The 'Islam-nationalist' divide, one obstacle to progress<\/p>\n
Mochtar Buchori, Legislator, Indonesian Democratic
\nParty of Struggle (PDI-P), Jakarta, mbuchori@indo.net.id<\/p>\n
In the Indonesian political psyche there seems to be a wall
\nthat firmly separates the \"Islamic wing\" from the \"nationalist
\nwing\", the two traditional main pillars of the political system.
\nThe rivalry between these two political communities can at times
\nbe so bitter that they look at each other not only as rivals, but
\nas adversaries.<\/p>\n
This is unhealthy. Many political leaders, now and in the
\npast, have been looking for a formula that can break this
\npolitical divide. One formula -- supposedly envisaged by first
\npresident Bung Karno -- suggests that to end this hostility two
\nhybrid groups should be created, the \"nationalistic-religious\"
\ngroup, and the \"religious-nationalistic\" group. In current
\npolitical idiom the political ideology of these two groups might
\nbe referred to as \"nationalistic Islamism\" and \"Islamic
\nnationalism\".<\/p>\n
The difference between these two ideologies would be very
\nslim, and whether they exist is also questionable. For one thing,
\nthe term \"Islamic nationalism\" itself would be an oxymoron,
\nnationalism having claimed to stand outside and above religious
\nmatters. In fact, nationalist political parties have always
\nclaimed that they are the political home for Indonesians from all
\nreligious creeds.<\/p>\n
Is it realistic to expect that one day such groups will
\nemerge? Thus far this dream has not materialized. However,
\ndevelopments in the last 10 years or so have signaled shifts
\nwithin both camps.<\/p>\n
The rise of the \"liberal Islam\" movement within the Islamic
\ncamp, and the rise in adherence to Islamic religious observance
\namong hard-core nationalists are signs of this shift. Admittedly
\nthey are weak signs, but nonetheless departures from political
\northodoxies, and readiness for rapprochement.<\/p>\n
Even though it is impossible to say at the moment whether this
\ndream of rapprochement would ever come true, it is still possible
\nto say whether the conditions that had caused the discord had
\nchanged; and whether these changes indicate converging or
\ndiverging trends.<\/p>\n
One important cause of this Islam-nationalist discord was
\neducation. There was a glaring contrast between the education of
\nIslamic leaders and that of Nationalist leaders. This contrast
\nlay primarily in the cultural orientation that the two
\neducational systems had cultivated in their students.<\/p>\n
Whereas the Koranic education introduced Islamic leaders
\nsolely to an Islamic orientation of life, the basically secular
\neducation of nationalist leaders provided them with a repertoire
\nof knowledge anchored in Western culture. Thus whereas subjects
\nlike natural sciences and Western languages were alien to the
\nIslamic leaders of that time, the nationalist leaders were
\nignorant about ideals of society based on Islam.<\/p>\n
The result of this educational dichotomy was that the groups
\nof leaders could not communicate effectively about matters
\naffecting respective followers. The social, economic and cultural
\nfactors among the grass roots of each group further separated
\nthem. The Islamic and nationalist blocs were thus divided both at
\nthe bottom and at the top.<\/p>\n
After 1950 the educational situation changed, if only
\nmarginally. But the basics are still more or less the same.
\nIslamic educational institutions like the madrasah and pesantren
\nhave been modifying themselves with regard to organizational
\nformat and method of instruction, but instruction in Islamic
\ntheology is still the dominant element.<\/p>\n
It is still very difficult to persuade these institutions to
\nintroduce mathematics and natural sciences into many of these
\ninstitutions. Their classic attitude has been that science
\neducation would reduce the faith of their students.<\/p>\n
Yet suspicion and dislike of everything Western is no longer
\nas strong as they used to be. The State Academy of Islamic
\nStudies (IAIN) is living evidence of this evolution. The question
\nis whether the new Islamic intellectuals are willing to assume a
\npolitical role or whether they would rather stay away from
\npolitics, and live as academics.<\/p>\n
On the nationalist side, despite changes in academic quality
\nand cultural orientation, the basic pattern of education is also
\nthe same.<\/p>\n
A decline in education quality have made students less
\ninclined to boast about achievements. The new cultural
\norientation in schools has made them conscious of their own
\ncultural identity, and less knowledgeable about Western culture.
\nThe ultimate impact of this change is that the feeling of
\nsuperiority toward people brought up within the Islamic education
\nsystem has been very much reduced.<\/p>\n
However, the mental wall that divides the Islamic and
\nnationalist communities still stands firm, especially among older
\npolitical leaders. They can argue for days about symbolism, but
\nnot about substance. This is obviously an unsettling obstacle for
\nefforts toward national progress.<\/p>\n
Where do we go from here? We cannot stop half way in
\neducational reform. Further reform must be based upon a new
\nparadigm, cultural and political, which should take into account
\nour current national and global realities.<\/p>\n
What we must build is a new Indonesia that can live in harmony
\nwith the rest of the world, and is part of the global
\ncivilization.<\/p>",
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