The latent dangers of extremism<\/p>\n
By Sidhesh Kaul<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Conditions in Indonesia are just right for
\nextremists to come goose-stepping into the theater -- high
\nunemployment, economic disparity, a divided society, a bickering
\npolity and an unstable government.<\/p>\n
Throw in a dash of restless youth and a pinch of religious
\nfervor and you have successfully cooked up a volatile dish that
\nhas the potential of replacing one form of tyranny with another.<\/p>\n
Revolutionary extremism does not take shape overnight. It goes
\nthrough several stages, as experts say. It starts with the decay
\nof the Old Regime. During this stage, the administration breaks
\ndown, taxes rise, corruption shamelessly manifests itself in all
\nwalks of life and the common folks lose their faith in the
\ngovernment.<\/p>\n
Intellectuals pontificate endlessly about idealized systems of
\ngovernance. The government maneuvers for legitimacy whilst the
\npolity undergoes polarization. This scenario sets the ground for
\na revolution.<\/p>\n
During the first stage of the revolution committees, networks,
\ncells and conspiracies are formed with the single-minded focus of
\noverthrowing the regime. Discontent amongst the masses becomes
\novert, the general mood turns rebellious and the political
\nplayers draw up battle lines.<\/p>\n
The government then calls out the troops to quell such
\nrebellion -- this move typically fails, the army losing its'
\ncourage at firing on their own and this event signals the
\nbeginning of the end for the Old Regime. The Old Regime is kicked
\nout, popular exultation breaks out and the next stage of the
\nrevolution sets in.<\/p>\n
The stage following the exit of the Old Regime is transitory
\nin nature. Leaders, having opposed the Old Regime in the past
\n(though still connected either directly or indirectly with the
\ndeposed powers), man the government typically during this stage.
\nReplacements to the Old Regime are generally moderate.<\/p>\n
The moderates initiate middle-of-the-road reforms (the typical
\nelitist struggle of balancing pretensions to change versus
\npreservation of effective power) and their energies are
\ndissipated between initiating reforms at a pace that is
\nacceptable to the general polity and hanging on to power.<\/p>\n
This stage witnesses the second wave of discontent among the
\nmasses as general impatience with the slow pace of reform rises,
\neven as it becomes increasingly difficult for the moderates to
\nplacate the expectations of the general public.<\/p>\n
During this next stage, the impatience of the populace with
\nthe perceived slow pace of the moderates and the yawningly wide
\nexpectations gap, sets the ground for extremists to step in
\nsavior-like. The extremists are better organized and focused on
\ntheir objectives than the moderates -- an aspect of great appeal
\nto the populace in general.<\/p>\n
The extremists oust the moderates and along with it everything
\n"Old" is thrown out as well. The extremists lay down canons for
\n"good" and "bad" and propagate an "idealistic society" -- by
\nforce, if necessary. The public's initial exultation on the
\nhastening of the reforms is soon replaced by fear as the
\nextremists reveal their own agenda.<\/p>\n
A reign of terror is unleashed, cloaked in high flown
\nidealistic canons and in the name of the revolution and gradually
\nmadness sets in and as Brinton elegantly says: "The revolution
\ndevours its' children".<\/p>\n
Its' only a matter of time before a "Thermidor" (named after
\nthe French Revolutionary month in which, Robespierre, the
\ndemagogue-revolutionary, himself was guillotined) sets in and
\ntypically, and history is witness to this, a dictator is born
\nonce again. The country goes back to square one.<\/p>\n
The problem with revolutionary extremism is that although they
\nset out with the intention of bringing about change but in the
\nend little is achieved. All that it does is replace one kind of
\ntyranny with another.<\/p>\n
French Kings were replaced by Napoleon. The despotic Tsars by
\nan even more despotic Stalin. The Batista Regime by Fidel Castro.
\nThe unpopular tyranny of the Shah by the unpopular tyranny of the
\npriests from Qom.<\/p>\n
Simon Bolivar, the liberator of South America, sums up his
\ndespair about the inefficacy of revolutionary extremism when he
\nsays, "He who aids a revolution ploughs the sea". In general,
\nrevolutions are disasters.<\/p>\n
Some critiques to this stand are quick to point out the
\nsuccess of the American Revolution as an important exception. In
\nmy opinion, it was not a revolution but merely a war of
\nindependence -- purely political and devoid of social issues.<\/p>\n
The French Revolution on the other hand was deeply involved in
\nsocial matters, became a bloody mess and ended in a dictatorship.
