{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1129691,
        "msgid": "the-institutionalization-of-state-violence-after-1965-1447893297",
        "date": "2005-09-30 00:00:00",
        "title": "The institutionalization of state violence after 1965",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "The institutionalization of state violence after 1965 Asvi Warman Adam, Jakarta Prof. Henk Schulte Nordholt maintains that in Indonesia's history, the intensity of violence increases during the transition of power, the reinforcement of power, and also amid economic woes. This is exactly what happened throughout the period of the New Order. The root of violence can be traced to the colonial era.",
        "content": "<p>The institutionalization of state violence after 1965<\/p>\n<p>Asvi Warman Adam, Jakarta<\/p>\n<p>Prof. Henk Schulte Nordholt maintains that in Indonesia's<br>\nhistory, the intensity of violence increases during the<br>\ntransition of power, the reinforcement of power, and also amid<br>\neconomic woes. This is exactly what happened throughout the<br>\nperiod of the New Order.<\/p>\n<p>The root of violence can be traced to the colonial era. While<br>\nhistory textbooks in Indonesia describe the early 20th century as<br>\nthe period of implementation of the Dutch ethical policy in this<br>\narchipelago, at the same time successive military expeditions<br>\nwere in fact dispatched to Aceh, Lombok, Central and South<br>\nSumatra, Borneo, Aceh, Central and South Sulawesi, Seram, Flores,<br>\nTimor, Bali and again Aceh. Some 75,000 people or 15 percent of<br>\nthe Acehnese population were killed by Dutch colonial troops.<\/p>\n<p>Following Indonesia's independence, various rebellions broke<br>\nout in the country with a high death toll, though they were<br>\neventually stamped out. This was not the case with the Sept. 30,<br>\n1965 movement (G30S) coup attempt, which set off the longest<br>\nconflict after independence. That year seems unending. Despite<br>\nthe passage of 40 years, the impact of this incident lingers,<br>\nleaving deep and lasting repercussions up to the present.<\/p>\n<p>Communists and Communism became the enemy constantly recycled<br>\nby the New Order or especially the New Order military. This<br>\ncountry turned into the most anti-Communist nation that probably<br>\never existed. The Nazis exterminated millions of Jewish people in<br>\ngas chambers at one juncture in history. But in Indonesia the<br>\ntorture inflicted on Communists or those accused of being ones<br>\nlasted for decades, making them suffer physical pain followed by<br>\nmental torment.<\/p>\n<p>I share the view of Australian historian Robert Cribb that we<br>\ncould not have guaranteed the absence of brutality if the<br>\nCommunists had risen to power. But I wish to point out that the<br>\nslaughter of 500,000 people in 1965 was the gravest tragedy of<br>\nhumanity in Indonesia's history.<\/p>\n<p>The 1965 incident also served as a watershed, marking major<br>\nchanges in economic, political and cultural areas. The free-and-<br>\nactive, non-aligned foreign policy became pro-American and pro-<br>\nwestern. The self-supporting economy shifted to a market economy<br>\nrelying on capital and external loans. The entire cultural<br>\npotential was mustered to ensure successful development, with no<br>\nmore polemics or criticism. Unlike the changes occurring in other<br>\nperiods, in 1965 they were so simultaneous that their<br>\nreverberations were more alarming.<\/p>\n<p>Below is the process and modes of institutionalization of<br>\nstate violence during the New Order era.<\/p>\n<p>The institute formed after the outbreak of G30S had unlimited<br>\npower. Kopkamtib (Operational Command for the Restoration of<br>\nSecurity and Order) seized and interrogated people considered<br>\ndangerous to the government. It also instructed the attorney<br>\ngeneral to banish B-category political detainees to Buru Island<br>\n(1969-1979).