{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1389446,
        "msgid": "the-powers-that-be-1447893297",
        "date": "1998-03-10 00:00:00",
        "title": "The powers that be",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "The powers that be Among the various decrees enacted by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) yesterday, one will give the new president additional powers to deal with emergency situations. The decree gives the president a free hand to take whatever steps deemed necessary to safeguard the nation and national development, if and when they are threatened. Although it provides one of the few highlights of the current MPR General Session, the decree is not entirely new.",
        "content": "<p>The powers that be<\/p>\n<p>Among the various decrees enacted by the People's Consultative<br>\nAssembly (MPR) yesterday, one will give the new president<br>\nadditional powers to deal with emergency situations. The decree<br>\ngives the president a free hand to take whatever steps deemed<br>\nnecessary to safeguard the nation and national development, if<br>\nand when they are threatened.<\/p>\n<p>Although it provides one of the few highlights of the current<br>\nMPR General Session, the decree is not entirely new. The powers<br>\ngranted by the decree have their origin in the famous executive<br>\norder signed by serving president Sukarno on March 11, 1966 which<br>\nempowered Gen. Soeharto, then the Army commander, to take all<br>\nsteps necessary to restore peace and order. When the order was<br>\nsigned, Indonesia was on the brink of collapse. One of the first<br>\nsteps taken by Soeharto was to outlaw the Indonesian Communist<br>\nParty and disband the cabinet. In retrospect, these measures put<br>\nIndonesia on the road to recovery and then subsequently, a path<br>\nto relative prosperity.<\/p>\n<p>These extra powers were confirmed by the Provisional People's<br>\nConsultative Assembly in 1967 and then extended by MPR decree in<br>\n1968, 1973, 1978, 1983 and 1988. Throughout this time, the<br>\nspecial powers remained at Soeharto's disposal but occasion for<br>\ntheir use did not arise.<\/p>\n<p>Appearing to be redundant, the MPR decided not to renew the<br>\ndecree authorizing use of the powers during the 1993 General<br>\nSession. The move reflected growing confidence in the country's<br>\npolitical situation and in the ability of the legal system and<br>\nlaw enforcement agencies to deal with any threats to national<br>\nstability and development. The nation was comfortable vesting<br>\nthese powers in the President and was equally comfortable<br>\nwithdrawing them five years ago.<\/p>\n<p>In any case, the government retained the comprehensive<br>\nSubversion Law at its disposal. The law was enacted by Sukarno in<br>\nthe early 1960s and has frequently been used by the present<br>\ngovernment in situations deemed a threat to national stability.<br>\nArmed rebellions, acts of terrorism, criticism of the government,<br>\ncorruption, smuggling and narcotic offenses are among the myriad<br>\ncrimes smashed by this law.<\/p>\n<p>The decision to resurrect the decree has raised many<br>\nquestions, which Golkar, the chief sponsor of the reenactment,<br>\nhas unfortunately been unable to answer satisfactorily. During<br>\nmedia briefings, Golkar executives have been unable to answer<br>\nsome of the questions raised, far less articulate a strong<br>\nargument for bringing back the decree.<\/p>\n<p>Why does the assembly want to reenact the decree when<br>\nPresident Soeharto, who will almost certainly be reelected today,<br>\nhas not had the occasion to use it's special powers for many,<br>\nmany years? What threats do Golkar and the government now<br>\nperceive -- what emergency situations do they foresee which could<br>\nwarrant the use of these powers?<\/p>\n<p>Golkar leaders have sought to allay concerns that these<br>\nspecial powers may be abused, arguing that the tough conditions<br>\nset out in the decree prevent the President invoking the powers<br>\nin all but the most exceptional of circumstances. If he does make<br>\nuse of the powers, he will later be called to account for his<br>\nactions before the MPR.<\/p>\n<p>Recent history is comforting, as it suggests these extra<br>\npowers will be used sparingly, if at all. But we lament the lack<br>\nof debate, both in the MPR and by the general public, in the<br>\nenactment of such a weighty and salient decree.<\/p>\n<p>Had the Assembly afforded the subject greater thought, it<br>\ncould have provided more articulate and persuasive arguments in<br>\nfavor of the motion. It could also have insisted that the<br>\nmilitary and the government provide intelligence on threats which<br>\nIndonesia may face in the coming years, and share them with the<br>\npublic. This knowledge would better prepare the public to face up<br>\nto dangers. If they are capable of that then, who knows, perhaps<br>\nthere will be no need for the decree after all.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/the-powers-that-be-1447893297",
        "image": ""
    },
    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}