\nThe degradation of a revolution is inevitable.<\/p>\n
A glance at this model should alarm every Indonesian. What is
\nhappening in the political-socio arena seems to be following the
\nBrinton script. Let us step back in time and examine the recent
\ndevelopments in Indonesia within the framework of this model.<\/p>\n
The "New Order" regime wrote its' own death sentence. Decades
\nof corruption, cronyism and collusion had withered the backbone
\nof the Soeharto administration and coupled with the skewed
\ndevelopmental, fiscal and monetary policies (all aimed towards
\ngrowth at the expense of inequitable distribution of wealth) the
\nregime soon found its' legitimacy evaporating.<\/p>\n
The growing, but deep-seated, resentment against the
\ngovernment was crushed. With the advent of the Asian Crisis the
\nNew Order's problems got exacerbated and the misleading veneer of
\ngrowth peeled away (and the decades long chorus of applause from
\nInternational Financial Institutions gave way to a cacophony of
\nnew found outrage) with the first shower of economic catastrophe,
\nto reveal a country ravaged by poverty and economic disparity and
\nmechanisms of government that were mired in corruption and
\ninefficiency.<\/p>\n
By calling out the troops to quell the protests, Soeharto's
\nregime ignited the populace into a mad frenzy of revolt. The New
\nOrder thus laid the foundations for the first stage of the
\nrevolution.<\/p>\n
With the demise of the New Order (and if one discounts the
\nbrief appearance by B.J. Habibie as the flickering and dying
\nflames of the New Order) the country witnessed a polarization of
\nforces. True to the Brinton script, the classic study in
\nrevolutions, the moderate Abdurahman Wahid walked into the
\nPresidency, a representation of the compromise amongst the
\nbitterly divided polity.<\/p>\n
Unfortunately, the crown sits precariously on President
\nAbdurrahman Wahid's head. The pace of reforms is slow, corruption
\nis still rampant, if not worse than before and the government
\nseems to be stumbling from one scandal to another. The people are
\nimpatient for change and frustrations are slowly manifesting
\nthemselves again in the form of protests that hold the promise of
\nviolence.<\/p>\n
Indonesia, if examined through Brinton's eyes, is thus ideally
\npoised for extremism. The shaky and reluctant governance of
\nPresident Abdurrahman, in the face of socio-economic frustration,
\nis an open invitation for extremists. The recent show of strength
\nby political parties who did not hesitate to mobilize their storm
\ntroopers (during the recent spate of protests and demonstrations)
\nis evidence to the fact that Indonesian politics is very close to
\nthe brink.<\/p>\n
Strong-arm posturing is symptomatic of the erosion of the
\ngovernment's effectiveness and legitimacy. Politicians have been
\nquick to cast away secular pretensions as they harness the
\nmomentum of the masses for their own political ends.<\/p>\n
Toying with sectarian and religious polarization as a means of
\nmass mobilization is a one-way road to hell and akin to holding
\naloft a welcome banner for extremism.<\/p>\n
The recent spate of pronouncements by zealots as well as the
\ndangerous experiment being conducted by some sections of the
\npolity to use the scepter of religious fanaticism as an
\ninstrument of change is a journey that is fraught with
\nirreversible perils.<\/p>\n
The polarization of the Indonesian masses along religious
\nlines to bring about a change in the system of governance is too
\nradical an approach and would bring about irreversible and
\nretrograde changes whose effects it would take decades to undo.<\/p>\n
President Abdurrahman is left with few choices and the die is
\ncast. By hastening the pace of the reforms single-mindedly and
\nmatching the people's expectations, the President can choose to
\ndon the protective shield of the legitimacy armor that the people
\nwill bestow on him and pursue the path of democracy -- or
\npreserve the ineffective status quo and unwittingly roll out the
\nred carpet for extremists.<\/p>\n
The writer is a commentator on regional economic and political
\nissues based in Jakarta.<\/p>",
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