{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1521407,
        "msgid": "the-korean-crisis-1447893297",
        "date": "1997-12-31 00:00:00",
        "title": "The Korean crisis",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "The Korean crisis The world's financial community has come to South Korea's rescue -- again. The International Monetary Fund already rode in ostensibly to the rescue once, yet the stock market and currency continued to slide; both lost more than half their value in less than a year. Estimates of economic growth worldwide have been adjusted downward in part to account for South Korea's drag.",
        "content": "<p>The Korean crisis<\/p>\n<p>The world's financial community has come to South Korea's<br>\nrescue -- again. The International Monetary Fund already rode in<br>\nostensibly to the rescue once, yet the stock market and currency<br>\ncontinued to slide; both lost more than half their value in less<br>\nthan a year. Estimates of economic growth worldwide have been<br>\nadjusted downward in part to account for South Korea's drag.<\/p>\n<p>It remains true today that many of South Korea's fundamentals<br>\nare in good shape: an educated and motivated workforce, a high<br>\nsavings rate, an impressive industrial base. The nation's<br>\nstructural problems, particularly its outmoded form of crony<br>\ncapitalism, are very real, but a psychology of panic had set in,<br>\nwith investors reacting out of proportion to those problems.<\/p>\n<p>The South Korean government helped create that crisis of<br>\nconfidence by waiting too long to seek help and by failing to<br>\nfully disclose the extent of its difficulties, although in truth<br>\nprobably no one -- not the IMF, not the South Korean authorities<br>\n-- knew the size of South Korea's short-term external debt. Mr.<br>\nKim did not reassure anyone when he pronounced himself \"totally<br>\nflabbergasted\" by the depth of the problems.<\/p>\n<p>Now, though, the South Korean legislature seems set to approve<br>\na series of reforms, some of which it rejected only a few weeks<br>\nago; Mr. Kim has pledged to fully implement needed reforms; the<br>\nIMF, the World Bank and others are rushing in with more loans;<br>\nand private banks are prepared to roll over loans that are coming<br>\ndue soon.<\/p>\n<p>These steps, along with the underlying strength of Korea's<br>\neconomy, should be enough to restore confidence. If not, South<br>\nKorea will go deeper into default. That would have the advantage<br>\n(to South Koreans) of spreading the pain to the U.S. and other<br>\nforeign creditors.<\/p>\n<p>But it would cost South Korea for many years in damaged<br>\ncredibility and higher interest rates. In any case, there seems<br>\nto be no option now that would spare ordinary South Koreans a<br>\ngreat deal of hardship.<\/p>\n<p>-- The Washington Post<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/the-korean-crisis-1447893297",
        "image": ""
    },
    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}