The problem of a 'clean environment'<\/p>\n
By Onghokham<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Recently it happened again: people being
\naccused of being tainted with leftism due to contamination
\nthrough relatives or even friends connected with what used to be
\ncalled the \"old left\", or communists or with the coup d'etat of
\nSept. 30, 1965.<\/p>\n
This is not the first time that \"cleanliness\" of any kind of
\nrelationship with \"leftists\" or \"rightists\", such as the Darul
\nIslam rebellion, has been called for by the authorities.<\/p>\n
However, twenty years or more after the event, one wonders
\nabout the legitimacy of such calls, especially now, after all the
\nrevolutionary changes that have taken place in Eastern Europe and
\nafter the shrinking space and activity of communism around the
\nworld.<\/p>\n
Of course, one knows that all this is politics: a way of
\npurging enemies and undesirables. It is also a convenient way of
\ndoing it since in Indonesia's history of turbulence one can
\nalmost always find some kind of fault with almost anybody.<\/p>\n
Nevertheless, this sort of accusation, especially when made
\nagainst relatives of those \"undesirables\", is against the
\nprinciples of human rights. It presumes guilt by association and
\nrejects the idea of individual responsibility. It also rejects
\nthe idea of a group's or an individual's capacity to change and
\ndevelop.<\/p>\n
An individual, for instance, could have been on the \"left\" or
\n\"right\" side during the Indonesian revolution for independence,
\nand who was not on one side or the other? But persons and
\nconditions change. Liken this with the acceptance of repentant
\ncommunists or even former communist parties in the former Eastern
\nEurope. Or compare this with the acceptance of descendants of
\nformer fascists in Europe. Societies seem to accept them and they
\nhave some legitimacy. Change and the development of parties, of
\nindividuals and of the world is possible.<\/p>\n
The difference between these attitudes characterizes the
\ndifference between a bureaucratic culture and a liberal one. A
\nbureaucratic culture tends categorize everything and bar the idea
\nof change or development.<\/p>\n
Police, intelligence agencies, agencies concerned with peace
\nand order, or even with law and order, are bureaucracies and they
\nkeep special records, mostly of troublemakers. Take, for
\ninstance, people with tattoos, or with long hair, or people from
\ncertain regions or groups, such as Surabaya soccer supporters
\n(perhaps with reason) or people from Surabaya in general. Or they
\ncould be people with special lifestyles, such as the warok of
\nPonorogo, which are men who because of their convictions practice
\nhomosexuality with young boys.<\/p>\n
Then there are the undesirables of recent political history
\nand almost every revolutionary period has yielded many of these
\nsuspected eternal (for the police) troublemakers. First among the
\nranks in Indonesia are communists and former politicians of the
\nnow-vanished Indonesian Socialist Party, as were the Babouf
\nconspirators or the Jacobins or Bonapartists in Europe.<\/p>\n
Some of those categories of undesirables in Indonesia date
\nback to the days of colonial bureaucracy, since bureaucracies
\nhardly change, whether they are colonial or national or whatever
\nelse. The Madiun-Ponorogo region, for instance, was regarded as a
\nturbulent area by pre-colonial Mataram, our last Javanese
\nmonarchy, as well as by the colonial and post-colonial regimes.
\nAs it happens, many Socialists and Nationalists politicians were
\nfrom this region.<\/p>\n
Banten is another such region, perhaps with more
\njustification than Ponorogo, although Ponorogo was economically
\nof greater importance than Banten, which had no colonial
\nplantations while coffee plantations thrived in the Ponorogo-
\nMadiun region.<\/p>\n
As far as blood or family relations are concerned, the
\nNetherlands East Indies bureaucracy used to compile genealogies
\nand genetic codes of the pangreh-praja -- members of the priyayi
\nindigenous elite in its employ and whom it used in a system of
\nindirect rule as described by J. Furnivall. The perceived
\npolitical purity of priyayi families reminds us of the
\ncleanliness of individuals in the present political order.<\/p>\n
In the colonial period, every problem a Dutch official had
\nwith a local priyayi of the pangreh-praja (native civil servants)
\ncorps invited investigations into his ancestral and family past,
\neven that of his wife. If necessary, that is if faults could not
\nbe found regarding the man himself, then in-laws or the mother's
\nfamily might become subjects of investigation.<\/p>\n
However, as is the case with accusations of \"left\" or \"right\"
\ncontamination, faults were usually found with the priyayi one
\nwanted to purge. Priyayi families were not that numerous even in
\nthose days and they usually married among each other. Sometimes a
\nrebel relative or ancestor could be found among them. In short,
\nthe \"cleanliness\" requirement has always been a good political
\ndevice. And one should not underestimate the culturally deeply
\ningrained bureaucratic practices of categorizing enemies of the
\nstate.<\/p>\n
The great political event in Java's colonial history was the
\nDiponegoro rebellion (1825-30). It was the last great rebellion
\nagainst the colonial order. The modern Dutch colonial system
\ndated from after that war.<\/p>\n
If at present the criterion for political \"cleanliness\" dates
\nfrom the time of the communist coup of Sept. 30, 1965, then the
\nDiponegoro revolt of 1830 was used as a criterion for loyalty to
\nthe Dutch crown. Descendants of Diponegoro were of course never
\naccepted into the colonial civil service. They could never become
\na sultan (local ruler) or even brides of sultans and princes.<\/p>\n
Several commanders of the rebel Prince Diponegoro, such as Ali
\nBasyah and some of their descendants, deserted to the Dutch side
\nin order to get appointed into the colonial civil service.
\nHowever, if there was trouble, or if there was a conflict between
\none of them and the Dutch colonial authority, then their
\nrelationship to Ali Basyah would be cited.<\/p>\n
On the other hand it must be said that the Dutch usually
\nconcealed blood relationships to rebels and this was only
\nrecorded in police reports or other official documents. Only in
\nthe case of the most serious misconduct, such as when their
\nloyalty was questioned, did they get dismissed.<\/p>\n
An even greater trauma for the colonial government where the
\nquestion of political pollution might come up involved the so-
\ncalled power blocks, whether they be government-appointed bupati
\n(regents) or Chinese entrepreneurs who leased the colonial
\ngovernment's tax farms.<\/p>\n
In recent studies on post-colonial countries, scholars have
\nargued that most post-colonial countries have in many ways
\nduplicated or continued the old colonial policies. I tend to
\nagree with them. There can be no denying that colonialism has
\nmade a deep impact on our world.<\/p>\n
I would argue that colonialist regimes are, or were,
\nauthoritarian governments. But in modern times authoritarian
\ngovernments rely on a modern bureaucracy. Post-colonial states,
\nare still very much authoritarian governments. To a great deal
\nthey depend on bureaucracies, although perhaps without the
\nniceties and problems of outside control, such as in the
\nIndonesian case by the Dutch parliament and other institutions.<\/p>\n
Authoritarianism and oppression rather than the creativity of
\nindependence are perhaps the cause of the duplicity of colonial
\nand post-colonial states.<\/p>\n
The writer is a historian and former lecturer at University of
\nIndonesia.<\/p>",
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