitment in line with production
\nfluctuations.<\/p>\n
The second is preparation of a precondition for facilities
\nconducive to industrial growth in the form of cheap, skilled and
\npolitically obedient labor.<\/p>\n
This policy is, in fact, not a new thing, but rather a sort of
\nlegalization of the policy that has already been in effect since
\nthe mid-1980s, when Indonesia began to adopt an export-oriented
\nindustrial strategy.<\/p>\n
In this case, the orientation of reform is established through
\na strategy of corporatism, namely (a) legalization of the system
\nof individual work contracts; (b) recognition of the right to
\nengage in an organization in a limited manner under the control
\nof the government; (c) reduction of the right to go on strike;
\n(d) placement of a dispute arbitration institution under the
\nstate's administration institute; (e) leaving national bipartite
\nand tripartite institutions to find solutions to industrial
\nconflicts and (f) handing over the power to set the rates of
\nwages from monopolies to the government.<\/p>\n
However, in the long run, the manpower bill is likely to harm
\nbusiness interests. The bill would very likely create a condition
\nconducive to accelerating labor turmoil on a wider scope and
\nkeeping the phenomenon of a high-cost economy in place.<\/p>\n
There are three reasons which explain how this condition would
\ncome about.<\/p>\n
First, in the future, workers will lose jobs more easily. As
\npermitted by law, every company will tend to recruit workers for
\ntemporary work, rather than employing them permanently.<\/p>\n
In this way, a company can freely replace its workers with
\nfresh recruits, who are abundantly available in the labor market.
\nIt may also happen that companies will not renew work contracts
\nof workers who do not show good conduct -- for example, those who
\ndemand a wage increase or join a sit-down.<\/p>\n
In short, job insecurity will emerge. It is this condition
\nwhich will actually trigger labor unrest in future.<\/p>\n
Second, with the adoption of the subcontract system and that
\nof individual contracts, labor unions and the collective
\nbargaining mechanism will lose their function as a means to
\narticulate workers' interests in companies.<\/p>\n
In addition, government intervention in the formation and
\nlimitation of the function of a labor union will give birth to a
\npro forma labor union.<\/p>\n
The two conditions which may come about will perhaps prompt
\nlabor movements to find an alternative. Labor movements may
\nreturn to political unions, leaving behind the method of
\ncollective bargaining.<\/p>\n
Such labor movements usually constitute an alliance of
\nsupporting groups with sociopolitical interests.<\/p>\n
However, the future of labor movements will be determined by
\nthe extent of the government's ability to implement law
\nenforcement in protecting the normative rights of workers and
\nimprovement of their economic conditions.<\/p>\n
Labor resistance in Indonesia in the form of wildcat strikes
\nand mass demonstrations have been in the 1990s on the increase
\nand in the past two years over 800 incidents have occurred. In
\nthe majority of cases, strikes were triggered by companies'
\nviolating minimum wage stipulations.<\/p>\n
The most alarming thing resulting from the intensification of
\nlabor unrest is that political patronage may be established in
\nbusiness. To protect their capital, business circles will depend
\neven more on security services. If this happens, labor repression
\nwill intensify to maintain the interests of state order and
\ncapital accumulation.<\/p>\n
We know for a fact that solving labor conflicts through
\ncoercion is not only fruitless but also tends to increase
\nproduction costs because of non-labor cost, which enables the
\nphenomenon of a high-cost economy to continue.<\/p>\n
Mass-media reports say that some business circles estimate
\nthat invisible costs now reach 16 percent to 30 percent of
\nproduction costs while labor wages account for only 4 percent to
\n11 percent (in the manufacturing industry sector).<\/p>\n
Labor rights violations will certainly be part of labor
\nconditions in the future, and this will harm the growth of
\nnational industry.<\/p>\n
Perhaps Indonesia's export products will face restrictions in
\nthe global market because there is at present a strong tendency
\nto link trade policies with labor conditions, at bilateral and
\nmultilateral levels. At a private level, boycott campaigns have
\ngained intensity against export products which are allegedly
\ncreated through labor exploitation.<\/p>\n
With the introduction of the manpower bill, it is likely that
\nIndonesia will be accused of practicing social dumping. Many
\nprovisions in the bill run counter to International Labor
\nOrganization conventions.<\/p>\n
Should trade sanctions be imposed, then national exporters
\nwould sustain big losses compared to multinational corporations
\nwhich control access to the global market.<\/p>\n
The writer is head of the labor division at the Foundation
\nof the Indonesian Legal Aid Institute.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/the-pros-and-cons-of-manpower-bill-1447893297",
"image": ""
},
"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}