The next move in Indonesian politics<\/p>\n
By Jusuf Wanandi<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Now that all the votes have been finally
\ncounted, the next step is to prepare for the General Session of
\nthe People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) and, in particular, to
\nfinalize the composition of its 700 respresentatives. The 135 MPR
\nrepresentatives from the provinces, which are to be added to the
\n500 members of the House of Representatives (DPR), will be
\nformally determined by the new regional legislative councils.
\nHowever, the criteria for the selection of these representatives
\nremains unclear.<\/p>\n
The National Elections Committee (KPU) is of the view that the
\nfive representatives from each region should reflect the votes
\nthat the parties received in the respective region. The
\nalternative is for the winner to take all five. This alternative
\nis less likely to be acceptable. The remaining 65 representatives
\nwill be composed of 20 representatives from religious groups, 5
\nfrom veteran, 9 from economic, 5 from women, 9 from artist,
\nintellectual and scientist, 5 from NGOs, youth and student, 5
\nfrom civil servants, 5 from ethnic minorities, and 2 from
\ndisabled. The KPU will nominate these representatives, and here
\nalso the process is not clear.<\/p>\n
The general preference is for these two groups of
\nrepresentatives to comprise personalities that are not involved
\nin political parties, i.e. neither a member on the board of
\nparties nor a party candidate in the general elections. These 200
\nrepresentatives are important because they can have a significant
\ninfluence on the election of the president. It is possible that
\nmembers of these two groups will be evenly distributed between
\nthe two potential coalitions, the Indonesian Democratic Party of
\nStruggle (PDI Perjuangan)-led or the Golkar-led coalition. This
\nfurther means that the Armed Forces faction in the MPR could play
\na decisive role. The Armed Forces (TNI) have at least 38
\nrepresentatives from the DPR and possibly an additional 12 to 14
\nfrom the regions.<\/p>\n
The preparations to formulate the guidelines of state policy
\nshould not be a cumbersome affair because Indonesia is in a
\nperiod of transition and change, as was the case in 1966. It will
\nbe sufficient to produce several decrees that can easily be
\nadjusted. In addition, it is currently also being envisaged that
\nthe MPR session be held annually instead of once every five
\nyears. The traditional form of the state guideline produced under
\nthe Soeharto government is long-winded and all encompassing, and
\nno longer fitting. It would only create frustration in drafting
\nand widespread apprehension if not duly implemented.<\/p>\n
There are three main areas of reform that the state guidelines
\nwill have to address. First, to deal with the entrenched
\ncorruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN). This will involve a
\ndismantling of policies that create monopolies and provide
\nspecial treatment. Rules and regulations to ensure fair
\ncompetition should be introduced and enforced. The rule of law
\nand the independence of the judiciary, Attorney General's Office
\nand the police are critical.<\/p>\n
Second is the realm of economic reforms. This will include
\ndeveloping more credible arrangements with the International
\nMonetary Fund (IMF)\/International Bank for Reconstruction and
\nDevelopment (IMF\/IBRD) and the international community in
\nimplementing programs for economic recovery. The main challenge
\nis to formulate and implement economic development policies that
\nwill produce growth with equity and social justice.<\/p>\n
Third is in the field of political reforms in which there will
\nbe a more powerful legislative to balance the executive branch as
\nwell as an effective Supreme Court and judiciary. In addition, it
\nwill also have to formulate a new relationship between the
\ncentral government and the regions that reflect decentralization,
\ngreater autonomy and self-government for the regions.<\/p>\n
The most important task is, of course, the setting up of a new
\ngovernment. The Habibie government is considered also a
\ntransitional one and is only an extension of the Soeharto regime
\nwithout Soeharto. Therefore it lacks legitimacy and credibility.
\nThe past year only confirms this. Habibie is rejected by almost
\nall the students, the mass media, generally, and most of the
\npeople, as was shown in the defeat of Golkar, from over 73
\npercent of the votes in the 1997 elections to over 22 percent in
\n1999.<\/p>\n
The election system is complicated and is one that is neither
\nan absolutely proportional nor full-fledged district system. As a
\nresult, a coalition has to be established to form a government.
\nIf the three reformist parties, PDI Perjuangan, National
\nAwakening Party (PKB) and National Mandate Party (PAN), can form
\na strong coalition based on a common platform, in which there is
\na full partnership and decisions on basic policies are made
\ntogether, it is possible to establish a strong government. Such a
\nstrong coalition will create a bandwagon effect on the rest of
\nthe parties as well as members of the MPR. It will gain
\nwidespread public support through the media, masses and students.
\nHabibie and Golkar cannot easily undo this even if they use money
\npolitics up to the MPR session.<\/p>\n
In the end, the TNI will vote with the people. It will base
\nits decision on one important factor, namely what would restore
\nits legitimacy, authority and credibility. This will be possible
\nonly if it goes with this coalition. It has to be appreciated
\nthat TNI will make its choice known at the last moment.<\/p>\n
There are a number of prerequisites for such a coalition to be
\ncredible and able to hold together. First, Megawati must be able
\nto lead and to bring others on board on the basis of full
\npartnership. Second, Gus Dur, NU scholars and PKB must give full
\nsupport to Megawati's candidacy. This has been secured. Despite
\nsome confusing statements by their leaders, NU and PKB are firm
\nin support for Megawati.<\/p>\n
Third, is the support of PAN and Amien Rais. This depends on
\nwhether some basic items in PAN's platform will be accepted by
\nMegawati and her party. This is to secure that there will be
\nbroad support from within PAN. Some of these basic items are:
\nrecognition of the concerns of Indonesian Muslims, reform of the
\nConstitution, decentralization and a referendum in East Timor,
\nthe phasing out of the dual role of the TNI and a political or
\njudicial resolution on Soeharto's alleged abuses. It should not
\nbe difficult for the two sides to come to an agreement on this.<\/p>\n
Thus far, Megawati has not taken any initiative to form a
\npartnership with PKB and PAN. This has created great uncertainty,
\ndisillusionment and frustration among the public, but perhaps
\nespecially so among her prospective partners. It may still be
\npossible that within the next couple of days the three leaders,
\nMegawati, Gus Dur and Amien Rais, will meet and conclude an
\nagreement that will be announced to the world. Only then will the
\nIndonesian people and the international community have some
\nconfidence that the general elections will indeed produce a
\nstable government.<\/p>\n
Will other parties join this coalition? There is an idea of
\nforming a national government that will consist of all the major
\nparties. In such a government even Golkar can become a partner.
\nGolkar members that are proreform, such as Marzuki Darusman, can
\nbe brought into the Cabinet. However, this is possible only
\nwithout Habibie at the helm of Golkar. Representatives of TNI can
\nbe included in the government, but as retired servicemen and the
\nonly active soldier in the Cabinet should be the commander. The
\nTNI may eye the vice presidential post, but this will be very
\ncontroversial. To rehabilitate itself, the TNI should avoid this.<\/p>\n
The idea of a national government may have some attraction,
\nparticularly in a period of transition. However, for a real
\ndemocracy to be established, there needs to be a strong
\nopposition. It may be best, therefore, that the two established
\nstatus quo parties -- Golkar and United Development Party (PPP)
\n-- place themselves in the opposition.<\/p>\n
The writer is Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Centre
\nfor strategic and International Studies.<\/p>",
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