<\/p>\n<p>These detainees' involvement in G30S was suspected but there<br>\nwas not sufficient evidence to bring them to court. Kopkamtib<br>\ndecided whether somebody was \"environmentally clean\" (with no<br>\nfamily members directly or indirectly implicated in G30S) through<br>\nspecial screening in the selection of civil servants and armed<br>\nforces candidates, or periodical screening in the framework of<br>\nrank\/office promotion of servicemen and civil servants.<\/p>\n<p>Under Admiral Sudomo, the agency prohibiting the public from<br>\nundertaking any activity or publishing anything seen by the<br>\ngovernment as a potential source of conflict relating to the key<br>\nareas of ethnicity, religion, race and societal relations, a<br>\nconcept known as SARA. At the end of the New Order, this body<br>\nchanged into the Coordinating Agency to Support the Strengthening<br>\nof National Stability (Bakorstranas), which was dissolved by then<br>\npresident Abdurrahman Wahid.<\/p>\n<p>The 1965 incident also led to a diplomatic freeze with the<br>\nPeople's Republic of China. Everything suggestive of China was<br>\nsuspect and banned. Parcels of magazines with Chinese characters<br>\nwere examined by immigration personnel; religious and socio-<br>\ncultural activities were considerable restricted if not<br>\nprohibited. In the various social disturbances arising under the<br>\nNew Order regime, the Chinese often became a target of mass fury.<\/p>\n<p>The policy of giving Indonesian names to or renaming citizens<br>\nof Chinese descent is worth noting. It was a form of oppression<br>\nthat considerably affected individuals in a community. A name has<br>\nits meaning and members of society treat each other also<br>\naccording to their names as they indicate the status and position<br>\nof families.<\/p>\n<p>In 1959 the law of land reform was enforced, which as a whole<br>\nwas not so radical. But it also contained provisions on<br>\nproduction sharing between farm workers and owners, which was<br>\nvery favorable to laborers and could overturn the rural social<br>\norder. While earlier land owners got 60 percent and laborers 40<br>\npercent of harvests, the law ruled otherwise.<\/p>\n<p>Starting from 1962\/63, the Indonesian Farmers Union and the<br>\nIndonesian Communist Party (PKI) launched \"unilateral actions\"<br>\nagainst village evils, including landlords, rural authorities and<br>\nloan sharks. Protests, land takeovers and village-head overthrows<br>\nprevailed. Insurgencies in Java's villages were far more<br>\nwidespread and intense because poor masses were involved. Some of<br>\ntheir victims were devout Muslims and clerics. The confused and<br>\nuncontrolled situation prompted people to arm or protect<br>\nthemselves. The G30S coup attempt took place against this<br>\nbackdrop.<\/p>\n<p>In the New Order era, the government supported by the security<br>\napparatus could easily seize people's land for and in the name of<br>\ndevelopment.<\/p>\n<p>The 1965 conflict was purposely maintained by the New Order<br>\nregime to perpetuate its power. One of the characteristics of the<br>\n1965 incident was the utilization of history to maintain<br>\nconflicts.<\/p>\n<p>The New Order's orchestration of history took different forms,<br>\nsuch as:<\/p>\n<p>The Indonesian National History (SNI) school textbooks clearly<br>\nmentioned Sukarno's involvement in the Sept. 30 coup attempt.<\/p>\n<p>Labor Day was annulled and the June 1 Pancasila (state<br>\nphilosophy) anniversary was replaced by the Oct. 1 Pancasila<br>\nSanctity Day, which had nothing to do with Pancasila. The killing<br>\nof six generals was commemorated by ignoring the massacre of<br>\n500,000 people that happened thereafter.<\/p>\n<p>Until now, none of Soeharto's successors, including Sukarno's<br>\nown daughter, Megawati Soekarnoputri, have been able or willing<br>\nto find the truth behind the Sept. 30 coup attempt. It will<br>\nremain one of the darkest chapters in the nation's history.<\/p>\n<p>The writer is research professor at the Indonesian Institute<br>\nof Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/the-institutionalization-of-state-violence-after-1965-1447893297",
        "image": ""
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    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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